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Source: www.state.gov
James A. Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Testimony before the House International Relations Committee
Washington, DC
June 2, 2004
Mr. Chairman, members of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, thank you for the invitation to testify on the Administration's strategy for East Asia and the Pacific. I welcome this opportunity because we have a good, positive story to tell in this dynamic and ever-changing region.
First, let me thank Chairman Leach for his service in leading the American people's delegation to the May 20 inauguration of President Chen of Taiwan. Your longstanding interest in Taiwan underscores the respect we feel for the people of Taiwan, their democracy and our commitment to working with the new Chen Administration. And, your presence delivered a clear and unambiguous signal to Taiwan and the P.R.C. on the importance of reducing tensions across the Taiwan Strait.
It is not my intention today to speak at length on our unofficial relations with Taiwan because it was covered extensively in my April 21 testimony to the full Committee. I will say only that we welcome the inaugural address of President Chen Shui-bian. By making clear his administration's commitment not to take unilateral steps that would change the status quo and underscoring its openness to seeking accord with Beijing, President Chen is helping to restore dialogue across the Taiwan Strait.
Mr. Chairman, East Asia is riding a wave of favorable trends and none is more important than the region-wide strengthening of democracy.
The remarkable April 15 elections in the Republic of Korea swept into the National Assembly a number of younger politicians representing a new generation of voters. On April 5, Indonesians went to the polls for Parliamentary elections, which were exceptionally well conducted given the logistical difficulties in holding elections in that huge archipelago nation and were free and fair.
We also congratulate the Philippines on the conduct of their relatively peaceful elections last month. Taiwan's elections in March confirmed its young but vibrant democracy and Malaysia's elections also took place smoothly and strengthened new Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi.
In months to come, East Asians can look forward to a first-ever direct Presidential election in Indonesia as well as elections in Mongolia, Malaysia, Japan, Thailand, Singapore, Australia, and even Hong Kong, for half of the Legislative Council seats. No serious observer can doubt that democracy has truly taken root in East Asia and is flourishing.
A second trend that I would like to highlight is the widespread rejection of radical Islam in Southeast Asia. Although we have legitimate concerns about terrorism and are working hard with governments in the region to combat it, the fact is that the terrorists are relatively few in number and radical Islam appeals to a very small segment of society.
The region benefits from, and the U. S. deeply respects a longstanding tradition of tolerance, pluralism, and religious moderation. If we overlook that tradition, we are misreading the situation and the desire of the majority for the peaceful resolution of religious and political differences.
Throughout the region, there is growing prosperity, strong GDP growth in almost every economy, and a healthy movement toward greater economic openness and lower trade barriers.
We see expanding regional cooperation and integration in East Asia. This is occurring not only through traditional fora such as ASEAN, the ASEAN Regional Forum security dialogue, and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum but also in new mechanisms, such as the Six-Party Talks. These talks were created for a specific goal, to address and to eliminate North Korea's nuclear weapons programs, but conceivably could form the basis for a permanent Northeast Asia forum at some point in the future.
Another factor is that globalization and economic development has made a remarkable difference in the lives of East Asians. The World Bank reports that in China alone, 400 million fewer people are in extreme poverty than 20 years ago. Increased trade and investment flows have lifted millions of East Asians to higher standards of living, encouraged economic interdependence, and convinced East Asian nations to look beyond their borders for markets, investment capital, higher education, and ideas.
Finally, this is an area largely at peace. Although there are a handful of local separatist conflicts and the potential remains for large-scale conflict in the Korean Peninsula and in the Taiwan Straits, the major states of the region are cooperating with one another and building stronger regional ties.
Together, these trends are in sync with U.S. interests and values and that fact make us optimistic for the future. We are convinced that the region's most intractable issues -- including the threat of terrorism as well as North Korea and the Taiwan Straits -- can be resolved peacefully in ways consistent with these trends.
We are working to achieve policy goals with the active assistance and coordination of our alliance partners. Our alliances in East Asia are stronger and deeper than ever.
Our five traditional allies -- Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, Australia, and Thailand -- are our strategic partners in and beyond the region. We share with them a common perspective on a steadily increasing range of interests.
With the governments of Japan and South Korea, we are proceeding apace ahead with negotiations for modernizing and adjusting our military force posture in those countries. In this endeavor, there has been exemplary cooperation between the Departments of State and Defense, which will co-chair these discussions.
Driven in large part by the forces of globalization, Japan is in the midst of its greatest social and economic transformation since the end of World War II -- a change that has important consequences for the U.S.-Japan Alliance and the world. Japan continues to play a positive role in East Asia, and its bold participation in coalition activities in Afghanistan and Iraq underscores Japan's determination to become more active elsewhere in coordination with the United States and other allies.
The Japanese Diet passed historic, passionately debated legislation to allow its Self-Defense Forces to be deployed abroad. Japan's decision to deploy approximately 1,000 Self Defense Forces to Iraq and the surrounding area, where they provide humanitarian and reconstruction assistance and airlift support, and its support for the global war on terror has come to symbolize Japan's active and outward-looking foreign policy under Prime Minister Koizumi.
The deployment complements Japan's many other actions on behalf of the Iraqi people, which include the Madrid Conference pledge of $5 billion over 4 years, and its commitment to solving the issue of Iraq's crippling debt burden. Japan continues to provide fuel, free of charge, to support the Operation Enduring Freedom interdiction efforts and has played a key role in the high-priority task of restoring Afghanistan's highway system. Japan's economy is on the rebound and we hope it can be sustained, leading to renewed growth and a continuation of vigorous foreign policy in support of our commonly held objectives.
We are also very pleased at the sustained support of the Roh Administration for the war on terror and its deployment of a 3,000 man contingent of South Korean troops to Iraq. The Republic of Korea will be the third-largest troop contributor to coalition forces, after the U.S. and U.K. This is a welcome development from a steadfast ally, a major trading partner, and a serious contributor to regional and global stability.
The South Korean Government has made clear that it understands the reasons for the deployment of a brigade of U.S. troops from the Second Infantry Division in South Korea to Iraq, accepts it as a needed measure, and is confident that this deployment poses no threat to deterrence on the Korean Peninsula. The situation on the ground in Iraq has changed rapidly, and this has required nimble planning and fast responses by our military.
Long an ally of the United States, since 9/11 the Philippines has emerged as a valued and supportive partner, sharing our policy goals, and sending its own men and women to help in Iraq and to restore order in other parts of the world. And the United States has reciprocated by providing the Philippine military with counterterrorism training to help put down violence and terrorism in its own back yard.
In fact, in a reflection of Asia's increasing acceptance of broader responsibilities, each of our allies -- and Australia and Thailand rate special mention -- has made important contributions to efforts to stabilize Iraq and Afghanistan -- whether it be with overseas development assistance, technical and engineering support, or combat troops. Our allies have proven their dedication not only in their material support, which has been extensive, but tragically in human lives lost.
Countries that are not de jure allies can also be effective partners in building regional security and we are strengthening those relationships too. Most notably, we are negotiating with Singapore to reach a Strategic Framework Agreement, which will expand our defense cooperation against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This is a tangible outgrowth of President Bush's October 2003 visit to Singapore.
Enriching but complicating our sense of optimism is our revitalized relationship with China. China will have an important role in shaping the future of Asia even though it is not clear yet what the political, economic, and social landscape of Asia will ultimately be, say, 50 years from now.
China is now our third-largest trading partner with total trade in 2003 of more than $180 billion and our fastest-growing export market with exports increasing nearly 40% in the first quarter of 2004. Of course, exports to us from China continue to far exceed our exports, yet China has a worldwide trade deficit.
As China's economy continues to grow -- at a staggering rate of nearly 10% in the first quarter -- there are increased opportunities for American commercial interests. That growth is also matched by considerable concern that China's huge appetite for certain commodities and energy is already creating shortages and price pressure in global markets. China is now the world's second-largest consumer of oil, after the United States, and accounted for 35% of the global rise in oil demand in 2003. Clearly, China trade is changing patterns of consumption and production of goods around the world, and its leaders have a major task if they are to avoid overheating the economy.
China's enormous stake in maintaining access to the U.S. and regional markets and preserving the international trading regime has had an impact on its foreign and domestic policies. During the April meeting of the Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade, we were able to make some important progress on trade issues with China in the areas of intellectual property rights, wireless encryption standards, and trading rights and distribution services.
We could easily devote several hearings to our complex relationship with China, including such critical issues as non-proliferation, WTO compliance, and our efforts to promote democracy, legal reform, and human rights.
In the key area of security, by being a strong and reliable partner on the counter-terrorism front and an active participant in the Six-Party Talks, China has proven that where its interests coincide with ours, it can be extraordinary helpful in enhancing regional stability. It also shows promise that it is prepared to take on global responsibilities.
In other areas, China is challenging the status quo aggressively. It is expanding its influence in Southeast Asia by enhancing its diplomatic representation, increasing foreign assistance, and signing new bilateral and regional agreements.
I note that a recent exchange of senior official visitors between China and Cambodia resulted in 25 bilateral agreements. They range from agreements to conduct feasibility studies for a hydropower plant to grant and loan agreements covering textile and cement plants, tourism, highway construction, and the development of a golf club. These agreements involve relatively little in financial terms, but they serve notice of how China is using its newly won economic power to expand its presence and political influence among its southern neighbors. While we welcome constructive engagement by China in the Asia-Pacific region, we need to ensure that the United States remains fully engaged with the nations of Southeast Asia.
Mr. Chairman, the trends which are present in East Asia are not abstract ideas or academic concepts. They are promoting tangible and dramatic changes in personal lives and public policy. My visit to Indonesia, Vietnam, and Hong Kong last month impressed me again that this is a time of transition in East Asia.
In Jakarta last month, the excitement over the upcoming July 5 Presidential election was palpable. The first direct election for the Presidency in Indonesia represents a remarkable step forward in the development of that nation's democratic institutions. A president accountable to the Indonesian electorate will be able to respond more effectively to the country's needs. The outcome of the election could have powerful implications because a strong and thriving Indonesian democracy would prove that democracy and Islam are not incompatible.
In Yogyakarta, where I led the U.S. delegation to the ARF Senior Officials Meeting last month, I had a chance to visit both Hindu and Buddhist temples. They exist peacefully and proudly among mosques of the predominant Muslim religion, and with Christian churches visible too. I was struck by the tolerance exhibited by the Muslim mainstream community in Indonesia, the country with the world's largest Muslim population.
On the same trip I also participated in a political dialogue with senior Vietnamese officials in Hanoi and visited Ho Chi Minh City for the first time in almost 30 years. There have been extraordinary changes and I was impressed by the emerging prosperity and entrepreneurial spirit of the Vietnamese people and the interest of the government of Vietnam to pursue closer ties with the United States.
We are moving forward in our economic cooperation with Vietnam, with the implementation of a bilateral trade agreement that has led to a striking increase in trade. Such an increase brings with it inevitable frictions, which we are working to resolve. We continue to receive cooperation from the Vietnamese on POW/MIA accounting and I note that our military-to-military ties have also expanded. We see a positive trend in our joint cooperation in counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism efforts. The most significant area of concern where we have not seen the positive progress we would like to see is human rights.
The analogy that comes to mind about U.S.-Vietnamese relations is that of a river. The current of our bilateral relations is strong, deep, and moving well. Human rights and religious freedom issues are the eddies and back currents that are holding up progress. We continue to address these concerns through increasingly frank discussions as we welcome the positive developments of our relations. When I met with the Deputy Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister, I emphasized that respect for human rights is in Vietnam's best interest, not just to respond to international criticism, but for the Vietnamese people to reach their potential.
Although I was only briefly in Hong Kong on this trip, I have passed through it many times. I understand the disappointment that many people feel about Beijing's decision on April 26 to delay movement toward representative government through direct elections and universal suffrage. I applaud the efforts of Hong Kongers to express their concerns about China's efforts to silence individuals whose views are at variance with those coming out of Beijing.
In my view, Beijing's April 26 decision reflects a lack of understanding about the sophistication and patriotism of the Hong Kong electorate. The one country, two system framework may be being undermined. The people of Hong Kong understand that a free press, an educated citizenry, and rule of law -- the foundations of representative government long present in Hong Kong -- have been core features of Hong Kong's civil society. These also are what give international investors and businesses confidence in Hong Kong's future.
The U.S. is committed to supporting Hong Kong's autonomy and the protection of its civil liberties, and we urge the Hong Kong Government -- as I told Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa during our meeting on May 16 -- to be responsive to the aspirations of the Hong Kong people. By ignoring those aspirations, he and the Beijing government will erode the very foundations that can continue to make Hong Kong great. We will watch with interest the peaceful demonstrations expected this week, the 15th anniversary of Tienanmen.
At the top of our list of policy priorities is waging the war against terror, a threat that respects no national borders, but is most dangerous in Southeast Asia. Because it is transnational, terror must be addressed through regional cooperation, which we have made the focus of our efforts.
The region's governments have put hundreds of terrorists behind bars, but there is still much more to be done to thwart future attempts to commit terrorist attacks, which seem all but certain to occur.
We are addressing terrorism through a combination of careful intelligence liaison, police work, and targeted foreign assistance aimed at enhancing counterterrorism capacity. A case in point is Indonesia where we are assisting the National Police in their creation and training of a Counterterrorism Task Force. Members of the Task Force are already participating in the investigation of terrorist crimes such as last year's Marriott Hotel bombing in Jakarta.
We have good reason to believe that terrorists may turn to soft targets, including vulnerable sea lanes through which significant amounts of shipping and trade pass. We are now examining ways to enhance maritime security and discussing ideas about how a partnership of interested regional nations might identify, monitor, and address transnational maritime threats under existing international and domestic laws.
Although our thinking will evolve as consultations continue with regional states, a collective effort should empower each participating nation with the timely information and capabilities it needs to act against maritime threats in its own territorial seas. Then each nation would be able to decide for itself what response, if any, it would take in its own waters. How the U.S. can help will be informed by the views of Southeast Asian states but could certainly include technology, training, and other capacity building assistance.
Under the ARF umbrella, we are planning to co-host with Indonesia and Malaysia a maritime security workshop in September 2004 in Kuala Lumpur to build capacity and to gain a more comprehensive view of the maritime environment and address potential problems.
In APEC we are working to improve travel and transportation security, promote international non-proliferation standards, strengthen export controls, and help APEC members meet international ship and port facility safety (ISPS) code required by the International Maritime Organization.
Beyond terrorism and its various manifestations, we are confronted by a number of dangerous threats to stability and prosperity in East Asia. These include North Korea's nuclear weapons program, non-proliferation, a host of transnational issues and, in several countries, the persistence of authoritarian regimes and serious human rights problems.
The Six-Party Talks process is well established and even those countries in the region not directly involved in the talks are highly supportive of this process. The two plenary sessions, in August 2003 and February 2004 laid out clearly the basic principle of comprehensive denuclearization -- what we call "CVID," complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement; indeed the North Koreans themselves have publicly and in the talks stated that their ultimate aim is denuclearization.
The mid-May working group sessions in Beijing gave each party to the talks a chance to clarify its positions. We look forward to an early third session of the plenary, perhaps preceded by another meeting of the working group. In the May working group session, the parties began exploring the structure of a resolution -- a structure that would involve concrete actions by North Korea with corresponding measures taken by other parties in a coordinated fashion. At the next working group and plenary round we hope to build on this emerging understanding of a possible resolution.
The Libyan experience has shown us that a nation can turn around its policies and maintain its integrity and independence. North Korea should examine this approach carefully.
We have been fully supportive of Prime Minister Koizumi's visit to Pyongyang. We are pleased that five abductee family members were allowed to go to Japan and that the Prime Minister reinforced the CVID message in his face-to-face discussions with D.P.R.K. leader Kim Jong-Il. Japan has kept the abductee issue on the agenda with the D.P.R.K. even as they continue to press for denuclearization. Similarly, we maintain our human rights concerns with North Korea as part of our broad agenda for discussions. Our bilateral cooperation with Japan and trilateral cooperation with Japan and South Korea continue to anchor our approach to the Six-Party Talks.
To address non-proliferation concerns, we are working towards implementing a global initiative, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which seeks to enhance cooperation and coordination among countries around the world to stop illicit proliferation-related trafficking. While not directed at North Korea, North Korea is affected by PSI because it is the world's leading proliferator of missiles and missile technology. It is important to underscore that PSI activities are voluntary and fully consistent with national legal authorities and international law.
To address trade in counterfeit currency and illicit narcotics, we are developing an Illicit Activities Initiative in cooperation with a number of other nations. With our support, Japan has taken the lead in providing training on export controls and providing outreach on these initiatives.
An obvious exception to the positive trends I mentioned earlier, Burma stands out as the one military dictatorship remaining in ASEAN. By proceeding with a National Convention without the participation of key opposition groups, leaving Aung San Suu Kyi and other democracy leaders under detention, and not addressing its deplorable human rights record, Burma has caused consternation in the region. Clearly, a convention that does not include all elements of Burmese society cannot be truly representative of the peoples of Burma and lacks the legitimacy needed to make any real progress toward democracy or national reconciliation.
In fact, a year after the May 30, 2003, attack on Aung San Suu Kyi, the people of Burma are no closer to reconciliation and accountability for human rights abuses. We urge the Burmese junta to release all political prisoners. We are steadfast supporters of the National League of Democracy. And, we believe the junta should allow the NLD to reopen its offices and to participate in a genuine and transparent dialogue.
Because our restrictions on Burmese imports represent a clear and forceful expression of our disapproval of developments in Burma, we support their extension. They are key components in our policy to bring democracy and human rights to Burma and we will maintain our strong stance until we see tangible progress in both these areas.
I should note that Thailand also faces difficulties with a rise in violent incidents since the beginning of the year in its southern, Muslim-dominated provinces. These have included arson attacks on schools, bombings, and killings of police and other officials as well as a series of assaults on police stations that resulted in over a hundred deaths.
There appear to have been multiple causes of these incidents, including the inattention of the government to recent social and political developments in the southern provinces. The Thai Prime Minister has toured the area and Thai authorities are reviewing the situation carefully, increasing security, and taking steps to address the problem. We are confident that they will arrive at a solution.
Finally, you will note that I have referred frequently to regional organizations throughout this testimony. The continuing development of these organizations is essential to East Asia. They are the foundations of our regional cooperation on transnational crime, trafficking in persons, contagious diseases, environmental protection, as well as international terror.
The purpose of my visit to Indonesia in May was to lead the U.S. delegation to the ARF Senior Officials Meeting. ARF is becoming an increasingly effective forum to exchange views and to build regional security cooperation. It has taken on new responsibilities in areas such as transport security, where it was not engaged just a few years ago.
With our active participation, ARF has in the last 2 years produced four statements encouraging states to take concrete actions, on their own or multilaterally, in the war on terror, on non-proliferation, and on transnational crime. ARF may still be a "forum," but it is increasingly useful to promote collective action. In July, the ARF Ministers will also approve the strengthening of ARF as an institution by establishing a permanent, though initially small, Secretariat.
With the proliferation of regional organizations in the Asia-Pacific region recently, several of which exclude the United States, we need to strengthen the organizations in which we are a member, such as the ARF, ASEAN, and APEC.
We are moving forward aggressively to implement Secretary Powell's ASEAN Cooperation Plan, which seeks to strengthen U.S. relations with ASEAN and to enhance cooperation on a broad range of key transnational issues, from protection of intellectual property to disaster management to counter-terrorism.
We are also working to implement the President's Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative (EAI) which offers the prospect of FTAs between the U.S. and ASEAN countries that are committed to openness and reform. Singapore is the first beneficiary of a FTA under the EAI, and we will begin negotiations with Thailand at the end of the month. In addition, we have deepened our trade dialogues with countries like Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Brunei, and Vietnam as part of AEI. We also support Normal Trade Relations for Laos. Trade has been a powerful tool for positive change elsewhere in East Asia and can be a force for progress in Laos as well.
In APEC, because economic development and security complement one another, we are pursuing both agendas simultaneously. We want APEC to push for trade liberalization by re-energizing the WTO Doha Development Agenda, which seeks increased market access for agriculture, manufactured goods, and services; an end to agricultural export subsidies; progress in services negotiations; and expanded trade facilitation.
Last year, in its Bangkok meeting, the 21 leaders of APEC agreed to focus on ensuring personal security as well as on promoting the economic prosperity. They agreed to dismantle terrorist groups, eliminate the danger of WMD, and confront other security threats. For 2004, it is important that the leaders carry through on their commitment by improving port security, adhering to nonproliferation regimes, strengthening export controls, and developing a MANPADS action plan.
In sum, we have a full and active policy agenda in the East Asia and Pacific region as it moves in overdrive into the future. "Nothing may be permanent except change" in East Asia but we are encouraged by the progress we have seen in the region and optimistic that our efforts will be successful.
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