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[106 Senate Hearings]
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[DOCID: f:60900.wais]

S. Hrg. 106-230

S. 693: THE TAIWAN SECURITY ENHANCEMENT ACT

Hearing
before the
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

AUGUST 4, 1999

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1999

60-900 CC

                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

                 JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana            JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia              PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska                CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon              JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota                 RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas                PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming                BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri              ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
BILL FRIST, Tennessee
                   Stephen E. Beigun, Staff Director
                 Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director

                                  (ii)

Contents

Statement of Hon. Max S. Baucus, U.S. Senator from Montana
Prepared Statement of Senator Max Baucus
Prepared Statement of Senator Craig Thomas
Statement of Stanley O. Roth, Assistant Secretary of State For East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State
Prepared Statement of Hon. Stanley O. Roth
-- Recent Events
-- Comments on "The Taiwan Security Enhancement Act"
-- Conclusion: A Serious Decision
Statement of Kurt Campbell, Ph.D., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of Defense
Prepared Statement of Dr. Kurt Campbell
-- U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan
-- The Taiwan Security Enhancement Act
-- U.S.-PRC Relations and Taiwan Security
Statement of Richard V. Allen, Allen & Company, Washington, DC
Prepared Statement of Richard V. Allen
Statement of Caspar W. Weinberger, Chairman, Forbes, Inc., Washington, DC
Statement of David M. Lampton, Ph.D., Director, Chinese Studies, Johns Hopkins-SAIS and the Nixon Center, Washington, DC
Prepared Statement of David M. Lampton: Enhancing Global, Regional, and Taiwan Security for the Twenty-First Century
Statement of R. James Woolsey, Shea & Gardner, Washington, DC
APPENDIX
Responses of Assistant Secretary Stanley O. Roth to Question Submitted for the Record
Responses of Deputy Assistant Secretary Kurt Campbell to Questions Submitted for the Record
Dynamic Elements in the Cross-Straits Military Balance, by Richard D. Fisher, Jr.
-- Summary
-- Introduction
-- Dynamic Element #1: Missiles and Space
-- New PLA Ballistic and Cruise Missiles
-- Anti-Missile, Anti-Satellite, and Space Information Systems
-- Taiwan's Missile Dilemma: Defense and Deterrence?
-- Dynamic Element #2: Information Warfare
-- Taiwan's Information Warfare Response
-- Dynamic Element #3: Air Force Modernization
-- Taiwan's Challenge: Maintaining Its Aerial Edge
-- Dynamic Element #4: Naval Modernization
-- Taiwan's Naval Challenge
-- Dynamic Element #5: Posture of the United States
-- The Truth About Taiwan
-- Statement by Ronald Reagan upon Ambassador George Bush's Return From
-- Guiding Principles for the Far East

S. 693: THE TAIWAN SECURITY ENHANCEMENT ACT

AUGUST 4, 1999

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations

Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:35 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jesse Helms (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Helms, Coverdell, Thomas, Biden, and Kerry.

The Chairman. The committee will come to order.

We have an array of distinguished witnesses today, a full schedule. And on behalf of the committee, I extend our welcome to each and every one of them.

The first being Senator Max Baucus, who is known to all of us, as is Assistant Secretary Roth, Deputy Assistant Secretary Campbell, and our private panelists. We are genuinely grateful to all of you for coming today.

Specifically, our purpose is to examine S. 693, the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act, which Senator Torricelli and I introduced sometime earlier this year. I think it was in March. This legislation will ensure that Taiwan will have essential self-defense capabilities. And to accomplish that, we propose to bolster the process for defense sales to Taiwan, and help Taiwan achieve and maintain an adequate military readiness.

Now, the need to enhance our defense relationship with Taiwan, I think, is obvious. First, the reunification of Taiwan has become an increasingly high agitation issue for Beijing now that they have reabsorbed Hong Kong and, as of this coming December, Macau.

Second, Beijing constantly demonstrates a willingness to use intimidation to achieve its goals. China fired missiles off of Taiwan's coast in 1995 and 1996, and is now engaged in a massive missile buildup opposite Taiwan, according to the February 1999 Pentagon report to Congress. Beijing is also undergoing a multifaceted military buildup, which includes increased emphasis on logistical improvements for a Taiwan scenario. And if one adds to this buildup the ugly, threatening rhetoric aimed at Taiwan by the highest levels of the Chinese Government, one can see the very real threat that Taiwan may face.

Third, part of Beijing's strategy is to continue its pressure on the United States to limit or cease arms sales to Taiwan. And this had the effect at various times on successive administrations in this country. Of course, it was the Reagan administration that signed the regrettable 1982 communique, which set a ceiling on arms sales to Taiwan, and promised China that we would gradually reduce these sales.

Over the years, the United States has refused to sell Taiwan needed defense items, such as submarines and missiles, solely to assuage China. Just 2 weeks ago, the Clinton administration withheld several arms sales notifications to Congress, and is reported to be considering further such measures in an obvious attempt to curry favor with Beijing and punish Taiwan for President Lee's recent remarks on Taiwan's status.

And, last, our friends in Taiwan have military capabilities that have operated in virtual isolation for more than 20 years. Taiwan's military does not conduct joint exercises with the U.S. military, and is not even able to observe many of our exercises. No U.S. officers above the rank of colonel or Navy captain can go to Taiwan. And those who do are limited in the things they can do and say. This has certainly had a corrosive effect on Taiwan's military preparedness at exactly the time Taiwan faces a growing military threat from China.

So, United States strategic interests, United States law, and United States moral values dictate, it seems to me, that we assist our long-time friends in Taiwan in meeting these challenges. And that is why Senator Torricelli and I have introduced this bill.

I look forward to hearing from our distinguished witnesses, but, first, I look forward to hearing from Senator Biden.

Senator Biden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think that we occasionally need an important bill like this to both attract the caliber of witnesses you have assembled today, as well as to prove to people that we do not agree on everything. Because, of late, that has been the case.

Mr. Chairman, let me first commend you for holding this hearing to examine S. 693, the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act. And let me also welcome the very distinguished panel of witnesses. I look forward to hearing each of their testimony.

As some in this hearing room may know, the chairman and I are among a handful of current Members of the Senate who were here to vote for the Taiwan Relations Act, or against it, 20 years ago. As I have said many times before, over the past 20 years, there has been no Member of the Senate who has been a more loyal friend of Taiwan than the chairman. Like the chairman, I, too, am proud of my vote 20 years ago to help pass the Taiwan Relations Act. And the TRA has helped preserve, in my view, peace and stability in the Western Pacific and created an environment in which Taiwan has thrived.

Taiwan today is an economically and culturally vibrant, multi-party democracy. And Taiwan's transformation, I think, would not have been possible without the United States' commitment to its security, as enshrined in the TRA. China should have no doubt that our commitment remains firm. The United States believes China and Taiwan should settle their differences peacefully, through dialog, on the basis of mutual respect.

Mr. Chairman, it is precisely because I share your commitment to Taiwan's security, and to the Taiwan Relations Act as the law of the land, that I have such grave reservations about the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act, which is the subject of today's hearing. Far from enhancing Taiwan's security, I am concerned that passage of this legislation would be the equivalent of waving a red cape in front of Beijing and inviting China to charge.

First, there is no security measure included in this act that is precluded by the Taiwan Relations Act, the TRA. Let me repeat that. Nothing contemplated in S. 693 is prohibited by the TRA. In fact, some of the enhancements suggested in the bill, such as increased military exchanges, better access to U.S. military schools, improved missile defense, airborne early warning aircraft, advanced medium-range air-to-air missile technology, anti-submarine warfare equipment, et cetera, are already part of the administration's security policy toward Taiwan.

Recent U.S. defense sales to Taiwan have included 150 F-16 fighters, advanced Patriot missile batteries, Perry- and Knox- class frigates, the E2T Airborne Early Warning Aircraft. Of course, some aspects of our security relationship are not publicized very much. And that is as it should be, in my opinion. But as a result of this low profile, results-oriented approach, some Members of Congress and the public may get the mistaken impression that the U.S. is neglecting Taiwan. In my view, nothing could be further from the truth.

Few people, for instance, know that Taiwan's Chief of General Staff, a four-star general who is currently Taiwan's Defense Minister, visited Washington last October to meet with Secretary of Defense Cohen. Three- and four-star generals routinely visit the Pentagon and other military installations-- usually with very little hoopla.

My second concern is the bill's mistaken conclusion that Taiwan's security is primarily a function of its military capabilities. While it is true that deterrence is a significant component of Taiwan's security, in my view, the reality is that no amount of weaponry alone can guarantee Taiwan's security. Taiwan's security, in my view, flows from its democratic form of government, its growing economic, cultural, and political contacts with the mainland, and, ultimately, the United States' abiding commitment to a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question.

In my opinion, we should concentrate on strengthening those areas, rather than spend time pre-authorizing the sales of weapon systems, some of which do not even exist yet. None of the authorizations included in section 5 of the bill, as I read the bill, is necessary, in my view. The administration already has all the authority it needs, under the TRA, to sell such defensive weapon systems to Taiwan as are deemed necessary to meet Taiwan's legitimate defense needs.

And, finally, Mr. Chairman, I am concerned that this bill is very ill-timed. U.S. relations with China leave a lot to be desired at the moment, to say the very least. And as Taiwan's Defense Minister told a visiting staff member of the committee 2 months ago, poor U.S.-China relations are bad news for cross- Strait relations, for Taiwan-Chinese relations.

There is no single issue with greater potential to bring the United States and China into conflict than Taiwan. And a surefire way to spark such a conflict is for the U.S. to reinforce the growing perception in Beijing, however mistaken it may be, that the United States is hostile to China or pursuing the fragmentation of China.

President Lee Teng-hui's July 9 statement that China and Taiwan should conduct their affairs on the basis of a special state-to-state--and that is to quote--``special state-to- state''--end of quote--relations has rattled Beijing and injected a measure of uncertainty about Taiwan's future into the cross-Strait dynamic. Now is not the time for the U.S. to add to that uncertainty by modifying the very foundation upon which six successive U.S. administrations have constructed their Chinese policy.

We should follow the old maxim: ``If it ain't broke, do not fix it.'' Mr. Chairman, I think this is premature. I understand your intentions. I believe they are obviously well-intended. There is nothing in the Taiwan Relations Act that would preclude anything that you are contemplating from going forward. I think we should let things simmer down a little bit, rather than heat up.

And I thank the chair for his indulgence.

The Chairman. Very well.

Senator Baucus visited me on the floor the other day, and said he wanted to comment on this, in opposition to the bill. And we welcome him. He suggested 5 to 7 minutes, but we are going to turn the red light on at 10 minutes and give you a little extra time.

Senator Baucus, we are glad to have you.

Statement of Hon. Max S. Baucus, U.S. Senator from Montana

Senator Baucus. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I very much appreciate your courtesy, as well as that of Senator Biden and all the rest of the committee. And I will be less than 10 minutes. I know you have a full agenda, so I will be very brief.

I, Mr. Chairman, share the motivation underlying the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act. I, too, am concerned about the security and stability of Taiwan. But I believe that this is the wrong approach at the wrong time.

The one-China policy has served the People's Republic of China, Taiwan, the United States, and the world very well for over a quarter of a century. It has led to peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and the region. In Taiwan, we have seen the development of a flourishing and vibrant democracy, a prosperous and dynamic high-tech economy, envied by the entire world, and security.

In the PRC, we have seen the opening up to the West, double-digit economic growth, a more responsible involvement in global affairs, liberalizing trends domestically, and security. For the United States, we have gotten over a quarter of a century of stability in Asia, the maintenance of workable relations with both the PRC and Taiwan, and the ability to influence both the PRC and Taiwan in the direction of modernity and responsibility on the world scene. And the world has seen peace, stability and economic prosperity in the region.

There are some who criticize the Taiwan Relations Act and the three communiques. They say that this framework is simply an artifact of the cold war, an artifact that is irrelevant with the end of the Soviet Union and the enormous political and economic changes in Taiwan. I see no alternative at the present time to this framework that we have helped so much to construct. It is not perfect. It is not neat. But it has benefited everyone. And at least in the near term, there is nothing better.

Over the long term, I believe that the current framework will not be sustainable. But change and adjustment must be done with great care and great caution. There can be no unilateral redefinition.

The message that we in the United States have given to Beijing and Taipei from the beginning of the normalization process has been that they must negotiate together to resolve their differences. Settlement must be found by peaceful means. And there should be no unilateral steps taken to change the situation. That message is the same today.

I want to take a moment to commend President Clinton for his active role that he has taken in trying to calm things down between Taipei and Beijing. I was extremely glad that the President called Chinese President Jiang Zemin to encourage restraint. His public comments, as well as his dispatch of Assistant Secretary Roth to Beijing and AIT Director Bush to Taipei have helped.

What is needed now, more than ever, is dialog across the Taiwan Strait--dialog without Taiwan attempting to change the framework unilaterally, and dialog without the PRC making belligerent threats, taking military action, or trying in other ways to squeeze Taiwan.

Let me conclude with a few comments about the WTO. The PRC is the world's most populous country. Taiwan is the twelfth largest economy in the world. It makes no sense to have them outside the WTO. The Taiwan agreement is finished. The Chinese agreement almost done. I urge Beijing to come back to the negotiating table now and complete the agreement quickly. The Congress can then approve permanent NTR. And we will see both Taipei and Beijing committed to the WTO this fall.

A peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue is deeply in the interest of all parties and of the entire region. We must avoid confrontation, which would inevitably draw the United States into it in some way. It is a delicate balance across the Taiwan Strait, and I do not believe that the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act is the way to maintain peace and stability and continued economic growth in the region.

Again, Mr. Chairman and Senator Biden, I thank you for giving me the opportunity to present my thoughts to the committee today, and I urge you to do what is right. And that is, maintain peace and the continuation of the one-China policy.

The Chairman. Thank you, Senator. I noticed you abbreviated your statement somewhat. So, without objection, the full statement as prepared will appear in the record.

[The prepared statement of Senator Baucus follows:]

Prepared Statement of Senator Max Baucus

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the Foreign Relations Committee today as you consider the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act.

I have had a long interest and involvement in our nation's China policy. I share the motivation of the authors of the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act, which I believe is concern for the security and stability of Taiwan. But, as a good friend and supporter of Taiwan, I believe this is the wrong approach at the wrong time.

The ``One China'' policy has served the People's Republic of China, Taiwan, the United States, and the world very well for over a quarter of a century. It has led to peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and in the region. All sides, the United States, the PRC, and Taiwan, have prospered, both economically and politically, since the opening of China in 1972 with the Shanghai Communique.

What has been the result of the ``One China'' policy for Taiwan?

Development of a flourishing and vibrant democracy, a prosperous and dynamic high tech economy envied by the entire world, and security.

What has been the result for the PRC?

An opening up to the West, double digit economic growth, a more responsible involvement in global affairs, liberalizing trends domestically, $30 billion in investment from Taiwan, and security.

What has been the result for the United States?

Over a quarter of a century of stability in Asia, the maintenance of workable relations with both the PRC and Taiwan, and the ability to influence both the PRC and Taiwan in the direction of modernity and responsibility on the world scene.

What has been the result for the World?

Peace, stability, and economic prosperity in the region and, I hope, WTO membership for both the PRC and Taiwan at the WTO Ministerial in Seattle this fall, with the attendant benefits to global economic growth.

There are some who criticize the Taiwan Relations Act and the three communiques, that is, the Shanghai Communique of 1972, the Normalization Agreement of 1979, and the Arms Sales Agreement of 1982. They say that this framework for the interaction among the PRC, Taiwan, and the United States is simply an artifact of the Cold War, an artifact that is increasingly irrelevant with the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, and even more irrelevant given the enormous political and economic changes and progress we have witnessed within Taiwan.

It is true that much has changed in the region over the past decade. But one major reason for many of these changes, and certainly the changes in Taiwan, lies in the existence of the Taiwan Relations Act and the three communiques and, frankly, their ambiguities.

I see no alternative at the present time to this framework that we helped so much to construct. It is not perfect. It is not neat. But, at least in the near term, there is nothing better than the framework created by the Taiwan Relations Act and the three communiques. Over the long term, the current framework will not be sustainable. But change and adjustment must be done with great care and with great caution. Change must not be made through unilateral measures by any party.

The message that we in the United States have given to Beijing and Taipei from the beginning of the normalization process has been that they must negotiate together to resolve their differences, settlement must be found by peaceful means, and there should be no unilateral steps taken to change the situation. This policy has worked. The United States must continue to oppose any effort, by either side, Taiwan or the PRC, to redefine the relationship unilaterally.

I want to take a moment to commend President Clinton for the active role he has taken in trying to calm things down between Taipei and Beijing. I was extremely glad that the President called Chinese President Jiang Zemin to encourage restraint. His public comments, as well as his dispatch of Assistant Secretary of State Stanley Roth to Beijing and AIT Washington Director Richard Bush to Taipei, have helped.

What is needed now, more than ever, is dialogue across the Taiwan Strait--dialogue without Taiwan attempting to change the framework unilaterally, and dialogue without the PRC making belligerent threats or taking military action.

The United States must do everything we can to encourage the resumption and continuation of the cross-Strait dialogue. We saw after 1993, when these talks began, that the result was rapidly improved cooperation--in tourism, investment, communications, and shipping. We must encourage this process. We have read a lot about the possibility that Wang Daohan, China's top negotiator on Taiwan, will not visit Taiwan in the fall. It is important that Taipei and Beijing make this visit happen.

I said earlier that, over the long term, the current framework is not sustainable. There will have to be changes, but they must be the product of discussion and joint agreement. And, whether we like it or not, the United States is going to be a party, one way or another, to any discussion and agreement on change.

Let me turn to the WTO for a moment. The PRC is the world's most populous country and one of the fastest growing economies in the world. Taiwan is the 12th largest economy in the world, despite a population of only 23 million people, and one of the world's major traders. It makes no sense to have these economies outside the WTO. They must be incorporated into the global system of trade rules.

The Taiwan agreement is finished. The Chinese agreement is almost done. I urge Beijing to come back to the negotiating table now and complete the agreement quickly so that the U.S. Congress can grant them permanent NTR and welcome both Taipei and Beijing as members of the WTO at the Ministerial meeting in Seattle this fall.

I am a firm believer that America's interest is to have China in the WTO, and I appreciate the support this has received from a number of members of this committee. There are solid economic reasons for wanting China to be a member of the WTO. In addition, it would represent one more step in China's integration into the world system, which is critically important to all of us.

A peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue is deeply in the interest of all parties, and of the entire region. We must avoid confrontation which would, inevitably, draw the United States into it in some way. It is a delicate balance across the Taiwan Strait. I don't believe that the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act is the way to keep the region in peace, with stability and continued economic growth.

Again, thank you for giving me the opportunity to present my thoughts before the committee today.

[The following prepared statement of Senator Thomas was submitted for inclusion in the record.]

Prepared Statement of Senator Craig Thomas

Thank you Mr. Chairman, and thank you for holding this hearing. I know we have a lot of witnesses this morning, so I will keep my opening brief.

I know there is no member of this Committee, or of the Senate as a whole, with a stronger commitment to the people of Taiwan than you. I also know that you have introduced S. 693 with the intent of strengthening the security of Taiwan. That security is very important to me too. I have made clear both to Beijing and Taipei that any move to settle the cross-Strait issue by less than peaceful means is completely unacceptable.

But as Chairman of the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, I strongly believe that enactment of S. 693 would actually have the reverse effect. Passage of this bill would be interpreted by the PRC--and reasonably so--as a complete abrogation of the 1982 joint communique, one of the three pillars of our bilateral relationship; as a significant revision of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA); and as a drastic change in our fundamental policy of maintaining unofficial relations with Taiwan. It would decimate our bilateral relationship with the PRC, and in turn would only make its relations with Taiwan more hostile.

The TRA and joint communique have successfully governed our relationships with both countries for 20 years through both Republican and Democrat administrations. Those two documents have enabled us to maintain good relations with both governments, maintain the security of Taiwan through the sale of purely defensive weapons systems, and encourage cross-Strait dialog--a dialog without which the cross-Strait issue will never be resolved. I do not believe that present circumstances call for the kind of sea changes contained in the bill; as the saying goes, ``if it isn't broke, don't fix it.''

The Chairman. Now, I have just been advised that there will be a vote on the floor at 5 minutes past 11. But let us get started with panel 2: The Honorable Stanley O. Roth, whom all of us know, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs and Dr. Kurt Campbell, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs.

Mr. Secretary, you may proceed.

Statement of Stanley O. Roth, Assistant Secretary of State For East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State

Prepared Statement of Hon. Stanley O. Roth

It is a pleasure to appear before the Committee today, Mr. Chairman, in response to your request for Administration views concerning S. 693, ``The Taiwan Security Enhancement Act.'' I welcome the opportunity to respond to you on that subject, but I would like to do so in the context of providing you the Administration's assessment of current cross-strait relations.

Recent Events

When I appeared before this Committee on March 25, I found some cause for optimism about dialogue between Taiwan and the PRC. In October of 1998, Koo Chen-fu, Chairman of Taiwan's Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and Taiwan's senior unofficial representative in talks with the PRC, traveled to Shanghai, where he was welcomed by his counterpart, Wang Daohan, the chairman of the PRC Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS). He then went to Beijing where he stayed in an official state guesthouse, and met with President Jiang Zemin. Koo and Wang agreed to further dialogue on political, economic and other issues, and Wang agreed to make a return visit to Taiwan.

The U.S. had strongly encouraged both sides to engage in such a direct dialogue. We welcomed the prospect that the dialogue would continue and hoped that Wang's visit to Taiwan might establish a more solid basis on which to continue the dialogue. Such a dialogue is the basis for Taiwan's lasting security, which military hardware alone cannot guarantee.

In the context of that positive momentum, we had in recent months suggested that both sides look at the possibility of ``interim agreements'' as one way to move forward in their dialogue. We offered no preconceived formula about what the substance of interim agreements might be, only that they might serve as a way for both sides to build confidence in their ability to work together, setting the stage for increased cooperation and enhanced regional stability. We did not offer this suggestion to put pressure on either side, only as an idea that might prove useful to both.

Unfortunately, the positive momentum which existed earlier this year has deteriorated sharply. On July 9, Taiwan's President Lee Teng- hui told Voice of Germany radio that ``we have designated cross-strait ties as state-to-state or at least as special state-to-state ties.'' On July 12, Su Chi, the Chairman of Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council, said that the PRC's formulation of the ``one China'' principle was not a basis for cross-strait discussions.

Beijing stated that Lee's statements threatened the idea of ``one China'' that was the basis for relations across the Taiwan Strait and ``was a very dangerous step along the way to splitting the country.'' Beijing repeated its long held position that it reserved the right to use force if Taiwan moved toward independence. Wang Daohan suggested that Lee's statement undermined the basis for him to travel to Taiwan this fall to continue the dialogue between the two sides, and he called for a clarification from SEF's Koo Chen-fu.

On July 30 Koo Chen-fu sent a statement to Wang Daohan to clarify Lee's statement. Although he stated that there had been no change in Taiwan's policies favoring cross-strait dialogue, agreements between the two sides, and the goal of a unified China, Koo also held to Lee's position on ``special state-to-state relations.'' Koo said Taiwan considers that `` `one China' is something for the future since China at present is divided and ruled separately by two equal sovereign states in existence at the same time.''

After Koo sent his statement of clarification, ARATS immediately rejected it and said that it ``seriously violated'' the 1992 SEF-ARATS consensus.

From the very beginning, the United States responded to this disruption of cross-strait relations with consistent public and private statements in an effort to calm tensions and encourage a peaceful resolution of this dispute. On July 12, the State Department spokesman reiterated the U.S. commitment to its ``one China'' policy. The spokesman also stressed that, in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act, we would view with grave concern any attempt to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means.

The President, first in a telephone call to PRC President Jiang Zemin, and later in a White House press conference, spelled out the three pillars of our position toward relations between Taiwan and the PRC:

Our ``one China'' policy is unchanged;
We support dialogue as the only way for differences between the two sides to be resolved; and
We have an abiding interest that there be a peaceful approach by both sides to resolving differences.

Following the Clinton-Jiang call, the Administration continued its diplomatic efforts to restore calm in cross-strait relations. This included dispatching parallel missions to Beijing and Taipei. NSC Senior Director for East Asia, Ken Lieberthal, and I traveled to Beijing while the Chairman of The American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), Richard Bush, traveled to Taipei. Both missions had the same objectives: to listen to senior leaders; and to make sure that they understood the United States' firm adherence to its long-standing policies: ``one China'' and our insistence on peaceful resolution of differences.

As a second step, the Secretary met with PRC Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan in Singapore July 25, on the eve of the meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), to make clear our commitment to a one-China policy, a peaceful approach and cross-strait dialogue. Secretary Albright pressed Beijing to continue the cross-strait dialogue and urged them not to use force.

Where does this leave the cross-strait situation today? It is impossible to be certain. There is no sign of imminent hostilities. It appears that PRC military activity is somewhat elevated, but reports in the media have been exaggerated. Nonetheless, the risk of escalation remains. The visit of Wang Daohan to Taiwan has not been officially cancelled, but the situation is serious, and we have urged that the visit proceed. In this period of uncertainty, all the key players will need to navigate with care.

Comments on "The Taiwan Security Enhancement Act"

Having set the context for our consideration of ``The Taiwan Security Enhancement Act,'' I would like first to offer a personal observation. Everyone who knows you, Mr. Chairman, knows beyond the slightest doubt that your overwhelming interest in offering this legislation is to strengthen Taiwan's security.

Nonetheless, Mr. Chairman--and I say this with all due respect--the Administration believes that this legislation could have serious, unintended negative consequences that would weaken Taiwan's security and impinge on our own security interests in the region. These consequences arise because this legislation will be interpreted by Taiwan and by the PRC as a significant revision of the Taiwan Relations Act, which has successfully governed the U.S. role in cross-strait issues for twenty years. It will be seen as an effort to reverse our commitment to an unofficial relationship and to recreate in its place a formal military relationship with Taiwan.

Several provisions of this bill lead to this perception. For example, the legislation mandates operational communication links between military headquarters of Taiwan and the U.S. in Hawaii, a linkage more indicative of formal military ties than an unofficial relationship. This perception would be further enforced by the Act's requirement that the Secretary of Defense permit the travel of flag- rank officers to Taiwan. Avoiding such senior military travel has helped this and previous administrations of both parties to have successful working-level contacts while avoiding the cloak of officiality that would be a hindrance to effective exchange.

Equally troubling is the specific authorization (in section 5 (d) and (e)) that the U.S. provide ballistic missile defense and early warning radar to Taiwan. As you know from my previous testimony, Mr. Chairman, the Administration, as a matter of policy, does not preclude the possible sale of TMD systems to Taiwan in the future. But, making this determination now, when the systems are still under development, and not yet even available to U.S. forces, is certainly premature. By their nature, providing these systems to Taiwan would be a decision with significant implications for Taiwan's security, for regional security, and for the security of the United States. That decision will need to be made based on a determination of Taiwan's defensive needs and in the context of regional developments at some point in the future when the system is ready for deployment.

One major element of that context will be the choices that the PRC makes over the intervening years concerning the deployment of its missiles. We believe, and we are discussing this with the PRC, that its own security interests, as well as regional security, would be best advanced by a decision to check or scale back its missile deployments. Trends in PRC deployments will affect our consideration of deploying ballistic missile defense systems to Taiwan. While I cannot predict the outcome of our discussions with the PRC, I can assure you that enactment of this language into law will make it harder rather than easier for us to succeed, and could fuel an arms race that would leave Taiwan worse off.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, this bill puts the Congress on record as endorsing the sales of a number of specific weapons, including several which the Administration had previously denied because they did not meet the criteria of strictly defensive weaponry.

We see a danger that this bill could be the first step in a process whereby Congress would attempt to mandate specific arms sales, thereby abrogating the long-standing and effective arms sales process that now exists. That very prospect would change the dynamics of the current process, encouraging Taiwan to seek direct Congressional authorization for the sale of desired weapons.

Equally significant, three actions required by the bill raise immediate constitutional concerns: the report detailing the administration's deliberative review of Taiwan's arms sales requests (sec. 4(b)); the plan for ``operational training and exchanges of personnel'' between the Taiwan and U.S. militaries (sec. 5(b)); and the establishment of a ``secure direct communications'' between the U.S. and Taiwan military (sec. 5(c)). All three would unconstitutionally interfere with the President's authority as Commander in Chief and interfere with his ability to carry out his responsibilities for the conduct of foreign relations

In considering all these potentially serious problems with the proposed legislation, Mr. Chairman, I think is worth considering whether there is really a need for this Act. Has the Taiwan Relations Act failed in assisting Taiwan to provide for its security and stability? The track record of four administrations says ``no.'' Despite the difficulties cross-strait relations have encountered since I testified before you in March, the assessment of the Taiwan Relations Act, which I offered then, remains valid:

I have no hesitation in declaring the TRA a resounding success. Over the past twenty years, the TRA has not only helped to preserve the substance of our relationship with Taiwan, it has also contributed to the conditions which have enabled the U.S., the PRC, and Taiwan to achieve a great deal more.

While there have been periods of friction over these twenty years, the dynamism and increasing prosperity across the Strait is unmistakable.

That dynamism and prosperity has been the product of people on both sides of the Strait working together. Thousands of Taiwan companies have established operations in the PRC, often in cooperation with PRC companies, both private and government owned. Tens of thousands of PRC workers work for these Taiwan companies.

That shared prosperity has been possible in part because Taiwan has been able, with the support of the United States under the TRA, to strengthen its self-defense capability. The United States has provided a wide range of defensive military equipment to Taiwan, ranging from Knox-class frigates, to anti-submarine S-2T aircraft, to anti-air missiles. Just last week, when some doubted we would move forward on pending sales, we notified to the Congress an additional sale of E-2T early warning aircraft and parts and equipment for F-16 aircraft.

Every year, it seems, there is some speculation that the Administration will not move forward with some sale of defensive equipment to Taiwan because of some issue of the moment. Each time the speculation has been wrong. We are and will remain committed to fulfilling our obligations.

In addition to providing military systems, we have provided extensive advice and training opportunities for Taiwan's military. Having an unofficial relationship has not obstructed our ability to have the kinds of contacts necessary to meet our obligations under section 3 of the TRA.

All of this has occurred in accordance with our commitments under the TRA. It has worked and is working. Taiwan has never had a stronger defense capability, and that capability remains robust as a result of our ongoing efforts. I would propose that this answers the question I posed a moment ago. The Taiwan Relations Act has succeeded in assisting Taiwan to provide for its security and stability. There is no benefit to counterbalance the risks entailed in changing it.

Conclusion: A Serious Decision

In concluding, I would like to note that the TRA, for all its considerable success, cannot by itself provide for Taiwan's security. Given the disparity in size between the PRC and Taiwan, the island's security must always depend on more than just military hardware. The TRA must be complemented by peaceful interaction, including dialogue, between Taiwan and the PRC, if we are to reduce tensions and improve security. For twenty years, with the support of the TRA we have seen progress, halting at times, toward such a dialogue. Despite the difficulties of recent weeks, it must continue. It was with that in mind that the President responded to recent statements on both sides of the Strait by reiterating our commitment to dialogue and to a peaceful resolution of differences between Taiwan and the PRC.

This bill would not enhance the prospects for dialogue and the peaceful resolution of differences. On the contrary, it could make it more difficult for both sides to advance cross-strait talks. And, it would do all this at a time of continuing concern, a time when the U.S. must provide stability and predictability if the two sides are to move forward to resolve their differences in a peaceful manner.

Your vote on this bill is a serious decision. It is not what some would call ``a free vote.'' It is a potentially dangerous vote against a policy that has worked through four administrations and continues to work today.

Thank you.

The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, you are a very articulate man. But I would point out, if you will check the transcript a little bit later, you may want to adjust that. You put all the blame on the President's speech. You did not say anything about the saber rattling of Beijing. You did not say anything about the threats. I think the facts are that Beijing is a belligerent bully, jealous and envious of what Taiwan has accomplished.

Dr. Campbell.

Statement of Kurt Campbell, Ph.D., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of Defense

Dr. Campbell. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is an honor to be able to appear before you.

And I think Assistant Secretary Roth has given you a broader and I think very accurate foreign policy representation of the cross-Strait situation. What I would like to do this morning is to speak specifically and very briefly on the security issues.

First of all, I would like to very quickly associate myself with much of what Senator Biden has said. I think it is very accurate and very clear. One thing in particular that I would like to draw attention to is when he talked about the security dynamic between the United States and Taiwan as being one that has been a low-profile, results-oriented approach, that best be done quietly. And I would like to associate myself with that. I think I have been part of that, and I think it has been very successful.

I would say just very briefly that I think the Taiwan Relations Act is the most successful piece of legislative leadership in modern history in the foreign policy realm. And I think it has been enormously effective in not only securing peace and stability, but an active U.S. role in the preservation of peace and stability in the Western Pacific.

And I also agree that it gives us every bit of authority we need to maintain peace and stability. And I think that is the key. The Taiwan Relations Act gives us what we need to maintain peace and stability.

Very briefly, in terms of your bill, the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act, Mr. Chairman, I just want to say quickly that it is, as Secretary Roth indicated, a very delicate time-- potentially even a dangerous time. And I think it behooves us to move very carefully in this context. And what I am worried about are the unintended consequences of the bill. And in my judgment, and I think in the judgment of the Department of Defense, is that the unintended consequences are likely to be dangerous. And so I would urge the committee to indeed re- embrace the Taiwan Relations Act, which I think, as has been already indicated, has served our interests and the interests of Taiwan so very well for these last 20 years.

Since I know you have a vote, I can conclude here, and then, as Mr. Roth indicated, I can take any questions about systems or discussions about the broader security implications or ramifications of what we are facing now subsequently.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Campbell follows:]

Prepared Statement of Dr. Kurt Campbell

Good afternoon Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. Thank you for this opportunity to speak to you about the U.S.-Taiwan security relationship. It is especially important to address these issues now that we are well into the 20th year of the Taiwan Relations Act. In the interest of reserving time to answer any questions you may have, I respectfully request that the following statement be entered into record. I have prepared a brief statement that specifically addresses your interest in the views of the Department of Defense toward the security situation in the Taiwan Strait.

An overarching national security interest of the United States is preservation of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. United States policy with regard to Taiwan and the PRC is integral to this goal. We maintain our obligations toward Taiwan as stipulated in the Taiwan Relations Act, not only because it is law but because it is good policy. We have also maintained a policy of comprehensive engagement and pursue a constructive relationship with the PRC, also because it is good policy. These two approaches are complementary and support our interests that the PRC and Taiwan directly and peacefully resolve their differences. A constructive and peaceful Taiwan-PRC dialogue serves the interest of all the parties and is a major element in achieving long- term peace and stability in the Pacific.

Our commitment to peace and stability is further bolstered by the maintenance of approximately 100,000 U.S. troops in the region, a policy reaffirmed by Secretary Cohen in DoD's 1998 East Asia Strategy Report. There have been times when more than simple dialogue and presence have been necessary to maintain stability. America's enduring commitment is well known and widely appreciated throughout the region, and contributes to our overall approach to the cross-Strait issue. The deployment of two carrier battle groups to the western Pacific in response to provocative PRC missile tests in March 1996 was a visible demonstration of the U.S. commitment to preserve peace and stability.

U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan

The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979 forms the legal basis of U.S. policy regarding the security of Taiwan. Its premise is that an adequate Taiwan defensive capability is conducive to maintaining peace and security as long as differences remain between Taiwan and the PRC. Section 2(b) states, in part, that it is the policy of the United States:

to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States;
to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; and
to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people of Taiwan.

Section 3 of the TRA also provides that the ``United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.'' The act further states that ``the President and Congress shall determine the nature and quantity of such defense articles and services based solely upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan, in accordance with procedures established by law.'' The TRA also asserts that a determination of Taiwan's needs ``shall include review by United States military authorities in connection with recommendations to the President and Congress.''

Let me also call attention to an aspect of the August 17, 1982, Joint Communique between the United States and the People's Republic of China that is important to Taiwan's security. In this document, the PRC stated that its ``fundamental policy'' is ``to strive for a peaceful resolution to the Taiwan question.'' Having in mind this policy and the anticipated reduction in the military threat to Taiwan, the 1982 Communique outlined our intention to gradually reduce the quantity and quality of arms sales to Taiwan. At the time the Joint Communique was issued, we made it clear that our intentions were premised upon the PRC's continued adherence to a peaceful resolution of differences with Taiwan.

The Chinese deployment of theater missiles has the result of undermining confidence in the PRC's commitment to pursue peaceful means to resolve the long standing cross-Strait dispute. The United States urges restraint in PRC military operations and deployments opposite Taiwan and does not wish to see the development of an arms race in the region. The United States has abided by and will continue to abide by its commitments to Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act. Similarly, we believe that Taiwan's security will also be enhanced as we work to improve relations with the PRC.

The Taiwan Security Enhancement Act

Our unofficial security relationship with Taiwan will remain an important part of maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. We share the concerns that are reflected in many of the objectives in the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act. PLA modernization and a host of other factors could present Taiwan with an ever widening array of challenges in the coming years. We believe, however, that the Taiwan Relations Act provides a sufficient basis for U.S. security cooperation with Taiwan and that the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act is unnecessary and could have a counterproductive effect on Taiwan's security. Moreover, Taiwan's security rests not only on its defense posture but also on a continued, constructive cross-Strait dialogue.

We already are addressing many of the provisions outlined in the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act. For example, DoD has a program of exchanges with Taiwan focused on such areas as planning, training, C4I, air defense, ASW, and logistics.

These non-hardware exchanges serve multiple purposes. ``Software'' programs attempt to address many of the shortcomings in Taiwan military readiness that were identified in the February 1999 DoD Report to Congress on the Cross-Strait Security Situation. They allow Taiwan to better integrate newly acquired systems into their inventory. These initiatives provide an avenue to exchange views on Taiwan's requirements for defense modernization, to include professionalization, organizational issues, and training. Exchanges and discussions enhance our ability to assess Taiwan's longer term defense needs and develop well-founded security assistance policies. Such exchanges also enhance Taiwan's capacity for making operationally sound and cost effective acquisition decisions.

We take very seriously our responsibility under the Taiwan Relations Act and have provided Taiwan with defense articles and services necessary for a self-sufficient defense capability. The U.S. has provided Taiwan with a range of advanced air defense systems, including E-2T airborne early warning aircraft, PATRIOT-derived Modified Air Defense Systems; HAWK and CHAPARRAL ground-based air defense systems; and F-16 air superiority fighters. We continue to examine means to enhance Taiwan's air defense capacity.

Taiwan's interest in theater missile defenses is driven by China's past actions and its theater missile build-up opposite Taiwan. Future Chinese actions can have an influence on U.S. decisions with regard to the provision of theater missile defenses to Taiwan. We do not preclude the possibility of Taiwan having access to theater missile defenses, but these decisions remain in the future when the technology is mature. Our decisions on this will be guided by the same basic factors that have shaped our decisions to date on the provision of other defensive capabilities to Taiwan. As noted previously, we believe that a cross- Strait dialogue that contains confidence-building measures is a critical ingredient to long-term stability across the Strait.

Our responsibilities under the Taiwan Relations Act include assisting Taiwan with countering surface and subsurface naval threats. The U.S. has provided Taiwan with Knox-class frigates; S-70C helicopters and modernized S-2T ASW aircraft. We are continuing to examine Taiwan's comprehensive ASW requirements. We have also provided Taiwan with systems to counter an amphibious landing, to include M-60A tanks and armed helicopters.

The Department of Defense's relationship with Taiwan is unofficial in nature. U.S. policy has been effective in promoting Taiwan security for the last 20 years. Senior DoD officials interact with their Taiwan military counterparts on a regular basis during unofficial visits to the United States. The Administration's policy regarding high-level visits to Taiwan is governed by the 1994 Taiwan Policy Review. We conduct responsible military interactions that are consistent with this 1994 Review within the context of the unofficial nature of our relationship with Taiwan.

U.S.-PRC Relations and Taiwan Security

In all our dialogues, we make clear to the PRC that we will continue to support Taiwan in its legitimate defense needs not only because it is required by U.S. law, but also because it serves the wider interests of peace and stability in the region. We also have made clear that we support only a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue, and regard any attempt to resolve the issue by other than peaceful means, or any other action that threatens regional stability to be of grave concern to the United States.

It is important to reiterate our belief that any improvements in the U.S.-PRC bilateral relationship are not zero-sum: they will not come at Taiwan's expense, but rather serve to prevent possible misperceptions, enhance mutual trust and transparency, and promote restraint. Taiwan will be a primary beneficiary of the regional peace and stability fostered by positive Washington-Beijing relations.

Ultimately, the U.S. position is that the Taiwan issue is for people on both sides of the Strait to resolve. This remains the best approach and our policy must remain consistent in this regard. Indeed, this is the only long-term guarantee of a peaceful and durable solution across the Taiwan Strait. It is also a necessary element in guaranteeing long-term peace and stability in East Asia.

Our relationships with Taiwan and the PRC are likely to be among our most complex and important foreign policy challenges for many years to come. Indeed, the global political and regional environment is very different today than at the time the three Communiques and Taiwan Relations Act were formulated and implemented. Nonetheless, these documents have served U.S. interests in maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait for more than 20 years and remain the best framework for guiding U.S. policies into the future.

The Taiwan Relations Act has been the most successful piece of legislative leadership in foreign policy in recent history. Its framework has contributed to an extended period of peace and prosperity across the Taiwan Strait and has promoted American interests in the western Pacific. This legislation, along with the three communiques, has also secured the foundation for the complex political and security interactions among China, Taiwan and the United States. The Taiwan Security Enhancement Act is unnecessary and potentially counterproductive. The Department of Defense opposes this legislation.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Very well.

Secretary Roth, the second part of section 3(b) of the Taiwan Relations Act says that ``determinations of defense sales to Taiwan should be based solely on our''--meaning the President and Congress--``judgment of the needs of Taiwan.'' Now, I read that to mean if Taiwan has a valid military requirement for something based on the threat it faces, we should approve that sale. In other words, political factors such as the opinion of dictators in Beijing should not be a consideration.

Do you differ with my interpretation?

Mr. Roth. If you are asking me, is the criterion for an arms sale whether China approves it or not, the answer clearly is no; that that would be illegal. But it would also be bad policy. That China opposes all arms sales to Taiwan. And as you know, the administration position is we not only abide by our obligations under the TRA to provide defensive weaponry, but we believe that is the correct policy. So we do look at it from the point of view of what Taiwan needs for self-defense.

That, however, is a complicated calculation as to what goes into that. And we sometimes differ with Taiwan in terms of what their needs are. So I would not go to the opposite extreme, and say the mere fact that Taiwan asks for it means that we agree that they should receive it.

The Chairman. Could you tell me, then, why there was so much agitation at the State Department--they had the nervous jeebies--in opposition to providing Taiwan with an early warning radar, which merely would give the citizens of Taiwan a few minutes' warning that a missile was headed their way? Why did the State Department get so excited about that?

Mr. Roth. Well, let me go back to what I said previously. First of all, it was always our intention to approve this package of arms sales prior to the recess. And I think there has been a lot of unnecessary concern that this was going to be blocked somehow by a pro-Beijing State Department that was going to sell out our obligations to Taiwan. And I have tried to say categorically that that is not the case.

There are concerns relating to a very different set of issues, Mr. Chairman, which is the larger set of issues relating to theater missile defense and ballistic missile defense, and the whole range of systems that could be contemplated under that category. And there, there has been a lot of consideration about what should or should not be provided at what point. That is a whole different set of issues where there has been a lot of discussion and no decisions.

So, I do not want to mislead you. But in terms of the narrow, specific sale that has now been notified, there was no guerrilla warfare from the State Department.

The Chairman. Well, is the State Department now committed to providing this early warning to Taiwan?

Mr. Roth. Are you are referring to the planes that were just notified? Let me defer that to my colleague.

The Chairman. You have approved it, but you have not notified; is that what you are saying?

Mr. Roth. I think I am thinking of the sale we just notified. Let me defer to Dr. Campbell.

Dr. Campbell. Mr. Chairman, I think there has been a slight bit of confusion. If you are talking about the early warning radar discussions that were held earlier this year, our understanding, of course, is that the administration agrees that Taiwan has a need for an appropriate early warning radar system. We have begun both intensive technical review, both internally and with Taiwan authorities, and we anticipate making final decisions at next year's arms talks.

And that has been notified both to all parties on Capitol Hill and it has been informed to interlocutors in Taiwan, as well. And I will tell you, I think that is a unified decision that the administration has taken.

It is unfair to characterize it as opposition within the State Department. I have been part of those discussions. The discussions are intense in terms of talking about what is appropriate. Remember, we have never provided these kinds of systems, really, to any country before. There are a lot of technical issues associated with releasability. I am comfortable that we have made the right decision. And we are in the midst of very, as I said, intense both internal deliberations and also discussions with Taiwan as we speak.

The Chairman. I am a little bit confused. You said you have advised, informed, Taiwan. I understood that you were in the process of deciding. What did you advise Taiwan about?

Dr. Campbell. We advised them that we agreed that there is a need for an early warning capability, and an early warning capability associated with the radar system. But, remember, as I said, Mr. Chairman, we have never had to consider this kind of request from any country before. So the technical issues are very difficult.

The Chairman. OK. My time is just about up. Just a second now. In other words, the State Department has taken the view that the April agreement is a commitment to provide the early warning radar; is that right?

Mr. Roth. Let me apologize for the confusion I may have just created, since I misunderstood the original question. I thought it applied to the sale that has already been notified. Now that I understand the question, the position is exactly as Dr. Campbell has represented. We have made a determination that a capability is needed for early warning, and we have agreed to address it in the context of next year's consultations with Taiwan.

We have not worked out all the specifics, but we have had the decision in principle that a capability is needed. And we will be working on that and will be consulting with the Hill. But we have not made a definitive decision, notified to the Congress yet, on a specific system.

The Chairman. But you have still got them dangling on the string, because they do not know what you are going to do. I am sure you did advise them that you are thinking about it.

Senator Biden.

Senator Biden. Thank you very much.

Let me make sure I understand about the radars. What we are talking about is a land-based radar that is part of a TMD, or maybe----

Dr. Campbell. No. In fact, Senator Biden--not to interrupt you----

Senator Biden. Interrupt me. I want to get it straight.

Dr. Campbell. This is a system that is designed--or will be designed--for early warning, exactly as the chairman indicated.

Senator Biden. I understand that. But they have E-2's now, and you have agreed to sell them more E-2's, right?

Dr. Campbell. Yes.

Senator Biden. So it is not like they are blind now, right?

Dr. Campbell. That is correct.

Senator Biden. Since there is a vote on and there is not much time, one of the things that I think has prompted--and this is me speaking, not for the chairman, and the chairman will correct me if I am wrong--I think one of the things that has prompted this legislation is not merely the PRC's saber rattling or placement of systems aimed at Taiwan, additional systems. I think much of it has to do with whether or not there is a belief on the part of those who introduced the legislation whether this President will in fact give everything that Taiwan needs, legitimately needs, for its defense.

I may be wrong about that, but I think that is what it is about. Nobody argues--nobody argues that I have heard so far, and I am anxious to hear the next panel--that everything that is contemplated in this legislation is not already allowed in the Taiwan Relations Act. This is kind of like a pre-approval. And what it is all about, as I see it, is putting the administration, from the perspective of those who think it is not doing enough, in the position of having to do what the Congress would like it to do and they are afraid the administration will not do.

Now, I am in the minority, so I can afford to not be taken seriously, and I can say things that maybe I would not say were I chairman. But the bottom line is there is a lack of trust here. Just like some of us did not trust the Reagan administration and what they told us, a lot of folks here do not trust the Clinton administration and what you all are telling them.

One of the questions I have for you, Mr. Roth, is would you be prepared to commit--and this may not be enough to stem the tide here to pass this legislation--but would you be prepared to--I mean would you consider communicating to the administration that if they were prepared to consult with the appropriate committees up here prior to an arms sale, not for the normal reasons--usually we seek prior consultation because we may not want an administration to transfer certain arms; here, it is the flip. Here, the flip is that you come up here with a plate full of goodies that are going to be sent to Taiwan in an arms sale, and the likelihood is you are going to have people here saying: Why is not there more on the plate?

And so, as an alternative here, would you take back the message that there should, in my view, be some consideration to more advance consultation with this committee? I am assuming this act does not become law, either because there is not sufficient votes or it is vetoed and there is no ability to override the veto. Would you be able to come back here to this committee and to the Armed Services Committee and the Intelligence Committees, and say, look, this is what we intend, do you all think we should do more? Would you make your case to us before we do what we now do--we make an internal decision, we inform you of that decision?

I absolutely think that just as you say cross-Strait discussions are important, cross-branch dialog, up-street, down-street relations are important here. Because the bottom line of all this is I think it is being driven by the fact that there is a concern--a concern that this administration will not do all that it is called for to do; that is, stand with Taiwan, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act that was voted 20 years ago.

Would you consider delivering that message and be willing to get back to us, or at least to me and the committee, to determine whether or not you are willing to enhance that consultation?

Mr. Roth. Of course, we will take the message back.

Senator Biden. Let me put it another way. If you all do not do it, you are all going to get what you do not want. So take some advice from a guy who may not know much about the politics of this place, get smart quick. Otherwise the boss is going to win. And it is not a good idea that he win this one.

I am going to go vote before I get myself in more trouble, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. We have to do this in tandem now.

When the United States sent aircraft carriers to the Taiwan Strait in 1996, were there secure communications directly between the U.S. and Taiwan? Either one of you may answer.

Dr. Campbell. Mr. Chairman, as you know, the Taiwan Relations Act specifies that dialog, both on political and security issues, be handled through AIT, our representatives in Taipei.

The Chairman. So the answer is no; is that right?

Dr. Campbell. If I can, let me just finish, if I can, Mr. Chairman. That office does have classified capabilities and secure communications. They were used extensively during that crisis.

But let me just underscore. Those are Americans in that office. And so the message was then subsequently passed from AIT to Taiwan officials. I would say and just underscore to you, during that time we did have extensive discussions with AIT, yes.

The Chairman. Gee, I am all alone here, and I am enjoying this now.

Secretary Roth, the Secretary of Energy recently visited Taiwan; is that correct?

Mr. Roth. Yes.

The Chairman. Why does the State Department continue to limit the rank of military officers who can visit Taiwan?

Mr. Roth. Well, it is not a question of the rank of military officers. There is a whole government-wide policy that includes the State Department.

The Chairman. Well, I understand that. I am asking you why.

Mr. Roth. The answer is that we approve those visits at any level that we believe are consistent with an unofficial relationship. President Clinton made the determination in his first term that since we had a robust economic relationship and that the PRC had a robust economic relationship with Taiwan, that it was appropriate for economic officials, up to the level of cabinet rank, as appropriate, to visit Taiwan. And so, under that policy, several economic officials, including Secretary Richardson, have done.

At the same time, a decision was made to continue the policy of all the preceding administrations, that senior diplomatic officials, including my level and up at the State Department, and senior military officials, I believe above the level of O-6, would not, as that would be more indicative of an official relationship, which we do not have. That has been the rationale.

The Chairman. You know, what you are saying to me in plain language? This Government is a bunch of nervous nellies, afraid that they will offend mainland China. That is what I get out of all of this. And I do not like it. And sure, Joe has referred to my working on this bill that is before us. But I think morality has got to enter this somehow, in terms of our attitudes toward governments.

Here you have a nation which is cutthroat in its economic dealings with the rest of the world. You find out how much green they bought from us, and how they have done it on the basis of prices and so forth and so on. But a nation that treats its political prisoners the way Red China does, you know, they conduct a blood type to find out what kind of heart they have and so forth, and people with $45,000 U.S. dollars can go in there, and if they match the heart, they can pay the money and get the heart after the political prisoner has been taken out in the yard and shot in the head.

Now, I would be just as hard on Taiwan or any other nation on that sort of thing. And there has been incident after incident. And I deal constantly with young Chinese students in this country. They are not Taiwanese people, they are from mainland China. But they are here and they are free, they feel, to say what they believe.

Do you ever talk to them?

Mr. Roth. Certainly I have met with----

The Chairman. What do they tell you?

Mr. Roth. Well, each individual generally tells me their saga of what their problem was with the Chinese Government, and they give me their assessment of the situation.

The Chairman. I know that.

Mr. Roth. They obviously are extremely critical of the human rights practices of China.

The Chairman. But I am talking about these kids who are disgusted with their own country and its moral practices. And we stand back and we do not say a thing and do not smell a thing. And if Taiwan goes down the tube, well, that is just too bad.

I will tell you, I am in a fix and I am going to miss a vote if I--let me do this. Let me declare a recess for just a minute or two. Paul Coverdell will come back and he will preside. I want the other members of the committee to have a chance to talk with you.

Mr. Roth. And I would like to respond to some of your comments, too, once you are back.

The Chairman. Pardon me?

Mr. Roth. I would like to respond to some of your observations when you have returned.

The Chairman. All right. That is fair enough.

The committee will stand in recess momentarily.

[Recess.]

Senator Coverdell [presiding]. Let me bring the committee back to order.

I apologize to the panelists, as has the chairman, for the unpredictable nature of the Senate.

Both you, Mr. Secretary, and Mr. Campbell, referred to the opening statement of Senator Biden often and frequently, and in particular to the statement, ``If it ain't broke, don't fix it.'' It strikes me that there is at least the nature of incongruity here. If you have a Washington Post editorial this morning, the opening paragraph: ``In just the past few days, China has illegally seized a Taiwanese ship, sent jet fighters provocatively across the Taiwan Strait, repeatedly hurled threats at Taiwan and its elected President, and test fired a new ballistic missile built in part on stolen U.S. technology. It also has cracked down on a peaceful spiritual sect, rounding up hundreds of members for some old-fashioned communist reeducation, and has, on Monday, sentenced two pro-democracy activists to terms of 8 and 9 years in prison on charges of subverting state power.''

The editorial goes on. It is substantially critical of the administration--and this comes to another one of your statements, Secretary Roth--implying, in general, that there is reinforcement of a world bully and turning a back on a world ally. That is the general nature of it.

You protested that as an incorrect characterization of the administration's policy, but, nevertheless, for whatever reason, there seems to be a growing perception that this is reflective of the administration, because it is being read and said everywhere in the country. So I would like each of you, beginning with you, Secretary Roth, to begin with what do you think is at the base of this misperception, this inability to understand the administration's policy here?

And then, if both of you would comment on the suggestion that everything is just fine--it ain't broke, don't mess with it. It strikes me that I know you are talking about TRA- specific, nevertheless, we are here today because I think everybody is alarmed.

Mr. Secretary.

Mr. Roth. I welcome this opportunity, since I woke up with some dismay to this editorial, which I think was an intellectual hodge-podge. And so I would like to try to provide the administration's perspective.

To say that the Taiwan Relations Act is working, in terms of promoting the interests of peace and stability in the Strait is not to say that all is well either with China's internal policies on human rights or on U.S.-China relations. They are distinct issues. And the notion that the administration simply accepts any Chinese behavior is ridiculous.

If you look at our annual human rights report, which China believes is a scathing attack--and it is, because that is the situation--we call it as we see it. If you ask about our efforts to try to secure a resolution in the U.N. Commission on Human Rights in Geneva on an annual basis, despite strenuous PRC opposition, we do it. We do it because it is right, because the situation calls for it. And we regret that other countries have not chosen to support us. But we have gone ahead anyway.

We have not been intimidated by the opposition of Beijing. We have tried to advance a human rights dialog with China. The President and the Secretary have pushed hard to try to get them not only to sign but ratify human rights covenants. We have publicly criticized the crackdown on dissidents. We have publicly criticized the crackdown on Falun Gong.

So we have not been silent. And the notion that somehow we are accepting this behavior and linking it to Taiwan, I just do not see the relationship. There are lots of problems in our bilateral relationship with China that we seek to address in a lot of different venues. But that does not focus in on the narrow issue of whether or not this particular legislation makes sense and whether that will work. So I hope we can distinguish between the issues.

I have been called to testify at numerous point, and undoubtedly will again in the future, about various aspects of China policy, whether it is human rights, nonproliferation, Tibet, and so forth. And we have positions on all of these issues. So this is not to say that if it ain't broke, don't fix it, that there are no problems with China. Nor is it to say-- coming to the narrow issue--that we are satisfied with the current situation in cross-Strait.

I think it is very clear, by the high level of attention we have given from the President down, that we are concerned about the situation in the Strait. And what we are trying to do is make clear that both parties understand just how determined we are to insist on peaceful resolution through dialog. And that is why the President has made his comments.

That is why I was dispatched to Beijing with Ken Liebenthal, why Richard Bush was dispatched to AIT, and why we continue to emphasize these points. It is precisely because things are not good that we are trying to play our role, which is as the stabilizer, to try to calm the situation down, to urge restraint on the parties, and to get this back in the channel of dialog. So that is the posture.

Senator Coverdell. Dr. Campbell.

Dr. Campbell. Senator, I think you ask a fundamental and extremely difficult question. And I was just reflecting on it. I will try not to give you an overly academic answer.

But as I think about it, I believe that the heart of this is we are on the verge, as many have said, the Pacific century, which will likely be the Pacific being the most dynamic, important and potentially the most dangerous area for American foreign policy. And at the center of that is the character and nature of our relationship with China.

And I think what you see in the United States are struggles, defining what our interests are, what kind of relationship we need to have with China. China, for us, encompasses almost every kind of challenge that a nation can face. It is both a rising power in the international system-- that is always hard for those powers that are status quo powers. It has a growing military. It is developing capabilities that we have to look at very carefully. It is not a threat militarily to the United States now, but it could be in the future.

It plays an important role in human rights, as Secretary Roth has stated, in proliferation, and in all matter of regional diplomacy, in North Korea, South Asia. It can be the key to peace and stability. It has a system of government, as Chairman Helms has said, that is antithetical to our own. And of course, at the middle of this is this complex relationship vis-a-vis Taiwan.

I would tell you that my own sense is that this is going to be one of those issues that will be debated within the context of the American polity for years to come. What is interesting, I think I would just note, is that the divisions do not break down along party lines. You have got divisions within parties. You have got debates on a whole host of issues.

I think the administration has done what it can to articulate why it is in U.S. interests to have a relationship with Beijing. It is going to be difficult. It is going to be subject to tremendous criticism. But I think it is the right thing to do. It is the right thing to do not just because we have key security issues in preserving peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, but simply because we cannot ignore China. China is going to be with us in the next century, whether we like it or not. And we better adjust to that as soon as possible.

Senator Coverdell. Will you acknowledge that on the balance of the public expressions made today that--I do not think all this national conclusion that this administration in these last several weeks have been weighted against, it has not been a balance. You said, well, we have sent both countries simultaneously.

Mr. Roth. With the same message.

Senator Coverdell. With the same message. Something has not worked, because there is too much international comment suggesting that it is not the same message. It does not have an equilibrium to it. Normally this does not happen, just falling out of a shoe. If you really believe--and I assume that you do--that it needs to be an equal message to both, do you think that there is any modification called for here, given the analysis that all of us are waking up, like you this morning, reading, not only in the Washington Post but across the country?

Mr. Roth. If you are asking me do I think there needs to be a modification in administration policy, I would say no. If you are asking me do I think that the parties on either side of the Strait need to continue making efforts to come up with a mutually acceptable formulation that lets them get the dialog back on track, I would say the answer is yes. What has changed has not been U.S. policy. What has changed has been the policy of the parties out there on either side of the Strait.

And so I think we have always taken the position, this administration and all our predecessors, that it is between the parties themselves to work out the precise formulas under which they conduct cross-Strait dialog and regulate their own relationships. But we do not get in the middle. We are not a mediator. We are not a negotiator. We do not propose language to them. We are not negotiating this for them.

But what we have said is that it is important on both sides to get to the table and keep to the table and make progress on working these issues out peacefully. That is the effort that now is still underway out there. As I indicated just yesterday, you saw in Su Chi's statement to the Financial Times yet another effort from the Taiwan side to offer a formulation designed to be reassuring, since it again referenced the one- China policy.

So it is up to the parties to make these formulations and to work it out. And what we have urged them to do is to be flexible, but meanwhile, urge restraint.

Senator Coverdell. Dr. Campbell, do you want to comment on that?

Dr. Campbell. I think the message that I take from the Senate today, Senator, is described I think very accurately by Senator Biden. I think we have to listen very carefully to the message you are giving us today. And I accept it. And I think, in terms of consultation and discussion with the Senate, I take it on, for myself, to do a better job along those lines.

Senator Coverdell. Within the appropriate discretion, what is your assessment of the risk level, where we sit right now? I would say that the incidents are not less heeded; they are more. What should we read from this? Is there a misreading of our intentions here? Are we being misjudged on either side, or both? Are we in a green situation, a yellow or red?

Mr. Roth. Well, you are asking the right question. I am not sure if I can tell you the right answers, because this depends on the actions of others, and particularly in determinations made by two parties. We have been as clear and as unequivocal as we can be about our determination to see a peaceful resolution. And as I said earlier, we have a track record on this, so people know we are serious. And this message has been communicated privately, as well as publicly.

But what you are asking me is, will this be sufficient? And that requires me to speak for other governments, which I cannot do. And so all I could say is that we have laid down every marker that we know how to lay down about the seriousness with which we take this issue. And, meanwhile, we continue, on specific terms, to call for restraint.

You undoubtedly saw the press article yesterday about the flights, the sorties, that are being conducted by both sides, approaching the median line in the Strait. And we have made not one, not two, but six demarches in the past 48 hours, in Beijing, in Taipei, in Washington, on the civilian side and on the military side, again, with the same message to both: Exercise restraint. Do not push this to confrontation. The risk of an accident, much less a deliberate confrontation, is high. It is not in your interest, it is not in the other side's interest, and it is not in our interest, and do not do it.

So we are trying very actively--this is not a passive administration policy--to push the idea of restraint. But I cannot give you an unequivocal guarantee, much as I would like to, that it is necessarily going to work.

Senator Coverdell. Dr. Campbell.

Dr. Campbell. Senator, I would put it at yellow. I think, as Assistant Secretary Roth has indicated, both sides tend to use military forces to signal. And I think one of the things that we have to be careful about is that I think both Taiwan and the PRC sometimes believe that they have an ability to signal in ways that the other side understands completely. And I think our experience certainly during the cold war and other experiences indicates that that kind of signalling is often very much misunderstood by the other side.

And I think what we worry about are circumstances, again, like Secretary Roth has indicated, are when you have got forces in proximity, trying to signal the other side, look, we mean business, we are serious, on whatever particular issue, that there are potentials for accidents and miscalculation. And I would say that the greatest concern that we at the Department of Defense has, and I think the administration has, is for an inadvertent or an accidental act.

Which, frankly, leads us back to where Secretary Roth began today. Which is that the most important thing that can happen is for lines of communication to be reestablished, without preconditions. And those lines of communications should be on a range of issues, not least of which, we think, issues designed to preclude the possibility of this kind of miscalculation or accident.

Ultimately, however, it is not our choice. One of the six assurances that we provided to Taiwan--and in fact, we informed the PRC in the 1980's--is that we will not interfere in their complex diplomacy. And so while we can make suggestions that this kind of mechanism might be useful, we cannot insist on it and we cannot inject ourselves into it.

I think one of the principles that is absolutely clear is that when we become more directly involved in this complex cross-Strait security dimension, the potential for instability probably grows, rather than is reduced.

Senator Coverdell. Interesting.

Senator Kerry.

Senator Kerry. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Obviously a topic of enormous consequence in so many different ways. I find myself exceedingly sympathetic to the chairman of the committee, Senator Helms, and the sentiment that he is expressing--the notion that there ought to be some clarity. But I obviously--maybe not obviously--find myself sharing the position of Senator Biden and others that the methodology is at least provocative and potentially dangerous.

But there is a fine line, clearly, that needs to be walked here. And I wonder if we are walking it correctly, if there is not something short of what the chairman seeks to do in his legislation, but greater than what is on the table today.

Reading your testimony, Mr. Secretary Roth, you say: ``Both missions had the same objective''--this in your trips to Taipei and Beijing--``to listen to senior leaders, to make sure they understood the United States' firm adherence to its longstanding policies, one-China, and our insistence on peaceful resolution of differences.''

Well, the one-China part, we can all understand. What does it mean, ``insistence on peaceful resolution of differences''? Is not the ambiguity that has purposefully existed in that in fact potentially leading China, in the wake of other aspects of the U.S.-China relationship, to make some judgments that might push the limits, absent some greater clarity to that particular sentence? What is your reaction to that?

Mr. Roth. Well, I think that sentence was chosen to try to reduce, not increase, ambiguity. The notion is that this is not a mere talking point, when we say, you know, if you use the standard rhetoric--and in cross-Strait issues, people tend to use the same rhetoric with almost theological significance--so you always say the United States has a abiding interest in the peaceful resolution of these issues.

My goal in drafting this sentence was to get away from that diplomatic language and just make it clear that what we are saying to people is this matters to us, that we take this very seriously--what I have said earlier today. We have a track record about how seriously we take this. And understand that this has to be resolved peacefully.

Senator Kerry. Well, speaking of the track record, Mr. Secretary--and I say this as the devil's advocate--but many people in the Congress today, and publicly, have written about and argued that the administration has not gotten very much for its constructive engagement policy with China. And the question, therefore, is being asked: Are they interpreting, therefore, the track record of the last years and where we currently are in a way that leads them to make some of these decisions, in a way that emboldens them, which then leads Senator Helms and others to believe we have to be more clear about what this means to us and what we might do?

Could one follow from the other, logically?

Mr. Roth. Well, perhaps I was being too diplomatic. When I was referring to the track record, I was talking about our actions in March 1996.

Senator Kerry. You are talking about the up-scaling in the Strait?

Mr. Roth. The deployment of the two carriers in response to what we felt were provocative actions by the PRC, that threatened the peace and stability of the region. And consequently, at that point, the administration acted, and acted decisively.

Senator Kerry. So that is the message you want China to clearly understand?

Mr. Roth. That we are serious about peaceful resolution.

Senator Kerry. What would you say to those critics who suggest that--when you look at the crackdown on dissidents, when you look at--I do not want to have to run through the whole record, you know the litany--what is your response to that, that in fact you are not getting very much from China, and therefore, your saber rattling in response is hollow? Again, a devil's advocate question.

Mr. Roth. I am not sure I understand the two linkages. If you are asking me about engagement policy in general with China and whether it has worked, we have always taken the position that this is designed to achieve results, and that the proof of the pudding is in the eating. That it is not engagement, full- out engagement, but that it is engagement for the sake of making progress on issues. And if it does not succeed, then we will have to try something else.

And we have argued, and I think with a pretty good case, that in some areas we have made considerable progress, in some areas we have made slight progress, and in some areas we have not made progress. So the record is open. But I certainly would not accept that engagement has failed across the board. I think there is a lot to show for it in some areas quite specifically, including on the nonproliferation side, including on some of our foreign policy areas where we work, on North Korea, South Asia and a few other areas.

So I think it is a mixed record. But I do not see how the overall debate about the effectiveness of engagement policy relates to the credibility on cross-Strait, where I think there is a very specific track record of the administration's seriousness on this issue.

Senator Kerry. And in your judgment, then, there can be no ambiguity in the leaders' of China's minds with respect to what that phrase means and what our position is?

Mr. Roth. I hope not. I cannot speak for the leaders of China. But I think we have made our positions very clear.

Senator Kerry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman [presiding]. Are you through?

Senator Biden. I just have one question, Mr. Chairman. And I know we have an important panel waiting.

China has deployed a large number of short-range missiles opposite Taiwan, and may deploy more missiles over the next 5 years. What can and should the U.S. do to increase Taiwan's ability to defend itself from this new threat?

Mr. Roth. Well, I think the first point is, and a point the administration has emphasized particularly to the PRC, is that China's actions matter. And that if China is perceived as acquiring major new capabilities, that that is going to trigger reasonable demands for U.S. responses. And I have specifically testified here previously--and let me repeat again today--that the administration has not precluded the sale of TMD to Taiwan, because we are specifically going to have to see, once the systems mature, as Dr. Campbell indicated, whether it is an appropriate response to the threat.

But what we said to the PRC is this is the moment for diplomacy. They are supposed to be having cross-Strait dialog. And one of the things that would make the most sense to be talking about with Taiwan would be the whole issue of missiles and TMD. You do not want them to get TMD; they do not want to be threatened by missiles. This is an obvious basis for discussion. And perhaps you two can work something out. If not, our options are open. So that is been the primary response that we have made.

Senator Biden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you very much.

Dr. Campbell. I would say just very quickly that the key here in the short term is going to be restraint. And it is absolutely critical for the PRC, over the next year or two, to demonstrate restraint when it comes to the deployment and development of systems across the Taiwan Strait.

The Chairman. But what are you going to do if they continue to thumb their noses at you and steal our secrets and make the big ``B'' out of them? I think we are just scared to death of them.

Mr. Roth. Well, Mr. Chairman, maybe I can respond to that, because I had asked prior to the recess to respond to you. Because you have made this statement that this administration is scared to death of them and this administration does not deal with them on a government-to-government level because we are afraid of their response.

And even though I know this argument is not going to persuade you, I think it is important for the record to indicate, first of all, every administration since 1979, including 12 years of Reagan and Bush, has had the policy of not having senior diplomats and military officials travel there. This is not a new policy.

But, furthermore, every major country in the world, every major power on every continent, behaves in exactly the same fashion. And the notion that this is simply cowardice on the part of every country in the world and every administration in the U.S. for the last 20 years I think is not fair. I think this has been a pragmatic formulation that has worked to promote peace and stability and Taiwan's own interest. And so I think that is the basis for it.

The Chairman. Well, I thank you, gentlemen. It is just a fact that Communist China has not been as belligerent in previous administrations. But I thank you for coming this morning. We have got the home team coming in on the panel now.

We are honored to have some officials of previous administrations: The Hon. Richard V. Allen, one of Ronald Reagan's right-hand men, whom I have known ever since then, and very well. And then there is the Hon. Caspar Weinberger, who is a great patriot and a good friend. Dr. David M. Lampton, director of China Studies at Johns Hopkins University. And last, and certainly not least, Jim Woolsey, formerly of the CIA.

Since we always begin on the left, and I do not know exactly why that is----

Senator Biden. It is a good habit, Mr. Chairman. It is a good habit.

The Chairman. Well, from the other view, it is on the right.

Mr. Allen, if you will proceed, sir.

Statement of Richard V. Allen, Allen & Company, Washington, DC

Mr. Allen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, Senator Coverdell, Senator Kerry, and other members of the committee who may come in. I am pleased to have an opportunity to share my views with you on this important legislation.

The United States has longstanding and solemn responsibilities toward Taiwan. This bill is timely and necessary primarily because the future security of Taiwan has been jeopardized by the policies of the administration and by the words and actions of the President and Secretary of State. Unless the Congress acts promptly to do something, Taiwan's future as the only Chinese democracy may be threatened.

The United States needs to have a straightforward, productive, positive, and normal relationship with the People's Republic of China. It has striven to do so. But a sound relationship with China does not mean that this country is obliged to respond to China's demands in a matter absolutely vital to our national security interests in the Pacific Basin and, more importantly, an obligation that is rooted in the law of the United States.

When President Jimmy Carter announced, on December 15, 1978, that he intended to establish formal diplomatic relations with the PRC, it came as a great surprise, and especially to Congress. On January 29, 1979, the President sent to Congress a draft bill. It was vague and feckless. The Congress immediately recognized the inherent risks in these Carter proposals, and set out to remedy them with tough, unambiguous and bipartisan language.

The final version of the Taiwan Relations Act, completely and dramatically different from Mr. Carter's version, was approved on March 29, 2 months after its introduction, in the Senate by a vote of 90 to 6 and in the House by 345 to 55. As Senator Biden noted, both you and he were there to cast that vote.

President Carter did not even try to resist, and signed that act on April 10, 1979. The clear intent of Congress was to assert its inherent constitutional powers to remedy a dangerously defective administration approach to a vital national security interest. As one expert put it, Congress, as an institution, brought all of its foreign affairs authorities to bear in enacting one of the most successful legislative initiatives of foreign policymaking in U.S. history.

The fundamental changes imposed by Congress conferred great significance on the future of our relationship with Taiwan, especially in providing adequate weapons to Taiwan so that it might defend itself against the only source of future aggression: the People's Republic of China.

The PRC insists that its version of the future of Taiwan is the only valid outcome. In its eyes, Taiwan is a renegade province, ruled by a nonexistent, illegal clique. And it has not renounced the use of force to reincorporate Taiwan.

We are in a period now of rough sailing in our relations with the People's Republic of China. And there is no question that the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade was a monumental blunder, even if it was an accident. It fanned nationalist sentiment, and allowed mobs to attack our Embassy in retaliation, in an ominous signal--not just petulant behavior that would pass by temporarily. Its vituperative attacks on the United States and those who insist that Taiwan's safety represents a vital American interest is unceasing.

S. 693 makes 20 important findings, and then proceeds to direct the Departments of State and Defense to make available a variety of defensive weapons that are going to update and modernize Taiwan's ability to defend itself. The administration argues that the Taiwan Relations Act is working and does not require adjustment or amplification. The administration also considers S. 693 to be intrusive, by placing unwanted restrictions on the ability of the executive branch to conduct foreign affairs, and it is congressional micromanagement.

These arguments are certainly not valid in the matter of Taiwan security. The Congress has a special ongoing responsibility to ensure that the law is upheld. If the Taiwan Relations Act were now being implemented fully or faithfully, there would be no need for Congress to exert its prerogatives and to draft S. 693 in the first place. In the 6\1/2\ years of the Clinton administration, the effectiveness of the TRA has been slowly eroded.

And numbers do not tell the story alone. Notably eroded since the visit of President Clinton to China last June, when he inexplicably embraced Beijing's ``three noes'' regarding Taiwan. This indeed was an important tilt, a change in U.S. policy. It sent a message. And I believe it was the wrong one.

From the outset, Beijing has simply rejected the Taiwan Relations Act as a gross interference in its internal affairs. China repeatedly declares the TRA to be null and void, of no significance whatever. It insists that the three communiques are the only basis for the Sino-American relationship. I have heard that argument for years, especially since Deng Tsiao Peng recited it to George Bush, then candidate for Vice President, and me in August 1980, in a pre-election trip that we took.

This, Mr. Chairman, is the nub of the argument: Does the law of the land, the Taiwan Relations Act, take precedence over diplomatic communiques? The administration may think it does not. Finding 11 of S. 693 puts it clearly: ``As has been affirmed on several occasions by the executive branch of government, the provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act take legal precedence over any communique with the People's Republic of China.''

The administration, I think, misleads the Congress and the American people when it insists that it has been just following the precedence of previous administrations. According to the legal advisor of the State Department in 1982: These communiques do not constitute a treaty or a legally binding international agreement, creating obligations and rights under international law, but, rather, are statements of future U.S. policy.

I now come to the central point of S. 693, the provision of defensive armaments to Taiwan. The very first stated purpose of the Taiwan Relations Act is to help maintain peace, security and stability in the western Pacific. The law states that to accomplish this, ``the President and the Congress shall determine the nature and quantity of such defense articles and services based solely upon their judgment and the needs of Taiwan.''

If the administration really believes that the defense of Taiwan's democracy is hinged to the continuity of its capability to deter war, why does it threaten to penalize Taiwan by withholding arms transfers and technical cooperation? Why did the Secretary of State make the incredible statement that Taiwanese elaboration of President Lee Teng-hui's July 9 speech ``does not quite do it,'' as if to put Taiwan in the corner, and as if to pressure it to hurry up and sign some interim agreements, leading to the reunification with the PRC.

Should President Lee Teng-hui issue a full mea culpa and petition Beijing for its understanding? Does not this policy stance actually put the United States on the side of a repressive and hostile PRC regime? The same folks who gave us Tiananmen Square, repress and jail democratic dissidents, who mobilized to crush spiritual movements like the Falun Gong and issue an arrest warrant for its leader who lives in the United States, who systematically violates every principle of human rights, who continue to subjugate Tibet.

At what price can we finally achieve, or purchase, a decent and stable relationship with the People's Republic of China?

Some specialists argue that China would be willing to fight the United States over Taiwan, either now or soon. And that this new possibility introduces a new dimension to our policy deliberations. It is the dimension of risk, which is inherent in every aspect of our foreign policy, and certainly was a characteristic of the cold war. Risk was the essence of our response to the Soviet Union.

Given the pace of China's military power and its buildup far in excess of its defensive requirements, we must fairly conclude that China anticipates that it will need to project its power in the region, perhaps to displace eventually the United States as the principal determinant of what goes on in the western Pacific, or to demonstrate sufficient muscle to persuade its neighbors to go along and get along on China's terms. But the most ominous reason, Mr. Chairman, for the accumulation of military power appears to be the prospective subjugation of Taiwan, preferably by threat of force and, in extremis, the actual use of force, while being able to deter the United States from intervening.

We need to look at our own capabilities and our long-term strategy. We cannot and should not proceed on the assumption that we will be drawn into conflict with China for any reason, yet neither can we afford to abandon our role or our capabilities in the region. Like all legislation, the Taiwan Relations Act is not frozen in time.

S. 693 is consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act. It properly elaborates the TRA in strategic conditions that prevail today and into the next decade. It is a response to present needs and is but the continuation of an insurance policy wisely enacted through congressional initiative 20 years ago.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Allen follows:]

Prepared Statement of Richard V. Allen S.693, A Bill to Assist in the Enhancement of the Security of Taiwan, and for other Purposes

Mr. Chairman, Senator Torricelli and Members of the Committee: I am pleased to have an opportunity to discuss this important joint initiative, to fulfill long-standing and solemn responsibilities of the United States toward Taiwan. This Bill is timely and necessary, primarily because the future security of Taiwan, the Republic of China, has been unfortunately jeopardized by the policies of the Administration and by the words and actions of the President and the Secretary of State. Unless the Congress acts promptly, Taiwan's future as the only Chinese democracy in the world may be threatened.

The United States should have a productive, straightforward and normal relationship with the People's Republic of China. My views are not intended to antagonize or confront those who may disagree with them, least of all the Government of China. But in my view a sound relationship with China does not mean that this country should be obliged to respond to China's demands in a matter that is absolutely vital to our national security interests in the Pacific Basin, and, more important, an obligation that is rooted in law.

Cross-Strait relations has been an issue of interest to me for decades, at least since the mid-1950s. In 1968 I served as foreign policy coordinator for Richard Nixon during his campaign for the presidency, and assisted in his now-famous October 1967 Foreign Affairs article, ``Asia After Vietnam,'' in which he signaled his intention for an ``opening'' to China. I was Deputy Assistant to the President when he announced his historic 1972 trip to China. From 1977-1980 I served as chief foreign policy advisor to Ronald Reagan, and between the 1980 nominating convention and the formal start of the campaign, I initiated a trip to China with the George Bush, then the nominee for Vice President, to meet with Chinese leaders, including Deng Tsiao Peng, to explain what a Reagan-Bush administration China policy would be if the ticket were elected in November of that year. I worked directly with candidate and then President Reagan on every aspect of his policy toward China and Taiwan during the first year of his Administration.

When President Jimmy Carter announced on December 15, 1978 that he intended to establish formal diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China, it came as a great surprise, especially to Congress. On January 29, 1979, the President sent to Congress a draft Bill; it was vague and feckless. The Congress immediately recognized the inherent risks in the Carter proposals, and set out to remedy them with tough and unambiguous language. Within five weeks both Houses of Congress had finished hearings and reported amended versions of the Bill, which was further amended on the floor of the House and Senate. Additional strengthening came in a joint conference, and the final version, completely and dramatically different from Mr. Carter's version, was approved on March 29, 1979, precisely two months after being introduced. That final version was approved in the Senate by a vote of 90 to 6, and in the House by 345 to 55. Faced with such overwhelming Congressional sentiment, President Carter did not try to resist, and signed the act on April 10, 1979. That swift legislative path, especially on such a critically important piece of legislation, was remarkable. It faithfully reflected the strong feelings of the Congress and the American people.

Perhaps more remarkable was the clear intent of Congress to assert its inherent constitutional powers in pursuit of a remedy for what it perceived to be a dangerously defective Administration approach to a vital national security interest. As one expert analyst so eloquently put it, ``Congress as an institution brought all of its foreign affairs authorities to bear in enacting one of the most successful legislative initiatives of foreign policy making in U.S. history. . . . this law stands as a model of decisive action by Congress with energy and dispatch to secure and advance the nation's foreign interests. By an unusual exercise of bicameral and bipartisan cooperation, Congress used the legislative power competently at a moment of dramatic change in U.S. policy to serve both the ends of the executive and the national interest.'' \1\ ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\1\ Terry Emerson, ``The Taiwan Relations Act--Successful Foreign Policy Making By Congress,'' Address to The Asia Society, Los Angeles, April 22, 1988. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Very significant is that the Congress responded to defective policy proposals of the President by making the best of what it clearly perceived to be an undesirable and, in the eyes of many, dangerous situation. Moreover, the fundamental changes imposed by Congress conferred great significance on the future of our relationship with Taiwan, especially in the sector of providing adequate weapons to Taiwan so that it might defend itself against the only real source of future aggression, the PRC, and it included specific language identifying boycotts and embargoes as a ``threat to peace'' and ``of grave concern'' to the United States.

So, twenty years later the United States again finds itself in a state of relative confusion vis-a-vis China and the handling of Taiwan's future security. The PRC has adroitly played a waiting game, insisting that its version of the future of Taiwan is the only valid outcome; in its eyes, Taiwan is a ``renegade'' province ruled by a non- existent, illegal clique, and it has not renounced the use of force to reincorporate Taiwan under Beijing's control. The issue of Hong Kong having been ``solved,'' China will reacquire control of Macao later this year, leaving only Taiwan as an outstanding ``issue.''

I cite this important history because we have clearly entered a period of rough sailing in