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S. HRG. 102-190

U.S. SOVIET MARITIME BOUNDARY AGREEMENT,
TREATY DOC. 101-22

HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SECOND CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

JUNE 13, 1991

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
44-474 WASHINGTON : 1991

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington. DC 20402
ISBN 0-16-035552-4

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CONTENTS

Murkowski, Frank H., U.S. Senator from Alaska, prepared statement........... 7

Olson, Carl, Chairman, State Department Watch...............................19
   Prepared statement.......................................................26

Stevens, Ted., U.S. Senator from Alaska.....................................16

Williamson, Hon. Edwin D., Legal Adviser to the U.S. Department of State.....8
   Prepared statement .......................................................9

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U.S.-SOVIET MARITIME BOUNDARY
AGREEMENT, TREATY DOC. 101-22
THURSDAY, JUNE 13, 1991
U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:19 p.m. in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., presiding.

Present: Senators Biden and Murkowski.

Senator BIDEN. The hearing will come to order.

Senator Helms, who will be here, is unavoidably delayed and will be a few minutes late, but hopes to be here to participate because he has some interest, more than a passing interest in this subject. But we are going to begin, and I apologize for keeping you waiting.

Today the United States and the Soviet Union stand at a crossroads. One path holds a continuation of the distrust and conflict that have characterized our dealings for nearly a half century, and in truth ever since 1917. The other path holds a more constructive future. On that road, if the two sides take it together, lies the possibility of constructive cooperation in our mutual benefit and to the benefit of the world community at large.

But today the subcommittee meets to consider a measure that constitutes one small step down that path of cooperation. This measure, the U.S.-Soviet Maritime Boundary Treaty, represents the attempt of the two sides to resolve an important dispute through negotiation, compromise, and mutual pledge to abide by the solemn obligations of a bilateral treaty and international law.

The dispute this treaty would lay to rest concerns the sovereign rights and jurisdiction of the United States and the Soviet Union in the seas between Alaska and Siberia. The treaty would govern each country's right to manage fisheries and to conduct oil and gas exploration and development in a vast maritime area.

The treaty was signed by Secretary of State Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze on June 1, 1990, after 9 years, 9 long years, of negotiation, and was submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent last September. The negotiations addressed four fundamental issues:

First, the basis for defining the limits of each country's maritime jurisdiction where under international law they would otherwise overlap.

Second, the method of description of the boundary lines established by the 1867 Convention, by which Russia ceded Alaska to

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the United States and made it possible for Mr. Murkowski to become a U.S. Senator; and I might note parenthetically, I did not mean he could not have been a Senator from somewhere else, but at least from Alaska. I do not want to encourage you to come to Delaware, Frank.

Third, the limit of each country's maritime jurisdiction in the areas outside of the 200-mile exclusive economic zones.

Fourth, the question of jurisdiction over areas that are within one country's 200-mile zone but on the other country's side of the boundary line.

The Maritime Boundary Agreement resolves these conflicts by: One, declaring that the 1867 Convention line is the maritime boundary between the United States and the Soviet Union; two, establishing a precise geographic description of the line; and three, providing for the transfer of jurisdiction and Russia rights in four special areas.

I look forward to hearing from our three witnesses today: Senator Ted Stevens of Alaska, who will be here later; Mr. Edwin Williamson, the State Department Legal Adviser; and Mr. Carl Olson, Chairman of an organization called State Department Watch.

Senator Stevens is attending a closed briefing at this time and will arrive later to give his statement. So at this time I would like to yield to my colleague, Mr. Murkowski, and then, assuming Senator Helms is not able to be here by then, and he probably will not be able to be, we will then yield to the State Department representative, Mr. Williamson, to make his statement, and we will proceed from there.

Senator MURKOWSKI Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your reference to the short time that Alaska has been a member of the Union, because oftentimes we try and convince our colleagues that we have a lot of catching up to do.

Senator BIDEN. We in Delaware view it that way, too.

Senator MURKOWSKI. And issues like ANWR and other controversial points of view clearly represent Alaska's effort to establish an economic pattern of support of a sound economy, when your State and others achieved that 100 years ago. We hope that we can learn by your mistakes.

Mr. Chairman, I very much appreciate you holding this hearing on the U.S.-Soviet Maritime Boundary Agreement. As you have pointed out, it is a treaty of great importance to my State of Alaska.

It is kind of unique as we address issues in the far North and find that all the Arctic in the United States happens to be in Alaska. If we had a few other States, it would be reaching a little bit to go to Delaware, but nevertheless a few other allies---

Senator BIDEN. You would get lost.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Well, you never can tell. It would allow us to pick up a few allies and have perhaps a little better understanding. But the reality is that the resources of North America are coming from the Arctic, and it is important that the decisions we make with regard to resource development be based on sound scientific evidence, where scientists are willing to basically put their reputation behind their recommendations.

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Unfortunately, much of the decisionmaking process is emotional, one of who can shout the loudest or generate the most argument on any particular side.

Now, this agreement, as you pointed out, has been under negotiation for a long time. The State of Alaska has had an opportunity to be briefed on the process, and I would ask that letters from Governor Hickel and former Governor Cowper be entered into the record that substantiate the specific communications that the State has had with the U.S. Government over this extended period of time.

Senator BIDEN. Without objection.

[The information referred to follows:]

STATE OF ALASKA,
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, JUNEAU, AK,
May 81, 1991.

Hon. JOSEPH A. BIDEN, Jr.,
Chairman, Senate Subcommittee on European Affairs,
Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I support the proposed U.S.-Soviet Maritime Boundary agreement and am satisfied that the agreement adequately addresses and protects the interests of the Uaited States and Alaska.

This treaty would resolve longstanding boundary disputes between the U.S. and the Soviet Union that have retarded fisheries management and mineral development. The treaty would allow oil development by U.S. companies in previously disputed areas, and would facilitate fisheries management and enforcement by clearly delineating extensive areas available to U.S. fishermen. Also, the treaty would extend U.S. jurisdiction to an additional 13,200 square nautical miles, thereby placing approximately 70 percent of the Bering Sea under U.S. control.

The final resolution of the current dispute would be further evidence of the evolving cooperation and goodwill between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. In turn, this spirit of cooperation will create increased trade, scientific and medical exchanges, and other types of economic and social interchange between U.S. and Soviet citizens.

It is my understanding that the treaty negotiations never encompassed the issue of ownership of Wrangel and other Bering Sea islands and that the proposed treaty does not address this question.

Thank you for considering my views.

With best regards. Sincerely,

WALTER J. HICKEL,
Governor.

STATE OF ALASKA,
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, JUNEAU, AK,
June 27, 1988

Hon. GEORGE SCHULTZ,
Secretary of State, Department of State,
Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Enclosed is a copy of a joint resolution of the Alaska Legislature regarding the United States' negotiations of its boundaries with the Soviet Union and Canada.

The resolution notes that there have been several rounds of boundary negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union regarding the nations' boundaries near Alaska. It states, among other things, that "the Department of State has never * * * formally solicited the input or advice of the state [of Alaska] about the content or strategy of the negotiations.

It is my ministerial duty to sign all joint legislative resolutions, and I have performed that duty in this case. I think it is only fair to acknowledge, however, that your Department has consulted with my Washington, DC, office and with Alaska's Congressional Delegation both before and after each round of negotiations, and has formally solicited the state's advice.

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Whatever arrangements should be made in the future for a more formal role for the state, I have appreciated your efforts to keep us informed and involved.

Sincerely,

STEVE COWPER,
Governor.

Senator MURKOWSKI. I am pleased to report that, at long last, we seem to have resolved the issue in dispute between ourselves and the Soviet Union over fishing rights and mineral exploration in the Arctic Ocean and the Bering Sea. The Congress, the executive branch, and the State of Alaska have worked closely together throughout the decade to achieve the results that we have before us today. All three are to be praised and recognized for the hard work and diligence that produced this treaty.

The U.S.-Soviet Maritime Boundary Agreement represents a very favorable outcome in terms of U.S. strategic and resource interests. It precisely defines the Convention line which was drawn when we purchased Alaska from Imperial Russia in 1867. The treaty limits the United States and the Soviet Union's territorial sea, exclusive economic zones, or EEZ's, and Continental Shelf jurisdiction when they would otherwise overlap.

As a result, it proposes to settle disputes which have in the past arisen concerning fishing rights in the area, valuable fishing rights, and oil and gas exploration.

Mr. Chairman, under the terms of the Maritime Boundary Treaty, the parties agree: One, that the 1867 Convention line is the maritime -- and I stress because there may be some misunderstand ing later in the hearing, I stress it is a maritime boundary -- between the United States and the Soviet Union.

It also clarifies how the 1867 line is to be defined, something that was left ambiguous in the Convention because we and the Russians used different cartographic techniques. This difference resulted in almost 21,000 square miles in the Bering Sea being claimed by each nation, the Soviet Union and the United States, as falling on its individual side of the 1867 line. So each side claimed it.

The disputed area contains very rich fishing grounds, oil and gas potential. And what we have in this new agreement is a division of the disputed area between the parties.

The 1,600-mile maritime boundary it creates is the longest boundary in the world. It will definitely establish once and for all U.S. and Soviet territorial sea jurisdictions, as well as EEZ and Continental Shelf jurisdictions, in the Bering Sea and the Arctic Ocean.

The treaty also establishes a precise maritime boundary in areas where our two countries' 12-mile territorial sea or 200-mile EEZ overlap or are otherwise in dispute and delimits the parties' Continental Shelf jurisdiction beyond their 200-mile EEZ.

Finally, by adopting an innovative "special areas" formula in the treaty, we minimize the size of the so-called doughnut hole in the Bering Sea that is beyond the fisheries jurisdiction of either party. This is that area 200 miles beyond the shore of either the Soviet Union or the United States.

What we did in the doughnut hole ultimately is give approxi mately 20 percent to 25 percent more to the United States, which certainly supports our contention of managing that area from the standpoint of vessels that go in there and seek sanctuary and then

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move out into the surrounding area within the 200-mile zone and fish.

Now, the bottomline is that this treaty places about 70 percent of the Bering Sea under U.S. jurisdiction and gives the United States an extra 13,200 square nautical miles, an area nearly equal in size to the combined area of New Hampshire and Vermont, as compared with the most favorable equidistant line. So one can conclude that we have benefited by approximately 13,200 square nautical miles in this delineation.

Now, Mr. Chairman, we have another issue here and, while I am pleased to support the maritime boundary, I am also equally pleased to note that it has the support of the State of Alaska, and I will get into what the other issue is in just a minute.

You have already indicated an acceptance of the letter from our Governor in which he states: "I support the proposed U.S.-Soviet Maritime Boundary Agreement and I am satisfied that the agree ment adequately addresses and protects the interests of the United States and Alaska."

You have also indicated an acceptance of the letter of June 27, 1988, from former Governor Cowper to former Secretary of State Schultz, in which Governor Cowper notes that the State Department "has consulted with my Washington, DC, office and with the Alaska congressional delegation both before and after each round of negotiations and has formally solicited the State's advice."

Mr. Cowper concludes his letter with these words: "I have appre ciated your efforts to keep us informed and involved."

Now, to get to the other issue, Mr. Chairman, I think we have a peripheral issue here before us that certainly is important. It is an issue, however, that has really nothing specific to do with the treaty that is before us, but one which nevertheless attaches itself to the treaty. This is the so-called five islands or the Wrangel Island issue.

I feel very qualified to speak on the Wrangel Island because I lived on Rangell Island for 4 years, from 1964 to 1966, and I would suggest that not only am I the only one in the room to have that distinction, but probably the only one in Washington, DC.

Now, I will concede that the island that I lived on had two l's at the end instead of one. But they are often confused, as I look at the audience and see some confusion at my profound reference to having lived on Rangell for 4 years. As a consequence, many of the 700,000 tourists that annually go through Rangell in southeastern Alaska by cruise ship and read accounts of us not claiming Wrangel Island, much of the confusion associated with the five island issue comes about.

Senator BIDEN. You mean you were not sure whether you were a Soviet or an American during that period of time?

Senator MURKOWSKI. No. I tell you, Rangell was -- you are going to learn more history than you ever wanted.

Senator BIDEN. Where is it on the map?

Senator MURKOWSKI. Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, would you believe that it is not even on the map?

Senator BIDEN. All right. Thank you.

Senator MURKOWSKI. It is on the part of Alaska that is off to the right, close to Delaware.

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Senator BIDEN. Got you. [Laughter]

Senator MURKOWSKI. Probably closer to Delaware than it is the Soviet Union. It is the archipelago down near Ketchikan, that wanders down off the Canadian coast. And unless some of the staff can produce an immediate map, I cannot show you where it is, but it is about 900 miles north of Seattle.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you.

Senator MURKOWSKI. And about 1,200 miles south of Anchorage.

But I wanted to point out that distinction to either clarify or confuse those who are addressing the topic today.

Well, as we look at the five island issue, or Wrangel Island, and that is the largest of the five islands, U.S. citizens were certainly involved in the discovery or exploration of each of these islands, located in the Chukchi and the East Siberian Seas.

I would ask that the staff with a pointer or appropriate long hand go out and point to where that is. Is there a volunteer on either side? Obviously, we have not rehearsed this. Go ahead, see if you can find it, because I want to make sure the chairman -- Wrangel Island is about 70 miles long.

Senator BIDEN. That is not the one you lived on?

Senator MURKOWSKI. No. No, I lived on the other one, the one that is way down near Delaware.

Senator BIDEN. I just wanted to make sure I understand.

Senator MURKOWSKI. No, that is quite all right.

Some of the other islands that are in dispute are Henrietta -- would you show.

STAFF. Herald is here and the other three are --

Senator MURKOWSKI. They are on another map, to the left. Well, you have got some idea of the geography, Mr. Chairman.

Now, as I said, U.S. citizens were involved in the discovery or exploration of each of these islands located in the Chukchi and East Siberian Seas. It is alleged that by ratifying the Maritime Boundary Treaty the United States would recognize claims -- excuse me. I think this is important.

It is alleged that by ratifying the Maritime Boundary Treaty the United States would recognize Soviet claims to these islands. Well, that is not true, but such an allegation has been made. The treaty, as I have emphasized time and time again, is a maritime treaty, not an instrument that addresses the issue of sovereignty over territory.

The five islands are not mentioned or alluded to in the treaty that we are now considering. Our claim to them is not properly a matter for discussion in connection with the ratification of this treaty, and a vote in favor of the treaty in no way prejudices potential future U.S. claims to these islands.

Mr. Chairman, I had an opportunity as a member of the Intelligence Committee to view some classified photos of Wrangel Island and I can tell you that Wrangel Island is inhabited. There is an air strip, there is a radar station, and there is an Arctic research station there.

But it is a very, very harsh environment, with just a few months of open sea. There is no source of food, nor is there a source of fuel, with the exception of the musk ox that were planted there some time ago and a small herd of reindeer or mixed caribou in the area.

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But it is a very, very harsh environment, and the other islands are even more severe in their climatic and barren status. But that begs the issue.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I would urge that my colleagues on the committee and the full Senate ratify the U.S.-Soviet Maritime Boundary Agreement because it will resolve many significant bilateral differences which have existed between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Bering Sea and will allow for the peaceful management of fisheries and mineral exploration in the area, and it will benefit my State of Alaska substantially for resolving once and for all just where that line of boundary is.

I want to commend those who are responsible for the negotiation. It took, obviously, a long time. I think it is fair to say that there is a good deal of criticism in the Soviet Union because they feel our negotiators basically achieved a better settlement than theirs, and I am inclined to agree that our people did very, very well. It took a long, long time.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the witnesses' presentations.

[ prepared statement of Senator Murkowski follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR FRANK H. MURKOWSKI

Mr. Chairman, I very much appreciate your holding this hearing on the U.S.- Soviet Maritime Boundary Agreement, a treaty of the greatest importance to the United States and, especially, my State of Alaska.

This agreement was under negotiation for 9 years, and I am pleased to report that it at long last resolves areas of dispute between ourselves and the U.S.S.R. over fishing rights and mineral exploration in the Arctic Ocean and Bering Sea. The Congress, the Executive Branch and the State of Alaska have all worked closely together throughout the last decade to achieve this result. All three are to be praised for the long, hard work which produced this treaty.

The U.S.-Soviet Maritime Boundary Agreement represents a very favorable outcome in terms of U.S. strategic and resource interests. It precisely defines the Convention Line which was drawn when we purchased Alaska from Imperial Russia in 1867. The treaty limits the United States' and the U.S.S.R's territorial sea, exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and continental shelf jurisdiction when they would otherwise overlap. As a result, it settles disputes which have in the past arisen concerning fishing rights and oil and gas exploration.

Mr. Chairman, under the terms of the Maritime Boundary Treaty, the parties agree that the 1867 Convention Line is the maritime -- and I stress maritime -- boundary between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. It also clarifies how the 1867 line is to be defined, something left ambiguous in the Convention because we and the Russians used different cartographic techniques. This difference resulted in almost 21,000 square nautical miles in the Bering Sea being claimed by each nation as falling on its side of the 1867 line.

The disputed area contains rich fishing grounds and may have some potential for oil and gas. The new agreement divides the disputed area between the parties. The 1,600-mile maritime boundary it creates -- the longest in the world -- will definitively establish U.S. and Soviet territorial sea jurisdiction, as well as EEZ and continental shelf jurisdiction in the Bering Sea and Arctic Ocean. The treaty also establishes a precise maritime boundary in areas where our two countries' 12-mile territorial seas or 200-mile EEZs overlap or are otherwise in dispute, and delimits the parties' continental shelf jurisdiction beyond their 200-mile EEZs. Finally, by adopting an innovative "special areas" formula the treaty minimizes the size of the so-called "dough nut hole" in the Bering Sea that is beyond the fisheries jurisdiction of either party.

The "bottom line" is that this treaty places about 70 percent of the Bering Sea under U.S. jurisdiction and gives the United States an extra 13,200 square nautical miles -- an area nearly equal in size to the combined area of New Hampshire and Vermont -- as compared with the most favorable equidistant line.

I am pleased to be able to support the Maritime Boundary Treaty, and I am equally pleased to note that it has the support of the State of Alaska. In fact, I have

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received a copy of a May 31st letter from Governor Hickel to you, Mr. Chairman, in which he states that "I support the proposed U.S-Soviet Maritime Boundary agreement and am satisfied that the agreement adequately addresses and protects the interests of the United States and Alaska." I also have a copy of a June 27, 1988 letter from former Governor Cowper to former Secretary of State Schultz in which Governor Cowper notes that the State Department "has consulted with my Washington, DC, office and with Alaska's Congressional Delegation both before and after each round of negotiations, and has formally solicited the state's advice." Mr. Cowper concludes his letter with the words, "* * * I have appreciated your efforts to keep us informed and involved."

Now, I would like to take a moment to address a peripheral issue -- an issue which really has nothing to do with the treaty before us today, but one which has nonetheless attached itself to it. This is the matter of the so-called "Five Islands," or "Wrangel Island," that island being the largest of the five. U.S. citizens were involved in the discovery or exploration of each of these islands located in the Chukchi and East Siberian Seas. It is alleged that by ratifying the Maritime Boundary Treaty the United States would recognize Soviet claims to these islands. But such an allegation is most definitely not true. The treaty, as I emphasized a minute ago, is a maritime agreement, not an instrument that addresses the issue of sovereignty over territory. The five islands are not mentioned or alluded to in the treaty we are now considering. Our claim to them is not properly a matter for discussion in connection with the ratification of this treaty, and a vote in favor of the treaty in no way prejudices potential future U.S. claims to these islands.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues on this Committee, and the full Senate, to ratify the U.S.-Soviet Maritime Boundary Agreement. It will resolve significant bilateral differences between us and the Soviet Union in the Bering Sea and will allow for the peaceful management of fisheries and mineral exploration in the area.

Thank you.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Senator. Mr. Williamson.

STATEMENT OF HON. EDWIN D. WILLIAMSON, LEGAL ADVISER TO THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE; ACCOMPANIED BY DAVID COLSON, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR OCEANS, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS; ALAN KRECZKO, DEPUTY LEGAL ADVISER; AND JAMES M. HUGHES, ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY AND DIRECTOR OF CONGRES SIONAL AND LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

Mr. WILLIAMSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Murkowski.

I am Edwin Williamson, the Legal Adviser to the U.S. Department of State. I am here today to discuss the U.S.-Soviet Maritime Boundary Agreement. With me are: David Colson, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Oceans and Fisheries, on my left; on my immediate right, Alan Kreczko, Deputy Legal Adviser; and on my far right, James Hughes, Assistant to the Secretary and Director of Congressional and Legislative Affairs at the Department of the Interior.

I have submitted a written statement, which I would like to summarize.

The treaty before you establishes the maritime boundary between the United States and the Soviet Union in the North Pacific Ocean, the Bering and Chukchi Seas, and the Arctic Ocean. Under the treaty the two countries agree that the line described as the "western limit" in the 1867 U.S.-Russia Convention ceding Alaska is the maritime boundary.

They also agree on a precise depiction of that line. Further, the agreement contains innovative transfer of jurisdiction provisions

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that will give each country the ability to exercise jurisdictional rights in new areas on its side of the boundary.

The treaty serves important U.S. national interests. First, the agreement places about 70 percent of the Bering Sea under U.S. resource jurisdiction. It allows the United States to exercise fisheries jurisdiction in several new areas and secures under U.S. jurisdiction other areas important to our fisheries interests.

In terms of hydrocarbon interests, detailed information does not exist. However, given what is known, the boundary serves the United States well both in terms of the size of the area on our side of the boundary and the quality of its resource potential.

Second, by establishing clear U.S. rights to manage fisheries and hydrocarbon activities in previously disputed areas, the agreement will permit resource activities to proceed unhampered.

Third, the agreement's special areas provision ensures that coastal state jurisdiction in accordance with international law can be exercised by one party or the other in all areas within 200 nautical miles of either or both coasts. This keeps to the minimum required by international law the size of the high seas area of the Bering Sea known as the doughnut hole beyond the 200-nautical-mile jurisdiction of both parties. That of course is particularly important to our salmon and pollock fishing interests.

Finally, the agreement removes a potentially significant source of dispute between the United States and the Soviet Union. Between any neighbors, jurisdictional disputes can give rise to serious problems. For nations with a broad-ranging and complex relationship like the U.S.-Soviet relationship, such disputes can have far-reaching political implications.

In this regard, I would emphasize that prompt U.S. ratification of the agreement could facilitate early Soviet ratification of the agreement, which is in the interests of both countries.

Thus far I have been speaking about what this agreement does. I would now like to state what it does not do. There are allegations that this agreement gives away five Arctic islands to the Soviet Union. This allegation is simply incorrect. The agreement is a maritime boundary agreement. It does not recognize Soviet sovereignty over those islands.

Mr. Chairman, this agreement is very favorable to the United States. It allocates resources in an advantageous manner. It permits fishing and hydrocarbon activity to go forward without fear of harassment or confrontation, and it resolves a long outstanding bilateral issue with the Soviet Union.

I urge the Senate to act favorably upon it. I would be pleased to answer any questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Williamson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF EDWIN D. WILLIAMSON

I am Edwin D. Williamson, the Legal Adviser to the United States Department of State. I am here today to discuss the Maritime Boundary Agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, signed at the U.S.-U.S.S.R. summit in June 1990 after 9 years of negotiation. The President has recommended that the Senate give early and favorable consideration to this agreement and advise and consent to ratification. With me today are David Colson, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Oceans, International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Alan Kreczko, Deputy

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Legal Adviser, and James M. Hughes, Assistant to the Secretary and Director of Congressional and Legislative Affairs, at the Department of Interior.

The agreement, which delimits the world's longest maritime boundary, serves important U.S. national interests. It places about 70 percent of the Bering Sea under U.S. resource jurisdiction. It establishes clear U.S. rights to manage fisheries and hydrocarbon activities in previously disputed areas. It ensures that no maritime area within 200 nautical miles of either country need go unregulated. And it removes a potentially significant source of dispute between the United States and the Soviet Union. Let me elaborate:

First, the location of the agreed maritime boundary is based on the 1867 Convention line, which is favorable to U.S. resource interests however the line is defined. From the point of view of sheer square nautical miles, it is obvious from the map that the United States has secured vast amounts of area under its resource jurisdiction. This agreement allows the U.S. to exercise fisheries jurisdiction in several new areas, which enhances our ability to manage important ground fisheries, including pollock, and to protect U.S.-origin salmon. The boundary secures under U.S. jurisdiction important crabbing areas, particularly in the shallower northern Bering Sea. In terms of hydrocarbon interests, detailed data and information do not exist. However, given what is known of the general geology of this area, the boundary serves the United States well. For example, it secures the United States? rights to a large portion of the Navarin Basin in the northern Bering Sea and the large continental shelf area in the middle of the Bering Sea.

Second, the agreement's resolution of differences over where each party may manage fisheries and hydrocarbon activities, as well as exercise other sovereign rights and jurisdiction, will permit resource activities to proceed unhampered in previously disputed areas. Importantly, it removes the potential for incidents in disputed areas involving fishing or hydrocarbon activities. Such incidents, which we have had in the past, pose a risk to life and safety.

Third, the agreement's "special areas" provision ensures that coastal state jurisdiction, in accordance with international law, may be exercised by one party or the other in all areas within 200 nautical miles of either or both coasts. This keeps to the minimum required by international law the size of the high seas area of the Bering Sea, known as the "doughnut hole," beyond the 200 nautical mile jurisdiction of both parties. That, of course, is important, particularly to our salmon and pollock fishing interests.

Finally, the agreement provides the stability of an agreed and precisely defined boundary line. Between any neighbors, jurisdictional disputes can give rise to serious problems. For nations with a broad-ranging and complex relationship such as that between the United States and the Soviet Union, such disputes and incidents can also have far-reaching political implications.

I would note that U.S. negotiation of this agreement was carried out with the full involvement and concurrence of all interested U.S. agencies. Further, every U.S. negotiating proposal, as well as the final agreement, was approved at the Presidential level.

I would also like to emphasize that our prompt ratification of the agreement could facilitate early Soviet ratification of the agreement, which is in the interest of both countries. Our failure to act could delay or make difficult ratification on the Soviet side, causing us to lose the momentum that will allow us to realize the important gains we stand to achieve under this agreement, including the certainty needed for commercial investment in hydrocarbon exploration and development.

The History of the Agreement With this introduction, I would like to turn now to a brief outline of the history of this agreement. As you probably know, in 1867 the United States purchased Alaska from the Emperor of Russia. In the 1867 Convention of Cession of Alaska, Russia ceded to the United States all "territory and dominion" up to the "western limit" specified in Article I of the Convention. At that time, the maritime jurisdiction of a coastal state over territorial sea and continental shelf was limited to one marine league (approximately 3 nautical miles).

I would now like to jump ahead by more than 100 years. By the late 1970s, an ever increasing number of countries asserted coastal state jurisdiction well beyond 3 nautical miles. In particular, there was growing recognition of a 200 nautical mile zone of economic interest. Rules for determining the outer limits of the continental shelf had also emerged.

In 1976, both the United States and the Soviet Union established 200-mile fisheries conservation zones. This presented a problem: in areas between Siberia and Alaska in which the U.S. and Soviet coasts are less than 400 miles apart, what was the limit of each state's fisheries conservation zone? Further, in U.S. outer continental shelf program planning, what should be the limits of the U.S. planning areas?

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In early 1977, the United States proposed to the Soviet Union that the two sides agree to respect treaties in force between them, in particular the 1867 Convention, in establishing their respective 200 mile zones. The Soviet government agreed, and it appeared that the two sides had resolved the most pressing issue of maritime delimitation. Later that year, a fishing enforcement incident occurred. A Japanese vessel was found fishing in U.S.-claimed waters under a Soviet license. This incident led us to question whether the United States and the Soviet Union were using different cartographic methods to depict the 1867 Convention line. This disagreement over the location of the line posed the risk of inflammatory incidents involving U.S. fishing vessels in the disputed area.

In 1981, President Reagan authorized opening discussions with the Soviets aimed at resolving the dispute over the location of the Convention line. These discussions clarified that the two countries were using two different methods of depicting the Convention line. The U.S. used lines based on "arcs of great circles," i.e., lines that best approximate the shortest distance between points on the surface of the earth. The Soviets, on the other hand, used rhumb lines, i.e., lines of constant compass bearing that appears as straight lines on a Mercator projection. The difference in these depictions resulted in a significant wedge-shaped area that each side believed was under its jurisdiction. Initially, the U.S-Soviet discussions centered on which of the two methods of depiction was the proper one, both from a technical standpoint and based on the negotiating history of the Convention. (Although various maps had been used in connection with those negotiations, there was no official map or definitive description of the Convention line).

In 1983, the United States proposed to "split the difference" between the two depictions. However, at that point it emerged that the dispute was actually broader than simply the differing methods of depiction. In 1977, the Soviets had accepted use of the Convention line in areas in which the U.S. and Soviet 200 mile zones overlapped and were now willing to depict that line on a split-the-difference basis. However, they argued that use of the Convention line would be inequitable elsewhere, i.e., in areas beyond 200 miles of both coasts and in areas within 200 miles of one coast but beyond 200 miles of the other country's coast. Use of the Convention line in those areas, the Soviets contended, would place most of the large Bering Sea continental shelf on the U.S. side of the line and would require them to give up claimed EEZ areas on the U.S. side of the line that were within 200 miles of the Soviet coast but beyond 200 miles of the U.S. coast where the United States could not claim EEZ jurisdiction.

After several years of stalemate, the core of the agreement emerged. It was agreed that the Convention line would serve as the maritime boundary throughout its entire length. Regarding the area of continental shelf beyond 200 miles of both coasts, most of this so-called "doughnut hole" lies on the U.S. side of the line. The areas on the U.S. side of the Convention line within 200 miles of the Soviet Union but beyond 200 miles of the United States were more complex. Restricting Soviet EEZ jurisdiction in these areas could have been counterproductive. Because those areas are beyond 200 miles of the U.S. coast, the United States could not, under international law, claim EEZ jurisdiction there. The result of simply applying the 1867 Convention line would therefore have been to leave these areas as high seas not regulated by either the Soviet Union or the United States. As this committee knows, this would have produced a larger "doughnut hole" in the central Bering Sea, where we and the Soviet Union share a concern about unregulated fishing. To prevent this, the two sides developed an innovative approach providing for the transfer to the United States of the Soviet right to exercise jurisdiction derived from the EEZ in such areas. Thus, rather than leaving these areas as Soviet EEZ or high seas, the United States has the right to exercise jurisdiction in these areas. To provide an equitable balance in the agreement, the U.S-proposed split-the-difference line was shifted a corresponding amount to the east.

The Maritime Boundary Agreement. With this historical background, I would now like to summarize the agreement itself. First, the parties agree that the line described as the "western limit" in Article I of the 1867 Convention is the maritime boundary between the United States and U.S.S.R. (Article 1). That line is defined precisely using a detailed geographic description contained in Article 2 and in an annex. Second, each party agrees that, with respect to the special areas, the sovereign rights and jurisdiction derived from EEZ jurisdiction that it could otherwise exercise in the absence of the agreement of the parties on the maritime boundary may henceforth be exercised by the other party. As the text of Article 3 makes clear, these novel "special area" provisions do not constitute unilateral extension of coastal state EEZ jurisdiction beyond 200 miles. Accordingly, each party is obligated to ensure that any special area in which it exercises these rights and obligations is

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represented on charts in a manner that distinguishes it from the party's exclusive economic zone.

The agreement (Article 4) also provides that the maritime boundary does not affect or prejudice either party's position with respect to the rules of international law relating to the law of the sea. It defines "coastal state jurisdiction" as referring to sovereignty, sovereign rights, or any other form of jurisdiction with respect to the waters or seabed and subsoil that may be exercised by a coastal state in accordance with the international law of the sea (Article 5). The agreement does not affect the right of hot pursuit under international law. Finally, the agreement provides that any dispute over the interpretation of the agreement is to be resolved by negotiation or other peaceful means agreed by the Parties (Article 6).

The Five Arctic Islands. Thus far, I have been speaking about what this agreement does. I would now like to state what it does not do. There are allegations that this agreement gives away five Arctic islands to the Soviet Union. This allegation is simply incorrect. The agreement is a maritime boundary agreement. It does not recognize Soviet sovereignty over those islands.

Conclusion. Mr. Chairman, this agreement represents a very favorable outcome for the United States. It allocates resources in an advantageous manner; it permits fishing and hydrocarbon activity to go forward without fear of harassment or confrontation; and it resolves a long-outstanding bilateral issue with the Soviet Union. I urge the Senate to act quickly upon it. I will be pleased to answer any questions.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Williamson, thank you for your testimony.

You made reference to one of the allegations that have been made, that the treaty has "given away" the five islands. I also would like to raise a question about the administration's coordination with other Federal departments and agencies.

Would you please describe who you received input from and whether any of these agencies expressed concerns during the negotiations and how their concerns were addressed? As you know, Governor Hickel of Alaska has submitted a letter in support of the agreement, for example. Did you consult with Alaskan officials during these negotiations?

Mr. WILLIAMSON. Yes, Senator. All relevant agencies of the U.S. Government were involved in the negotiating process and support the resulting treaty. The U.S. delegation generally included representatives from State, the Department of Defense, Interior, NOAA, and the Coast Guard.

The Department consulted regularly and extensively with the Alaska congressional delegation as well as the Alaska Governor's office in Washington. We conducted such consultations before every meeting with the Soviets. Once the negotiations began, we consulted at least before and after each round of negotiations.

I would note that these were consultations in the truest sense. That is, we were always looking for the ideas, reactions, and suggestions of the Alaska representatives.

I would also add that we offered to each Alaska Governor the opportunity to be briefed on this issue, at least one of which offers was accepted.

Senator BIDEN. With regard to the special areas that are established by the agreement, can you explain why it was necessary to create them? And what action would have to be taken to take advantage of the rights to these areas that are granted by the agreement?

Mr. WILLIAMSON. The special areas constitute the areas on a particular country's side of the boundary which are not within the 200 nautical miles of the coast of that party. There are three. On the

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U.S. side -- and Bob Smith is going to give us a slightly different map. [Chart shown.]

There is the northernmost and one on the south, on the eastern, on the U.S. side. There is also one on the Soviet side of the boundary.

To exercise the rights that were given to us under the agreement in those special areas will require implementing legislation. The reason is that the current legislation authorizes the exercise of jurisdiction in the U.S. exclusive economic zone, the EEZ, which is the area, of course, within 200 nautical miles of the U.S. coast. Special provision would have to be made for the exercise of jurisdiction in the special areas, which lie beyond nautical miles of the U.S. coast.

Senator BIDEN. I understand that, as you have mentioned, there is a large area in the center of the Bering Sea called the doughnut hole, where there will still be some question of fishing rights even after the agreement is in place. Could you explain the situation and tell us what can be done to resolve it?

Mr. WILLIAMSON. Well, first, Senator, I would like to ask Mr. Colson to speak to this issue. He was involved in our negotiations on that.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Colson.

Mr. COLSON. Thank you, Senator.

Last June at the same summit meeting at which the agreement was signed, Presidents Bush and Gorbachev issued a statement about the fishing in the doughnut hole, noting the concern of both Governments about that. Since that time, we initiated negotiations here in Washington here in February, working together with the Soviets and involving the four countries that fish in that area, which is beyond 200 miles of both coasts -- Korea, Japan, Poland, and the People's Republic of China.

We made some progress at that meeting. We reached some interim arrangements on data collection, agreement that the foreign fishing nations would not retain salmon or herring that might be caught as bycatch in that area, and they agreed to come to another meeting.

Senator BIDEN. What do you mean by "bycatch"?

Mr. COLSON. Sir, they are there -- they are not the target species of the fishery. They are there fishing for pollock and they accidentally catch salmon occasionally and, in order to create a disincentive for them to do that, they are asked to throw them back over the side.

And then they agreed to come to a further meeting. They agreed to come to a further meeting, which will be held in Tokyo in July, with a view to reach an agreement on some observer and monitoring programs, as well as development of a transponder program for that area so that we can make sure that these fishermen that are in the area, as Senator Murkowski said, are not cheating and come into the U.S. EEZ.

So it is a matter of very active negotiation. I am sure that we will probably be having a negotiating round every 3 or 4 months on this with these countries until we get it satisfactorily brought under control.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you.

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Senator Murkowski.

Senator MURKOWSKI. For just a moment, gentlemen, on the issue of discovery. I have always looked at this issue as one which, while it is not necessarily part of the Maritime Boundary Agreement, nevertheless it is before us in theory with regard to discovery, and I have looked at it from the standpoint of how we could substantiate a case for discovery.

And while we acknowledge the role that Americans played in discovery and exploration of the five islands, I believe Wrangel Island was first discovered by a U.S. vessel in 1881, and the captain reportedly raised the American flag and claimed the island for the United States. And also in 1881 the crew of a U.S. naval vessel made the first recorded landings on Bennett, Henrietta, and sighted Jeannette as well.

I am told, on the other hand, that under international law discovery itself is not sufficient to establish a right of sovereignty over or valid title to territory. Instead, discovery gives rise only to an inchoate claim that temporarily bans the establishment of dominion by another country until the discovering country has had a reasonable opportunity to occupy and possess the territory.

Discovery by a national of a country does not suffice to create even an inchoate claim. The nation itself, rather than its nationals, must manifest the intention to establish dominion. To establish definite territorial sovereignty, discovery must be combined with effective occupation by which the claimant nation exercises the actual continuous and peaceful display of the functions of a State over a territory.

And even though the island was occupied by the Lomen Co. and Lomen family for a period of time, I am wondering if you could enlighten us briefly for the record concerning the differentiation between the American discovery and the question of the application of international law and claim to the islands in question.

Mr. WILLIAMSON. Senator, as you correctly point out, discovery does provide a potential claim, but it is an inchoate claim, and something else must be done. The United States has never attempted to establish territorial sovereignty over these islands.

Wrangel, Bennett, Henrietta, and Jeannette Islands were discovered by U.S. citizens. When the Russian Imperial Government asserted sovereignty over them in 1916, the United States did not respond. Similarly, when the Soviets asserted sovereignty over them in 1924 and thereafter extended Soviet administration over them in 1926, the United States did not respond.

In 1940, the Department of State was specifically asked what its position was and it declined to assert a claim.

Senator MURKOWSKI. So by not asserting, we have not necessarily abandoned the opportunity, as is pointed out, I believe, in your opening remarks. The Maritime Boundary Agreement is what is before us here, as opposed to the question of sovereignty, and we are just not addressing that matter again at this time. Is that a correct interpretation?

Mr. WILLIAMSON. That is right, Senator. The issue is just not ad dressed in this agreement.

Senator MURKOWSKI. But is it precluded from being addressed should we care to address it with the Soviets?

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Mr. WILLIAMSON. I would say the agreement does not preclude addressing it. I think the ability of the United States to make a claim on these islands has been significantly affected by many events which occurred prior to the negotiation of this agreement.

Senator MURKOWSKI. But by adopting the Maritime Boundary Agreement, are we placing ourselves in an adversarial position should we want to negotiate on the issue of sovereignty? Or does it really make any significant difference?

Mr. WILLIAMSON. I do not think it makes any significant difference as far as our ability to assert a claim.

Senator MURKOWSKI. If we were to pursue a claim for territorial status and we reached an impasse, what is the procedure for arbitration? The World Court? Or does it have to be agreed upon by both sides?

Mr. WILLIAMSON. Well, if there is a dispute between the two parties under the agreement, the agreement does not specify a dispute resolution mechanism, but simply provides that the parties will try to peacefully settle their dispute. A claim asserted by the United States I do not believe would be a matter covered by the agreement.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Well, if we were to initiate a claim against the Soviet Union and could not resolve that claim, is there a historical precedent set for resolving claims of this nature through an arbitration or a World Court, from the standpoint of the record?

Mr. WILLIAMSON. There is no mandatory procedure. The parties could certainly agree to either arbitration or agree to submit to World Court jurisdiction.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Or they could just agree to disagree and leave the issue?

Mr. WILLIAMSON. Yes.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BIDEN. I have one last question for you, Mr. Williamson. How serious is the opposition to this treaty in the Soviet Union?

Mr. WILLIAMSON. Senator, we know that there are some hard-liners and some fishermen in the Soviet Far East who have voiced opposition to it. But we do not know whether that is strong enough to keep it from being approved by the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union.

Senator BIDEN. It may sound like a silly question, but has Mr. Yeltsin or anyone in the Russian Republic in the upcoming election spoken to this issue? Has it reached that dynamic in their fledgling attempts at democracy?

Mr. WILLIAMSON. I am not aware of any comments by Yeltsin. Of course, Yeltsin is running for President of the Russian Republic and we are talking about the Soviet Union.

Senator BIDEN. Is this not within the Russian Republic? It is, is it not?

Mr. WILLIAMSON. Well, the agreement, though, is with the Soviet Union, the central government.

Senator BIDEN. I understand, I understand that.

Mr. WILLIAMSON. And if the Russian Republic were to secede and become an independent republic, an independent State, we believe that this is the kind of agreement that it would be as obligated under the agreement as the Soviet Union.

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Senator BIDEN. I guess this is just more of a point of curiosity than of legal consequence. If the United States were negotiating the boundary between Canada and the United States at Vermont, I assure you those running for Governor in Vermont would have a view of where that boundary would lie, and it would lie well into Canada, I am sure. And that is all I meant.

But that is more a matter of curiosity, not of legal consequence.

Mr. WILLIAMSON. I understand that Yeltsin has complained, more about the process and that he was not consulted.

Senator BIDEN. See, he is sounding like a Governor already. [Laughter]

I see our colleague from Alaska is here and, with the permission of the committee, since he has other committee hearings himself to be part of, I would invite him to come forward. You all stay right there. I am sure he would not mind you staying there.

If you would join us, and if the staff would pull the microphone over for the Senator. I know he has a statement to make. Welcome, Senator.

STATEMENT OF HON. TED STEVENS, U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA

Senator STEVENS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.

I am involved in a hearing in which we are inquiring of General Schwarzkopf what may be necessary to improve the armed forces. So I appreciate your courtesy in letting me proceed so I may return.

I am really here today because I think that this agreement is important to our State, and I would like to state the reasons for that. It is going to improve the management of the international fisheries area in the North Pacific. The area between the United States and the Soviet Union is most important. This is the most prolific area left in the world for the production of seafood products, and I believe the Soviet Union in ceding jurisdiction to the United States in three special areas has made a significant concession to us.

These areas, with a combined total area of 3,850 square nautical miles, are actually now within what would technically be the 200-mile exclusive economic zone of the Soviet Union and under this agreement would now be on our side of the maritime zone.

In terms of this agreement, we grant control over one special area which is 300 nautical miles, as I understand, that would be under Soviet jurisdiction. So we really gained control over 12 times the amount of ocean surface we give up.

It is, I think, indicative really of the need for management in the area. The existing situation of the dispute is detrimental to our fisheries and it has left us with a situation of unregulated fishing that already threatens the total system.

In order to reach what we call the doughnut in the North Pacific, a fishing vessel must pass through waters which are either under the jurisdiction of the Soviets, in their 200-mile zone, or the United States in our 200-mile zone. The doughnut which is in between the two 200-mile zones, approximately 48,000 square nautical miles, does not now fall under the jurisdiction of either nation.

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The Coast Guard has caught a number of vessels, foreign vessels, that illegally fish in our waters, because they go through one zone or the other, the Soviet zone or others, and then dart back into our waters to fish for our fish. In these raids, over 1 million metric tons of pollock have been taken. I am talking about the illegal raids of these fishing vessels into our waters, and increasingly they are taking salmon, herring, cod, and other species.

The reported catch the past year from the doughnut of 1.4 million metric tons of pollock is more than the amount that is legally taken inside our own exclusive economic zone, and foreign fishing vessels operating out of the doughnut, in other words, have out-fished us, taking the same species that we harvest.

It is a key element of the food chain in the North Pacific. Pollock is extremely important to the total ecosystem of our Bering Sea and the North Pacific.

I think that without the control that will be established with the approval of this agreement, we would face disaster in the long run in the North Pacific.

For instance, salmon caught by foreign fishing vessels operating out of the doughnut would normally go either to Soviet or Alaska streams, and they are anadromous fish. Neither country allows the harvesting of salmon on the high seas, and yet these foreign fishing vessels operating in the doughnut can continue to do this terrible damage on our major species, the salmon.

In 1988 the Senate unanimously approved S. Res. 396. That was a resolution I introduced, that this committee supported, and I thank you for your help. It called upon the State Department to work with the Soviet Union to bring about a moratorium on fishing in that doughnut.

Since that resolution, I am informed there are negotiations underway between our two countries to try and address the problems. Next month the United States and the Soviet Union will be meeting with Japan, Korea, the People's Republic of China, and Poland in Tokyo to discuss this very agreement, that is the control of fishing in the doughnut area between the two 200-mile limits.

The approval of this agreement that you have before you, in our opinion, will strengthen the efforts to work jointly with the Soviets to achieve a common goal, and it is a common goal because the Soviet Fisheries Minister was in Alaska and explained to us that they do understand the problem of unregulated fishing in the doughnut.

This agreement that is before you is supported by U.S. fishermen, I am sure of that. It grants the U.S. jurisdiction over 13,200 square miles more than the waters that we now have control of under our former theory of using a line that would be equidistant between the two competing claims.

What I am saying to you, Mr. Chairman and members, my colleague Senator Murkowski, I think that this agreement will settle a longstanding dispute over who controls the waters of the Bering Sea. A clearly defined boundary will prevent this harassment of our species. It will also prevent harassments of U.S. boats by the Soviet Union.

I will never forget when the Frieda K, a small boat from Homer, was seized and taken into Providenya by the Soviet Navy. We have

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had as recently as 1987 Soviet gunboats and planes threaten U.S. fishing boats in the disputed area.

I brought with me a letter from the Alaska Crab Coalition that I would ask you to place in your record if you have not got it already. The total crab coalition that works in the North Pacific and the Bering Sea from both the State of Washington and Alaska support the approval of this agreement, and I would ask that you put that in the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

Alaska Crab Coalition,
Seattle, WA, June 11, 1991.

Hon. TED STEVENS,
SH-522, Hart Senate Office Building, Washington, DC.

DEAR SENATOR STEVENS:

The Alaska Crab Coalition ("ACC") Strongly supports ratification of the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Maritime Boundary which would delimit the coastal state jurisdiction of the two countries in the maritime areas between Alaska and Siberia. The ACC is a trade association representing owners of approximately 70 United States-flag fishing vessels which operate in the crab fisheries of the Bering Sea. Although the ACC is based in Seattle, it represents vessels which are based not only in Washington, but also in Alaska. In addition, the ACC represents companies which engage in the processing of crab and in support services for the crab fishing industry.

The ACC believes that the Agreement is in our national interest. The resolution of the long-standing difference of view between the United States and the Soviet Union concerning the depiction of the maritime boundary, and the proposed establishment of an arrangement to avoid enclaves beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, are important to the orderly conservation and management of the fisheries of the area.

The Agreement also removes a source of potentially dangerous friction between the two countries. You will recall that Soviet vessels challenged U.S. fishing vessels operating in the boundary area. This gave rise to difficulties both for the American fleet and for the United States Government which is responsible for the security of its citizens.

The ACC hopes that the Senate will promptly give its advice and consent to the Agreement and that the Congress will expeditiously enact the requisite implementing legislation. The ACC would be grateful if you would bring its position on this matter to the attention of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

With best regards.

Sincerely,

KEVIN KALDESTAD, President.

Senator STEVENS. In summary, I believe the benefits to U.S. fishermen and the protection of the marine ecosystem that will come from the U.S. control over the Bering Sea make this boundary agreement very worthy of Senate approval. And let me emphasize this, Mr. Chairman: No representative of any industry with interests in the affected area has contacted me or my office to express opposition to this agreement.

And on that basis I recommend your prompt approval of the agreement, and I thank you for your courtesy.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Senator. If there is anyone in this Congress who ever has been jealous of the prerogatives of the State of Alaska and Alaskan interests, it is the Senator from Alaska, the senior Senator, as well as the junior Senator. But you have been here longer, hollering about it more.

And I must tell you, if you come and approve this, recommend the approval of this agreement, I doubt whether there is a woman or man in the Senate who would not conclude from that alone that

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it is beneficial to U.S. interests, clearly to Alaskan interests. And I know, as you pointed out to me on many occasions, whatever is in Alaska's interests is in the interests of the United States.

Senator STEVENS. I am pleased you noted that, Mr. Chairman. Let me tell you further than that. I want you to know that I cannot think of an issue that has affected our State that the State Department has been more forthcoming on. We have been in a series of meetings on this agreement going back to the days of Lloyd Cutler, and it has been ongoing ever since then.

We have been kept informed. The negotiations have been fully disclosed to us and to our Soviet counterparts. We did have a meeting, as I indicated, in Anchorage to discuss this with our fishermen. And I think the full disclosure has led to the position that I can disclose to you now: No one that I know of in Alaska involved in industry that is related to the North Pacific objects to this agreement.

Senator BIDEN. You are fully supportive of this agreement?

Senator STEVENS. I am absolutely supportive.

Senator BIDEN. I have no questions. Senator? [ response.]

Senator STEVENS. Thank you very much.

Senator BIDEN. Senator Helms is still necessarily tied up in another meeting, so I can say to Mr. Williamson and his colleagues that we are delighted to have them stay, but there is no need for that -- I know they are busy as well -- as we turn now to our final witness, Mr. Carl Olson, Chairman of State Department Watch. Thank you very much for being here and thank you for your testimony.

Mr. WILLIAMSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Olson, in light of the decision made by the Department to leave at this time, why do you not come up here and take a seat in the middle. Mr. Olson, would you identify your self for the stenographer, and also who is accompanying you.

STATEMENT OF CARL OLSON, CHAIRMAN, STATE DEPARTMENT WATCH, ACCOMPANIED BY MARK SEIDENBERG, VICE CHAIRMAN

Mr. OLSON. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman. My name is Carl Olson. I am the Chairman of State Department Watch. With me today is our Vice Chairman, Mark Seidenberg.

Senator BIDEN. Welcome, Mr. Seidenberg.

Mr. OLSON. State Department Watch is a nonpartisan, nonprofit foreign policy watchdog group.

I want to thank you very much for this opportunity to testify on the proposed U.S.-U.S.S.R. Maritime Boundary Treaty. This is something of an historic occasion, since this is the first time that the public has had an opportunity to provide input on consideration of the content, process, and consequences of this proposed treaty.

At the outset here, I would like to suggest that the committee proceed slowly, since much of the material will take considerable analysis. Our group has done extensive original research on these matters and has conducted a campaign to bring public attention and sentiment to bear.

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Inasmuch as this is an initial interchange of information and views, I respectfully request from the Chair to have the right to respond on the record to the materials the Department of State is providing today and to respond to any answers that the State Department might provide to questions on this issue and to keep the record open so that we can provide more materials as they come in.

Senator BIDEN. Without objection, we will allow that. We will allow you 3 days to respond to what you heard here today, and if there are any written questions submitted by the committee to the Department, we will allow you 3 days to have an opportunity to respond to their answers.

Mr. OLSON. We appreciate that.

Mr. SEIDENBERG. Thank you.

Mr. OLSON. Our presentation is divided into three areas. We have a very extensive briefing here, with about 65 exhibits attached. I will talk about it in a concise fashion and then discuss any issues that want elaboration.

Senator BIDEN. We will allow your entire statement to be placed in the record as if read.

Mr. OLSON. We appreciate that.

The three areas are: The secrecy under which the proposed treaty was negotiated; the threat to the constitutional principles of Federal-State relations; and the substance of the agreement, including the giveaway implications of U.S. and Alaskan territory and seabeds to the Soviet Union.

Although the proposed treaty involves areas in and around Alaska, it encompasses not only the major concerns of the State of Alaska, but also the interest of every other State and person in the United States and the sovereignty of the U.S. Government.

First of all, the secrecy. Negotiations on this proposed treaty have been carried out in the utmost secrecy for almost a decade. The public, the State of Alaska, and the Congress have been systematically excluded from any meaningful information and/or participation.

According to the Department of State, the negotiations began in 1981. It says that several rounds were held on setting a boundary line between the United States and the Soviet Union. As can be appreciated, these were always intended to be historic and unprecedented talks, since there has never been any boundary agreement between the United States and Russia or its successor Government of the Soviet Union.

If anything, the Department of State should have been inviting all manner of inputs over these negotiations of monumental consequences. But for reasons not yet revealed, it decided not to publicize the negotiating sessions. We never saw any news briefings on them, nor were there any typical public ceremonious events such as we are all accustomed to for significant issues, such as the START talks, Helsinki Accord discussions, and so on.

As a matter of fact, the Department of State still regards the entire series of negotiating sessions to be a deep, dark secret, to be kept from the public and congressional view. It even continues to refuse to divulge the dates and places of negotiations and the names of the United States and Soviet negotiating teams.

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Our group has been working diligently since we found out about this in 1984. We did not find out about it by an announcement from the Department of State, but rather from something from the Department of the Interior. The Department of the Interior was leasing out the Navarin Basin and in their announcement they noted that they did not have a western boundary there in the Bering Sea because there was a dispute going on.

Now, when it was mentioned in the Federal Register that "the United States depicts the 1867 Convention line as the maritime boundary," this announcement was very startling. Two adverse consequences were immediately apparent. First, somehow the Department of State wanted to elevate the 1867 United States-Russia Convention line from its role as a line of demarcation, indicating what territory is being ceded to the United States by Russia in 1867, into a maritime boundary. It never had been considered a boundary line in the past and there is no reason to believe it would be an advantageous or equitable boundary line.

Now, the second implication was that if the entire 1867 Convention line were to become a maritime boundary, not just the portion in the Bering Sea in the vicinity of the Navarin Basin, then it would extend due north from the Bering Straits. This would effectively cut off the American islands of Wrangell, Herald, Bennett, Henrietta, and Jeannette, which are west of that line, and the immense amount of Outer Continental Shelf and exclusive economic zone that attaches to those islands and cede them de facto to the Soviet Union. No quid pro quo was even mentioned.

To get a perspective of what the Outer Continental Shelf and exclusive economic zone in this area, I think the panel that is up here in the committee room up to the right gives an absolutely perfect view of it. If you look in the Arctic up north of the Bering Straits, all that light shaded area is Outer Continental Shelf. It is the shallow part of the ocean.

In most parts of the United States, the shallow part of the ocean goes out maybe 5, 10 miles and drops right off. There we are looking at it extending about 200 miles north into the Arctic, and that is the area that we fear is going to be lost to the United States.

Well, as you can imagine, we considered this very disturbing news. Our group made several attempts to uncover substantive information about negotiations from the Department of State. Well, upon constant rebuff we had to begin a campaign of our own, and in that regard I want to report on our success of gathering information.

First, as to public response to this issue. The public has responded overwhelmingly in opposition to the Department of State's position. We know of at least 30,000 letters from members of the public delivered to the Department of State, with virtually unanimous disapproval of the apparent secrecy and the giveaway in progress.

Numerous organizations have become concerned and have passed resolutions of opposition, and in our testimony we present 15 organizations, nationwide ones and local ones, of all shades of opinion. As a matter of fact, just yesterday another organization sent me this entire booklet here. It is a group of the chamber of commerce of Rhode Island, especially the Newport area, which is very concerned about the implications to our petroleum, ocean export, and

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transportation industries. That part of the country is suffering very much. I believe they sent copies to every member of the committee also in this respect.

Now, also considerable national and local news coverage has been given to the campaign to open up the negotiations. Editorials and articles have been published in the Wall Street Journal, the Knight-Ridder chain, Associated Press, Anchorage Times, Chicago Tribune, several front page articles along this line, and we submitted 10 of them here for the record also.

In congressional action, Members of Congress were approached to see if they would have any better success in obtaining cogent answers about the boundary negotiations. In the House, bills were introduced in successive Congresses, in the 99th, the 100th, the 101st, and with a cumulative total of approximately 60 cosponsoring Congressmen, including the Member from Alaska, Don Young.

These bills would establish in statute form the constitutional principle that a treaty would be required for the setting of a boundary line with a foreign country and the transfer of territory and seaward zones from the United States to a foreign country. We have exhibits here of those bills that were introduced.

In the Senate, S. Res. 279 in the 99th Congress and S. Res. 20 in the 101st were introduced to express the same sentiments. And further in the Senate, in the 101st Congress amendment 387 was included in the Department of State's authorization bill to require a treaty for "all agreements with the Soviet Union which relate to boundaries of the United States."

These measures were all sponsored by Senator Helms and at the time they were introduced several pages were inserted in the Congressional Record of substantiating background materials, and we have included that for the record.

Also, on the 100th anniversary of a significant congressional act, it was memorialized in the Congressional Record on September 20, 1990, by Senator Pete Wilson, then a Senator from California. On September 30 back in 1890, Congress had awarded medals to the crew members of the U.S.S. Jeannette for their heroic deeds in the expedition into the Arctic Ocean that resulted in discovery and bringing into the American sovereignty the heretofore undiscovered islands of Bennett, Henrietta, and Jeannette.

These three islands are collectively known as the DeLong Islands after the ship's captain, George Washington DeLong. The islands themselves are named for the expedition's cosponsor, the famous New York City Herald publisher, James Gordon Bennett, his mother Henrietta, and his sister Jeannette.

Now, in addition to these actions in Congress, the Constitution calls for the "advice and consent" by the Senate on treaties. This proposed treaty is currently in the "consent" phase and I am troubled that it appears that the Department of State made next to no effort to involve the Senate in the "advice" capacity.

The second area of concern has to do with the State and Federal constitutional crisis. All 50 State governments have a vital stake in the procedure of establishing boundaries between a State and a foreign country, and if land territory is to be ceded it would not only be at a loss to the State's sovereign territory, but it would be a loss

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of the State government's property in the tidelands and their other holdings.

The State of Alaska, the State government of Alaska, has never been meaningfully involved in negotiations, nor has its consent been solicited on any of its terms. These attitudes on behalf of the Department of State violate very clear precedents regarding setting boundaries between States and foreign countries.

In the famous case of Secretary of State Daniel Webster in 1842 negotiating with Great Britain over the boundary between Maine and Canada, President John Tyler and Secretary Webster required the representatives of Maine and Massachusetts, which had residual interests in the area of Maine, be involved in the negotiations and that the two State governments consent to the outcome that was obtained.

Now, at no time during the Department of State's negotiations with the Soviet Union were representatives of the State of Alaska consulted on an official basis. The Department of State represents that it occasionally gave briefings to the Alaska Governor's staff. The Department of State also represents that everything concerning the substance of its negotiations is secret, classified material. Such material cannot be divulged to anyone who lacks a proper security clearance. We are informed that for most of the decade between 1981 and 1990 no Federal security clearances were obtained for the Alaska Governor's staff or for the Governors themselves.

Now, at the State level in Alaska, upon hearing that the Navarin Basin dispute over the boundary line in 1984 was going on, Alaska State Representative Roger Jenkins with 17 cosponsors introduced their H.J. Res. 53, which urged the Department of State "to adopt a firm stance and aggressively pursue resolution of the Bering Sea boundary dispute favorable to the interests of the Government and the people of the United States." It passed unanimously in both houses and was signed by Gov. Bill Sheffield in April 1986.

When it became apparent that the Department of State was going to continue to exclude representatives from the State of Alaska from the negotiating sessions, State Senator Rick Uehling introduced S.J. Res. 12, which passed both houses unanimously and was signed by Gov. Steve Cowper in May 1988.

It asked the Department of State "to include a representative of the State, appointed by the Governor with the consent of the legislature, on all delegations that negotiate the boundaries between the State and the Soviet Union or Canada" and asked Alaska's congressional delegation to intercede in this on behalf of the State of Alaska. The Department of State never replied.

In the same session, State Senator Paul Fischer introduced S.J. Res. 61, which reiterated Alaska's sovereignty over Wrangell, Herald, Bennett, Henrietta, and Jeannette, and it passed the State Senate on a unanimous vote in February 1988.

In this regard, the State legislators in Alaska have sent, I believe, a letter here which is included in our testimony to the committee, reiterating their total opposition to the adoption of the treaty at this point and to refer it back for negotiations. I believe 36 of the current legislators signed that, both Republicans and Democrats, in the house and on the senate side. We have enclosed a copy here for the record.

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Joining the controversy on the side of Alaska has been the California legislature. In September 1987, its two houses passed nearly unanimously Assembly J. Res. 37, sponsored by Assemblywoman Marian LaFollette, which supported Alaska's right to be represented on boundary negotiations and to have the power of consent over the outcome for its boundaries.

Subsequent to the submission now of this proposed boundary treaty, State Senator Don Rogers introduced in May S.J. Res. 20 to reiterate California's support for Alaska, and this is pending at this moment.

In Pennsylvania, H.R. 88, introduced in April, urges the Department of State to include Alaskan State representatives in any boundary negotiation. The measure, sponsored by Representatives George Hasay and Italo Cappabianca and Fred Serafini -- the latter two are the Chairman and the Cochairman of the Pennsylvania House's Federal-State Relations Committee.

During the 1989-90 session of the Ohio legislature, S.J. Res. 1 was introduced by Senator Gary Suhadolnik to support Alaska's rights to ensure that any boundary be in the form of a treaty.

Now, third, the proposed boundary line and the giveaway, we believe, of land and seabed territory. The drawing of the proposed maritime boundary line defies rational -- -- Senator BIDEN. Mr. Olson.

Mr. OLSON. Yes.

Senator BIDEN. I am happy to listen to you, but you were told that you had about 3 to 5 minutes. You have gone 20 already. Can you give us an idea of how much more you are going to go?

Mr. OLSON. I am sorry. Maybe about 1 or 2 minutes.

Senator BIDEN. Great.

Mr. OLSON. Our contention about the boundary line is that this boundary line is in fact going to be inextricably tied up with the sovereignty over those islands. Let me point out a couple of reasons why we believe that, if I could point to the chart here.

Senator BIDEN. Sure.

Mr. OLSON [Pointing to chart]. The proposed maritime boundary line here would basically give the Soviet Union all this exclusive economic zone and Outer Continental Shelf. Well, normally when you are deciding on that you decide it from the territory of a particular country.

What this is basically doing is saying that all this territory over here [indicating] on which this is being declared is Soviet. It is in fact conceding that, and it is specifically conceding it up in this little area up here, because this arc up here in here [indicating] is drawn from Wrangell and Herald, stating, oh, this belongs to the Soviets because this is Soviet territory right now.

Senator BIDEN. That special area which the Soviets are ceding is 200 miles from Wrangel. Your argument is that, if that is the case, then obviously by implication Wrangel has been ceded by this treaty? Is that the idea?

Mr. OLSON. That is the underlying assumption that is sitting right in front of us.

Senator BIDEN. I just wanted to make sure I understood what you were saying.

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Mr. OLSON. OK. Then there is one other part of this. If you read the treaty back in 1867 stating where this line is, because this line was never drawn out in the treaty, it drew a line that basically came like this [indicating], went through the Straits, and came down in this area.

But the last line of the treaty stated that all of the Aleutian Islands to the west of this line here [indicating] this meridian 167 east, this line here, belonged to the United States. So what this does is it includes Copper Island and a couple of little rocks right next to it. Well, the way the line is now being drawn it goes like this [indicating] and leaves these two on the Soviet side and asserts some territory down here based on those islands staying in Soviet hands.

Senator BIDEN. You are suggesting that the line, the 200-mile limit, is drawn from those islands? Is that the Soviet territory from which it is drawn?

Mr. OLSON. Yes. It allows this here, this Copper Island and the two rocks next to it, Sea Lion and Sea Otter Rocks, to be on the Soviet side, whereas now if you went to the 1867 treaty, the 1867 treaty said that we, the United States, were being given or sold all of the land to the west -- I am sorry, to the east of this meridian here, which goes between Bering and Copper Islands. That is the literal last line of the treaty.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you.

Mr. SEIDENBERG. Excuse me. It is the last line of article 1.

Mr. OLSON. Yes, I am sorry, the description of the line.

There were a couple of other points I wanted to make in this regard. There are some very good legal arguments. There is a law journal article that is included in the record.

Second, there is a court challenge now in Federal court in Anchorage specifically on these issues that is proceeding right now. And we also have positions that are somewhat contradictory from the legal advisor's office, correspondence with the State of Alaska on this issue about our ownership, our claims, our sovereignty of these islands.

I want to make sure that these are in the record. And the last thing I want to make sure is in the record is a letter that we just recently received from Rear Adm. J. Austin Yeager, who is the Di rector of the Coast and Geodetic Survey. Now, part of this boundary line goes to the Bering Strait, so if I could just go back up here one more second.

It goes between Little Diomede and Big Diomede. Little Diomede is on our side and Big Diomede is on their side. They are about 2 1/2 miles apart. In order to establish territorial seas, they are supposed to be drawn from a baseline that is based on a survey of the territory.

The head of the NOAA office that is in charge of the Coast and Geodetic Survey has written back to us as to whether or not any survey ever has been done of Little Diomede Island, and let me just give you a couple lines about that: "The National Ocean Service surveyed the Bering Strait area in 1960, but did not cover the area of the Diomede Islands. We have never performed a hydrographic survey, nor have we ever compiled a shoreline manuscript of Little Diomede Island. Determining bottom foot ice conditions would re-

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quire extensive field work, which NOS has no plans to pursue at this point."

So what we are saying is that there is no data to be making a drawing of a line on our side. We believe that the line the State Department has done not only disregards that, but also draws it right through a reef of Little Diomede and gives half the reef to the Soviets.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Olson follows and other information referred to is in committee files:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. CARL OLSON

Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman. My name is Carl Olson, And I am chairman of State Department Watch. With me today is our vice chairman Mark Seidenberg. State Department Watch is a nonpartisan nonprofit foreign policy watchdog group.

Thank you very much for this opportunity to testify on the proposed U.S.-U.S.S.R. maritime boundary treaty. This is something of an historic occasion, since it is the first time that the public has had an opportunity to provide input on consideration of the content, process, and consequences of this proposed treaty. At the outset here, I would like to suggest that the committee proceed slowly since much of the material will take considerable analysis.

Our group has done extensive original research on these matters and has conduct ed a campaign to bring public attention and sentiment to bear. Inasmuch as this is the initial interchange of information and views, I respectfully request from the chair to have the right to respond on the record to the materials that the Department of State is providing today and to respond on the record to answers the Department of State provides to questions on these issues.

Our presentation is divided into three areas: 1. The secrecy under which this proposed treaty was negotiated. 2. The threat to constitutional principles of federal-state relations. 3. The substance of the agreement including the giveaway implications of U.S. and Alaskan territory and seabeds to the Soviet Union. Although the proposed treaty involves areas in and around Alaska, it encompasses not only the major concerns of the State of Alaska, but also the interests of every other state and person in the United States, and the sovereignty of the United States government.

I. THE SECRECY

The negotiations on this proposed treaty have been carried out in utmost secrecy for almost a decade. The public, the State of Alaska, and the Congress have been systematically excluded from any meaningful information and/or participation.

According to the Department of State, the negotiations began in 1901. It says that several rounds were held on setting a boundary line between the United States and the Soviet Union. As can be appreciated, these were always intended to be historic and unprecedented talks, since there has never been any boundary agreement between the United States and Russia or its successor government of the Soviet Union. If anything, the Department of State should have been inviting all manner of inputs over these negotiations of monumental consequence. But for reasons not yet revealed, it decided not to publicize the negotiating sessions. We never saw any news briefings on it, nor were there any typical public ceremonious events, such as we are all accustomed to for significant issues such as the START talks, Helsinki Accord discussions, and so on.

As a matter of fact, the Department of State still regards the entire series of negotiating sessions to be a deep, dark secret to be kept from public and Congressional view. It continues to refuse to divulge the dates and places of the negotiations and the names of the United States and Soviet negotiating teams.

Our group has worked diligently to try to bring this issue out into public discussion. It was only by chance that we discovered in 1984 that the negotiations had been ongoing for 3 years. There was obviously no announcement from the Department of State, but rather it was an indirect announcement by the Department of the Interior. In publishing the invitation for bids for oil and gas exploration in the Navarin Basin in the Bering Sea, the Department of the Interior admitted that it did not have a specific western boundary to the Navarin Basin and therefore any bids on these tracts were subject to cancellation. The problem was that no maritime boundary existed between the United States and Soviet Union, and that a dispute was ongoing in negotiations for setting the boundary. Along with the revelation about the existence of the talks was the startling statement of the Department of

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State's position. The Federal Register on March 16, 1984, page 10065, noted, "The United States depicts the 1867 Convention line as the maritime boundary.* * *"

Two adverse consequences were immediately apparent. First, somehow the Department of State wanted to elevate the 1867 United States-Russia Convention Line from its role as a line of demarcation (indicating what territory is being ceded to the United States by Russia in 1867) into a maritime boundary. It never had been considered a boundary line in the past, and there was no reason to believe that it would be an advantageous or equitable boundary line.

The second implication was that if the entire 1867 Convention Line were to become a maritime boundary (not just the portion in the Bering Sea in the vicinity of the Navarin Basin), then it would extend due north from the Bering Straits. This would effectively cut off the American islands of Wrangell, Herald, Bennett, Henrietta, and Jeannette (which are west of that line) and the immense amount of outer continental shelf and exclusive economic zone that attaches to these land areas, and cede them de facto to the Soviet Union. No quid pro quo was even mentioned.

As you can imagine at this disturbing news, our group made several attempts to uncover substantive information about the negotiations from the Department of State. Upon constant rebuff, we began a campaign to enlist the aid of the Congress, state governments, and the public to open up the negotiating process.

Public Response

The public responded overwhelmingly in opposition to the Department of State's position. We know of at least 30,000 letters from members of the public delivered to the Department of State, with virtually unanimous disapproval of the apparent secrecy and giveaway in progress.

Numerous organizations have become concerned and have passed resolutions of opposition. Included are the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the American Legion (Department of California), the National Society of the Daughters of the American Revolution, the Military Order of the World Wars, the Ohio Society of the Colonial Dames XVIIth Century, the California Republican Party, the California Republican Assembly (two resolutions), the Los Angeles County Federation of Republican Women, the Women's Republican Club of Grosse Pointe (Michigan), the California Federation of Women's Clubs, the Legislative Research Associates (Springfield, IL), and Young Americans for Freedom. (Exhibits 1-15)

Considerable national and local news coverage has been given to the campaign to open up the negotiations. Editorials and articles have been in the Wall Street Journal, Knight-Ridder chain, Associated Press, Anchorage Times, Chicago Tribune, etc. (Exhibits 16-26)

Congressional Action

Members of Congress were approached to see if they would have any better success with obtaining cogent answers about the boundary negotiations. When their inquiries were either ignored or incompletely answered, it became necessary to take legislative action. One constitutional threat to Congress was the fear that the Department of State would circumvent Congress by attempting to make a maritime boundary in the form of an executive agreement, rather than in a proposed treaty. No indication was forthcoming that the intended outcome of the negotiations would be in the form of a treaty.

In the House, bills were introduced in successive Congresses (H.R. 3766 in the 99th Congress sponsored by Mark Siljander (R-Michigan), H.R. 341 in the 100th Congress sponsored by William Dannemeyer (R-California), and H.R. 2383 in the 101st Congress sponsored by Dan Burton (R-Indiana)) with a cumulative total of approximately 60 cosponsoring Congressmen (including the member from Alaska Don Young). The bills would establish in statute form the constitutional principle that a treaty would be required for the setting of a boundary line with a foreign country and the transfer of territory and seaward zones from the United States to a foreign country. (Exhibits 27-28)

In the Senate, S. Res. 279 in the 99th Congress and S. Res. 20 in the 101st Congress were introduced to express the necessity for a treaty in any transfer of territory or seaward zones to a foreign government (specifically noting Wrangell, Herald, Bennett, Jeannette, and Henrietta Islands). Further in the Senate in the 101st Congress, amendment 387 was included in the Department of State's authorization bill to require a treaty for "all agreements with the Soviet Union which relate to boundaries of the United States." These measures were all sponsored by Senator Jesse Helms (R-North Carolina). Extensive background appears in the Congressional Record for Dec. 18, 1985 (pp. 5 18002-18021), Jan. 25, 1989 (pp. 5 779-787), and July 20, 1989 (pp. 5 8438-8447). (Exhibits 29-32)

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The 100th anniversary of a significant Congressional act was memorialized in the Congressional Record of September 20, 1990 by Senator Pete Wilson (R-California). On September 30, 1890, Congress awarded medals to the crew members of U.S.S. Jeannette for their heroic deeds on the expedition into the Arctic Ocean that resulted in the discovery and bringing into American sovereignty the heretofore undiscovered Bennett, Henrietta, and Jeannette Islands. (They are collectively named the DeLong Islands after the ship's captain Lt. George Washington DeLong. The islands are named for the expedition's cosponsor, the famous New York City Herald publisher James Gordon Bennett, his mother Henrietta, and his sister Jeannette.) (Exhibits 33-35)

The constitution calls for the "advice and consent" by the Senate on treaties. This proposed treaty is currently in the "consent" phase. I am troubled that it appears that the Department of State made next to no effort to involve the Senate in its "advice" capacity. If any advice were sought, it was neither extensive nor well publicized. As such, I would suggest that the current form of the proposed treaty is pre mature.

II. STATE-FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS

All 50 state governments have a vital stake in the procedure of establishing boundaries between a state and a foreign country. Moreover, if land territory is to be ceded, it not only would be a loss of a state's sovereign territory, but it would be a loss of a state government's property in the tidelands and other holdings.

The State of Alaska has never been meaningfully involved in the negotiations, nor has its consent been solicited on any of the terms. These attitudes on behalf of the Department of State violate very clear precedents regarding setting boundaries between states and foreign countries. In the famous case of Secretary of State Daniel Webster in 1842 negotiating with Great Britain over the boundary between Maine and Canada, President John Tyler and Secretary Webster required that representatives of Maine and Massachusetts (which had a residual interest in the area of Maine) to be involved in the negotiations and that the two state governments' consent to the outcome be obtained. (Exhibit 36)

At no time during the Department of State's negotiations with the Soviet Union were representatives of the State of Alaska consulted on an official basis. The Department of State represents that it occasionally gave briefings to the Alaska governor's staff. The Department of State also represents that everything concerning the substance of its negotiations is secret classified material. Such material cannot be divulged to anyone who lacks a proper security clearance. We are informed that for most of the decade from 1981 to 1990, no federal security clearances were obtained for the Alaska governor's staff and for the governors themselves.

(As an indication of the forcefulness with which the Department of State guards classified materials, an incident regarding our organization should be mentioned, in as much as it deals with the Alaska governor's office. Our group had made an inquiry to the Department of State with regard to the briefings that the Department of State said it had given in late 1987 to the Alaska governor's staff. Immediately the Legal Adviser's office tasked the FBI to raid the residence of our vice chairman Mr. Seidenberg looking for classified material. Mr. Seidenberg suffered the indignity of being detained without cause, without any charges pressed, and without being allowed to contact his attorney.) (Exhibit 37)

Upon hearing of the Navarin Basin dispute over the boundary line in 1984, Alaska State Representative Roger Jenkins (R-Anchorage) with 17 cosponsors introduced H.J. Res. 53 which urged the Department of State "to adopt a firm stance and aggressively pursue a resolution of the Bering Sea Boundary dispute favorable to the interests of the government and the people of the United States." It passed unanimously in both houses and was signed by Gov. Bill Sheffield in April 1986. (Exhibit 38)

When it became apparent that the Department of State was going to continue to exclude representatives from the State of Alaska from the negotiating sessions, State Senator Rick Uehling (R-Anchorage) introduced S.J. Res. 12 which passed both houses unanimously and was signed by Governor Steve Cowper in May 1988. It asked the Department of State "to include a representative of the state, appointed by the governor with the consent of the legislature, on all delegations that negotiate the boundaries between the state and the Soviet Union or Canada"; and asked Alaska's congressional delegation to intercede in this on behalf of the State of Alaska. The Department of State never replied. (Exhibit 39)

In the same session, State Senator Paul Fischer (R-Soldotna) introduced S.J. Res. 61, which reiterated Alaska's sovereignty over Wrangell, Herald, Bennett, Henrietta

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and Jeannette Islands. It passed the Senate on a unanimous vote in February 1988. (Exhibit 40)

Joining the controversy on the side of Alaska has been the California Legislature. In September 1987 its two houses passed nearly unanimously Assembly J. Res. 37 sponsored by Assemblywoman Marian LaFollette (R-Northridge), which supported Alaska's right to be represented on boundary negotiations and to have the power of consent over the outcome for its boundaries. Subsequent to the submission of the proposed maritime boundary treaty, State Senator Don Rogers (R-Bakersfield) introduced in May 1991 S.J. Res. 20 to reiterate California's support for Alaska and to ask that the proposed treaty either be withdrawn or to be rejected by the Senate until such time as Alaska has been properly involved. This measure is pending. (Exhibits 41--42)

In Pennsylvania, H. Res. 88, introduced in April 1991, urges the Department of State to include Alaskan state representatives in any boundary negotiations. The measure, sponsored by Representatives George Hacay (R-Wilkes Barre), Italo Cappabianca (D-Erie), and Frank Serafini (R-Lackawanna), is pending. (Exhibit 43)

During the 1989--90 session of the Ohio legislature, S.J. Res. 1 was introduced by Senator Gary Suhadolnik (R-Akron) to support Alaska's rights and to ensure that any boundary be in the form of a treaty. (Exhibit 44)

III. THE PROPOSED BOUNDARY LINE AND THE GIVEAWAY OF LAND AND SEABED TERRITORY

The drawing of the proposed maritime boundary line defies rational assertion of America's best interests. It concedes just about everything to the Soviets. There is no quid pro quo.

The proposed treaty is defective in three areas: 1. It wrongfully elevates a version of the old 1867 Convention Line into a boundary line. 2. It places on the Soviet side several Alaskan islands and vast seabeds with enormous resource potential. 3. It gives the Soviets "Sovereign rights and jurisdiction" over U.S. territory.

1. Erroneous Use of 1867 United States-Russia Convention Line

The proposed treaty starts out in Article I by elevating the old 1867 Convention Line into the proposed maritime boundary. "The Parties agree that the line described as the 'western limit' in Article I of the 1867 Convention, as defined in Article 2 of this Agreement, is the maritime boundary between the United States and the Soviet Union."

The version of the 1867 line, as defined in Article 2, is at best a tortured depiction. Included in the concessions is the deviation from the arc of a great circle in the Bering Sea (i.e. the normal shortest distance measurement on the globe) toward the Soviet-demanded "rhumb line" depiction (which gives the Soviets several thousand more square miles on their side of this thousand-mile line).

It should be realized that the 1867 line never was a boundary line. It was merely a line of demarcation to define what territory was being sold to the United States by Russia. It never touches land anywhere. Countries did not divide up oceans and seabeds in those days, and no language in the 1867 Convention even hints at it being some sort of boundary line. Unfortunately, many mapmakers have printed on their maps showing the 1867 line with the word U.S.S.R. on one side and U.S. on the other, erroneously implying that this is a boundary.

This practice was so widespread that even the Geographer of the Department of State issued Boundary Study #14 in 1965 on the "U.S-Russia Convention Line of 1867" with the following clarifications: "Rather than a boundary line per se, this report concerns a convention line. * * * Furthermore, in keeping with the policy that the line does not constitute a boundary, the standard symbol for the representation of an international boundary should never be used." (Exhibit 45)

Authoritative Dr. William E. Butler, Dean of the Faculty of Law at University College in London, wrote in 1978 in International Straits of the World, "The Russo-American Convention Line of 1867 is not regarded as a state frontier, and the continental shelf boundary in the Chukchi Sea and northward remain to be negotiated."

Arbitrarily using the 1867 line has meant that the Department of State is ignoring the basic principle of equidistance in dividing up the seabeds, is ignoring the value of the seabed resources to the United States, and is ignoring the history of American acquisition of considerable territory west of the 1867 Convention line in the Arctic subsequent to 1867.

2. Surrender of Several Alaskan Islands

In 1867 the Russians did not own the Arctic islands of Wrangell, Herald, Bennett, Jeannette, and Henrietta. They had never even set foot on any of them. Moreover, the United States made no agreement explicitly or implicitly in 1867 to avoid or

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renounce any subsequent territory acquired in the Arctic west of the 1867 Convention line.

Some of the most heroic and adventuresome episodes of American history brought these islands into American sovereignty.

Wrangell Island is the largest of the five. At approximately 2,800 square miles, it is equal to Rhode Island and Delaware combined. It was first landed on by the crew of the U.S. Revenue Marine ship Thomas Corwin, commanded by Captain Calvin Leighton Hooper, on August 12, 1881. (The Revenue Marine was the predecessor of the current day Coast Guard.) The Treasury Department effectively administered Alaska at that time, and that made Captain Hooper the de facto governor. Hooper described the discovery in a report printed by the U.S. Senate.

Following prolonged battles with close-packed icebergs in the Arctic 80 miles north of the mainland, Hooper recorded, "At 7.30 we reached the open space and dropped anchor within a cable's length of the land in 5 fathoms of water. We immediately landed and, raising the American flag, took possession in the name of the United States of America.* * * At 9.30 a.m., being unable to maintain our position any longer, a gun was fired to recall the parties sent out to explore the cliffs in search of cairns or other signs of human life, and we began to work out towards the lead, which we reached at 11 a.m. We left the American flag flying and also a record of our visit. * * * Upon taking possession of the land in the name of the United States, the name New Columbia was provisionally given to it. The provision being the approval and concurrence of that portion of the Government having the authority to issue charts, etc., the decision of that body was adverse to my suggestion, and by its action I cheerfully abide not only on account of its undoubted right to decide according to its own judgment in this and all other matters over which it has jurisdiction, but because the size of the island, as now known, does not justify the bestowal of a name of this character, the name of one of the early Arctic navigators being much more appropriate." (Exhibits 46--47)

Another distinguished authority confirms this account. Professor John Muir, the famous explorer and naturalist, was aboard the landing party onto Wrangell. In his book The Cruise of the Corwin, Muir writes glowingly, "A notable addition was made to the national domain when Captain Calvin L. Hooper landed on Wrangell Land, and took formal possession of it in the name of the United States. We landed near the southeast cape, at the mouth of a river, in latitude 71 degrees 4', longitude 177 degrees 40'30'' W." The text has illustrations of the landing party and the U.S. flag flying over this new part of America. (Exhibit 48)

Two weeks later, U.S.S. Rogers landed at Wrangell and conducted a complete official survey ending on September 13. One party proceeded overland to the mountains, and the other found the cairn left by the Corwin. This Navy crew also raised the American flag over Wrangell.

As can be appreciated, being so far north in the icepack, Wrangell was rather remote for settlement. Nevertheless, various U.S. parties utilized Wrangell over the years, and in 1924 the Lomen Brothers of Nome, AK, took over the settlement it had bought from Vilhjalmur Steffanson. Unfortunately, on August 20, 1924, the Soviet government sent the gunboat Red October to Wrangell, armed with a 6-pound cannon and a company of Soviet infantry. In an act of war, they attacked the settlement, chopped down the American flag pole, confiscated all the possessions, and shanghaied the 14 Americans off to Siberia. Two died in the process, and the remaining 12 were eventually released by the Soviets. The process of release was made more difficult by the fact that the United States did not maintain any diplomatic relations with the Bolshevik government; it continued to recognize the Russian government in exile until 1933. (Exhibits 49--50)

A memorandum by the Solicitor of the Department of State on November 25, 1924, pointed out, " * * so far as the (1867) treaty is concerned, it would appear that the United States would not be prevented from preferring a claim to Wrangel Island if it so desired." (Exhibit 51) The authoritative Digest of International Law by Green Haywood Haywood Hackworth in 1973 made this unequivocal statement: "The United States has not relinquished its claim to Wrangell Island."

Military conquest is not a recognized or acceptable method of transferring sovereignty from one civilized country to another. The United States does not recognize this method as legitimate, and in this case it would be an unprecedented embarrassment. It would be the only territory lost by the United States to military conquest by a foreign government. As a matter of fact, the Department of State ought to initiate a negotiation process to end the military hostilities that continue with the Soviet occupation of Wrangell.

Bennett, Henrietta, and Jeannette Islands (DeLong Islands) became part of the United States in 1881 as a result of the famous expedition of U.S.S. Jeannette, a

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joint venture of the U.S. Navy and the New York City Herald publisher James Gordon Bennett. Commanded by Lt. George Washington DeLong, U.S.S. Jeannette entered the Arctic Ocean in 1879 in search of the North Pole and Northwest Passage. To the northeast of Wrangell Island it got trapped in the ice, and it drifted with the icepack to the northwest for 2 years. It came across Bennett, Henrietta, and Jeannette Islands and took possession in 1881 in the name of the United States. Unfortunately, at this point the ship was finally crushed in the ice, and the crew had to head south in lifeboats across about 200 miles of ice and open water. About half the crew returned safely. A famous large monument with icicles stands at the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis, and the U.S. Congress awarded the crew with special medals. The book Icebound published by the Naval Institute Press gives a terrific account. (Exhibit 52)

Little Diomede Island in the Bering Strait is in danger by the way the Department of State has drawn the proposed boundary. The proposed boundary runs north and south through the middle of the western reef of the island. The determination of the geographic baseline around Little Diomede is especially important to the tide lands that the State of Alaska has there. Unfortunately, we understand that no survey has yet established the baseline, including the requisite study of the ice attaching onto the island. Thus, it would appear that the drawing of the proposed boundary was done in disregard of any actual U.S. territorial measurement. (Exhibit 53)

Copper Island, Sea Lion Rock, and Sea Otter Rock are at the western end of the Aleutian chain, lying east of the 167 East (or 193 West) longitude meridian line. In the treaty ceding Alaska to the United States, the last clause in Article I which describes the territory being sold to the United States, says all the islands east of the 193 West meridian are being conveyed to the United States. That particular meridian seems to have been chosen since it clearly runs between Copper Island and Bering Island (which remained as Russian territory). (Exhibit 54)

3. Soviets to Exercise "Sovereign Rights and Jurisdiction" Within the United States

The proposed treaty in Article 3 specifies a "western special area" of U.S. territory, and then states "the United States agrees that henceforth the Soviet Union may exercise the sovereign rights and jurisdiction derived from exclusive economic zone jurisdiction that the United States would otherwise be entitled to exercise.* * *"

Other than embassy property, no foreign government is ever allowed to exercise sovereign rights and jurisdiction within the United States. There is no compelling need to allow an exception here. To do so would require the passage of revolutionary enabling legislation by the House and Senate. Perhaps it would be better to redraw the boundary lines around these "special zones" so as to leave them on the side of the line which would receive them anyway.

Opposition to Proposed Treaty by State Legislators

In contemplation of this hearing, 36 members of the Alaska legislature (Republicans and Democrats of both houses) have written their opposition to the proposed treaty. In part, the letter states, "We firmly believe United States interests and Alaskan interests are at stake and in jeopardy in the proposed treaty. * * * No Alaskan official has ever been invited to participate in the treaty negotiations, in spite of abiding Alaskan interests in fisheries, petroleum, and other potential continental shelf resources and the considerations of navigation in the area. In the entire history of the treaty negotiations, Alaska has had no official voice. Alaska has not been officially consulted in the entire matter.* * * It is our purpose to urgently recommend that the presently-proposed treaty not be ratified by the U.S. Senate, and that negotiations be continued to include appropriate Alaskan officials and current United States and Alaskan historic, territorial and resource interests." (Exhibit 58)

Support for State of Alaska by State of California

In contemplation of this hearing, State Senator Don Rogers and State Assemblywoman Paula Boland have written their support for the rights of Alaska and all states. Senator Rogers is the sponsor of the pending S.J. Res. 20, which reiterates the California Legislature's support for the rights of Alaska and all states in negotiations over the state's territory and/or boundaries. (Exhibits 59 and 60)

Law Journal Article on Wrangell Island

A good law journal article on asserting the maximum American position on Wrangell Island was published in 1981. It was just coincidental that this was the same year as the beginning of the negotiations, inasmuch as the author Don Eric

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Salom and the rest of the American public were kept completely in the dark about the negotiations for the entire series of negotiations. (Exhibit 61)

Court Challenge to Prospective Giveaway of Five Islands

A federal court challenge has been mounted in Alaska by R.M. Christiansen to prevent the impending giveaway of the five Alaskan Arctic islands. To quote the most recent court order filed May 23, 1991, "The complaint seeks injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment declaring null and void an agreement signed June 1, 1990, by James Baker and Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze on behalf of the United States and the Soviet Union, respectively, under the terms of which the United States surrenders any claim it may have to the Wrangell, Herald, Bennett, Henrietta and Jeannette Islands in the Arctic Ocean and fixes an ocean boundary between the two nations. Plaintiff further asks this Court to declare the ownership of the aforementioned islands, their seabeds, natural resources and sovereign limits." The order goes on, "In a separate pretrial motion for preliminary injunction, Plaintiff seeks a preliminary (temporary) injunction halting any further action either Executive or Legislative until this matter is decided by the Court."

In the interests of the Congress, the order continues, "As grounds for his complaint Plaintiff alleges that the Executive branch of the U.S. Government does not possess the authority to divest the United States of its property and that the agreement therefore is repugnant to the U.S. Constitution under Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2 which provides: 'The Congress shall have the power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States.* * *'"

This court action is a very important proceeding, and it may be well worth holding off on any action on the proposed treaty until the Federal Court has had a chance to make rulings in the case. (Exhibit 62)

Position of US. Department of State Concerning Wrangell Island

In 1975 the Department of State's Assistant Legal Adviser for European Affairs made very plain and cogent representations regarding Wrangell Island. The noteworthy positions included the following: "The United States has never had occasion to formally recognize Soviet ownership of Wrangel Island and early Soviet claims based on a sector principle in the Arctic were rejected. The United States, however, has long adopted the practice of dealing with authorities in de facto control of territory, and we do not consider that scientific cooperative activities with the U.S.S.R. with respect to Wrangel necessarily import any recognition of legal status." (Exhibit

Previous Attempt to Turn Over Alaskan Land and Oil to Foreign Country

Revelations have come to light about a previous attempt by the Department of State to trade off a part of Alaska. According to the Associated Press story, "Americans might be buying much of their oil from Denmark if a plan to trade parts of Alaska for military sites in Greenland had been approved after World War II. The proposed swap came to light in newly discovered documents in the National Archives that also showed the United States proposed in 1946 to buy the entire arctic island from the Danes.* * * One alternative that was discussed was for the United States to trade land in the Point Barrow district of Alaska for those portions of Greenland that the United States considered of military value. Under this plan, the Danes would have received the rights to any oil discovered in the district and would have had to sell the oil to the United States. The richest oil strike in U.S. history was made in 1967 in the Prudhoe Bay area, 200 miles east of Point Barrow. The Point Barrow area now is part of the National Petroleum Reserve, which is reserved for national defense." This is a lesson from history that America's oil resources should be protected better, especially in today's world aftermath of a $50 billion military effort in the Persian Gulf to secure control over worldwide petroleum sup plies. (Exhibit 64)

Lack of Coastal Baseline Survey for Little Diomede Island

In order to determine a proper measurement of the boundary of Alaska around Little Diomede Island, including tidelands and the territorial sea, a thorough survey would have to have been done. According to a letter from Rear Adm. J. Austin Yeager, Director of the Coast and Geodetic Survey, National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration, "The National Ocean Service (NOS) surveyed the Bering Strait area in 1960, but did not cover the area of the Diomede Islands. We have never performed a hydrographic survey, nor have we never compiled a shoreline manuscript of Little Diomede Island. * * * Determining bottom foot ice conditions would require extensive field work which NOS has no plans to pursue." (Exhibit 65)

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Recommendations

The Senate should gather more information regarding the circumstances and consequences surrounding the proposed treaty. Toward that end, we are submitting several questions that we request this committee direct to the Department of State. (Exhibit 57)

The proposed treaty should be referred back to the President and the Department of State for considerable revision of content and process:

1. More study of the oil, gas, fishery, and other resource potential should be made so that an adequate economic assessment can be made of the exclusive economic zone and outer continental shelf. As an indication of the oil potential in the area, consider these statistics: Four major oil companies (Shell, Amoco, ARCO, and Unocal) were willing to pay over $108,000,000 for the rights to explore in the blocks along the western edge of the Navarin Basin where the proposed maritime boundary will run. In the Chukchi Sea north of the Bering Strait adjacent to the proposed maritime boundary, the Department of the Interior estimates that between 430 million and 3.54 billion barrels of oil will be found. (Exhibits 55-56)

2. The State of Alaska must be represented in the negotiations that affect its territory and its boundaries, and its consent must be obtained for same.

3. The Department of State must involve the Senate every step of the way as part of the "advice" requirement for a treaty.

4. The Department of State should be encouraged to assert the maximum sovereignty for Wrangell, Herald, Bennett, Henrietta, Jeannette, Little Diomede, and Copper Islands and Sea Lion Rock and Sea Otter Rock. It should not accede to any military incursion.

5. If any of these islands are ceded de facto or de jure to the Soviet Union, then adequate provision should be made for just compensation for this unprecedented taking of property.

6. The Department of State should be requested to prepare a definitive statement on how it decides on what territory the United States has sovereignty over. The current process is not now codified and is an uncoordinated assemblage that is subject to uncertain results.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to present our preliminary views on these matters. We look forward to a continuing dialogue and a favorable outcome for the American public's interest.

COMMENTS REGARDING TESTIMONY OF THE LEGAL ADVISER TO THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1. On page 4, Mr. Williamson asseverated "As you probably know, in 1867 the United States purchased Alaska (sic.) from the Emperor of Russia (sic.)."

This statement is not correct in both fact and law. Even though the Department of State titled the Convention of Washington 1867 on Bevans (our exhibit 54) as "Cession of Alaska", the word Alaska does not appear in that convention. By Article I "the Emperor of all the Russias" ceded to the United States on June 20, 1867 "all the territory and dominion now possessed by his said Majesty on the continent of America and in the adjacent islands."

The western limit by this convention conveyed to the United States, from Russia, "the whole of the Aleutian islands east of that (193 degree west longitude) meridian." The term Aleutian islands as used in this convention was a term of art.

The only Aleutian islands west of the 193 degree west longitude we are aware of is Bering Island and maybe a couplet of islets. The Solicitor of the Department of State by "MEMORANDUM" dated November 25, 1924, stated "that the United States on its part entered into no commitment which could be interpreted as an undertaking not to press claims to any land west of the particular line above described." (see our exhibit 51)

The term "Alaska" was proposed in 1867 for official acceptance by William Henry Seward, U.S. Secretary of State, the Hon. Charles Sumner, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and by Maj. Gen. Henry Wager Halleck, U.S.A., in comma