Mister Chairman, Members of the Committee/Sub-Committee:
On behalf of the men and women of the United States Pacific Command, thank you for this opportunity to provide you my theater security perspective on our region. The past year at the Pacific Command has been busy, enlightening, and rewarding, with many opportunities for dialogue with key U.S. and foreign officials and military leaders, service members and their families, and U.S. civilians. This report also marks the Pacific Command's fiftieth year of promoting peace and security in Asia and the Pacific. Though most of the region today bears little resemblance to the immediate post-World War II scene, the importance of strong U.S. military presence and engagement continues. Our presence, together with the cooperation of our allies and friends throughout the region, deter conflict and continue to underwrite the stable conditions upon which economic prosperity depends. This statement begins with a brief assessment of our area of responsibility, a review of our strategy, a report on how our strategy is working, and ends with some essential resources and needed support.
SECURITY. The Asia-Pacific, perhaps more than any other region, represents a confluence of the security, diplomatic, and economic elements of international power. This confluence helps define the significance of the region to the U.S. and the world, and drives our strategy of presence and engagement to promote and protect our national interests. Our government's leaders as well as those throughout the region agree that security, brokered primarily by U.S. military engagement and presence, underwrites the stable conditions upon which regional economic prosperity depends.
JAPAN. While many other issues draw our attention, our security relationship with Japan is pivotal to the entire region. Our united efforts are the foundation for peace and stability throughout the Pacific. The tangible Japanese support for our forces gives us the strategic reach necessary to deter conflict and to prevail in war. We should continue to nurture the U.S.-Japan relationship as the cornerstone of security and stability for Asia and the Pacific.
NORTH KOREA. North Korea's downward trends lead most observers to agree that economic and governmental change will occur. Due to North Korea's opaqueness, the timing and pace of change are uncertain -- one to ten years perhaps, but it could come faster. Our immediate security concern is North Korea's ability to lash out if cornered. Our commitment of thirty-seven thousand U.S. troops plus our solidarity with our Republic of Korea and United Nations partners mitigate against that. We are also working to shape and accommodate eventual North-South reconciliation.
CHINA. China will be a backdrop against which many regional activities are played. We share regional concern about China's military modernization and lack of transparency on security objectives. Our military-to-military contact with the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is important, not only to improve transparency, but also because of the PLA's influence on China's security policies. We see Hong Kong as a harbinger of China's ability to integrate into the global community as a responsible player. We can also expect perturbations on Taiwan issues, although we are much better off than we were a year ago. Peaceful resolution of cross-Strait tensions will be a long-term process where it is not in any party's interest to use force. We do not view China as an immediate threat and are cautiously optimistic about China's evolving leadership role in Asia. We have decades of steady work ahead, to patiently engage China from a position of strength and resolve, focusing on our interests while respecting theirs.
OTHER NATIONS. The other countries in the region also deserve our attention and military-to-military engagement. Although India's immediate concern is with Pakistan and the Kashmir, India's long-term military concern is China. Economically, India also looks east, particularly to Southeast Asia. The Southeast Asian nations, with their burgeoning economies, are modernizing their armed forces. To date, these military enhancements are balanced and appropriate.
TREATIES. Our treaty partnerships with Australia, Thailand and the Philippines are solid. Australia remains an especially staunch friend and regional supporter who highly values its defense relationship with us. Thailand is a model of access and mutual training. Continued military-to-military interaction with these countries is important to ensure that the relationships are not taken for granted.
STRATEGIC CONCEPT. Our strategy of engagement and presence throughout Asia and the Pacific is the right solution for shaping an otherwise uncertain future. Our investment in peacetime engagement is more effective than a strategy based solely on reacting and fighting. The readiness of our combat forces and the will to use them to fight and win are essential to rendering peacetime engagement possible and successful.
FORCES. Forward-deployed forces of about 100,000 military personnel mitigate the tyranny of distance in the Pacific and are the regional metric of our commitment. Maintaining our forward-deployed, forward-based, and CONUS reinforcing forces is essential to our strategy's success in peace, crisis and war. The resources allocated to PACOM are appropriate and necessary if the U.S. is to continue to be an active, engaged player, partner, and beneficiary in this vital region.
The unique Asia-Pacific region is important to the U.S. for a number of reasons. It goes well beyond the fact that we fought three wars in Asia in this century. A confluence of political, diplomatic, economic, and security issues help define the significance of the Pacific Command Area of Responsibility (AOR) which encompasses this region:
The Pacific Command AOR includes 44 countries representing many different forms of government.
More than fifty-six percent of the world's population lives in the Pacific Command's AOR.
Many developing countries in the Asia-Pacific region have economies growing at an annual rate greater than 7 percent.
Thirty-eight percent of U.S. international trade is with this region. This is double our amount of trade with Europe, and more than our trade with North and South America combined.
U.S. exports to the Asia-Pacific region account for more than 3 million American jobs.
Foreign exchange reserves of the countries in the region total over $600 Billion.
Sixty percent of the world's economic growth over the next decade is expected in this region.
Eight of the world's nine largest armed forces are located in or operate in the region.
Five of seven U.S. defense treaties are with nations in the region. These commitments bind the U.S. legally and morally to the region.
The confluence of these factors inextricably links the U.S. with the nations of the Asia-Pacific region.
Rapid changes which are occurring throughout the region also challenge present and future U.S. security interests:
Expanding commercial ties and market competition will increasingly affect our relationships within and without the region.
Increasing regional energy demands, particularly in India, China, and Japan, will stress global energy supplies.
Rapid industrialization, urbanization, and diminishing agrarian sectors pressure the region's states, domestically and internationally.
As economies expand globally, there are corresponding increases in reliance on shipping lanes and vulnerability from sea-lane chokepoints.
The propensity for rapid technical modernization of militaries increases as economies flourish and dual-use technologies become available and affordable.
The region faces a potential proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Historic animosities and enduring ethnic and ideological differences simmer among and within countries.
U.S. relationships will be affected as "Asian values" shape the evolution of national, regional, and international institutions.
Engagement and presence of credible, combat-capable forces are key to safeguarding our national interests and coping with regional challenges and uncertainties. As Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto stated during his January trip to ASEAN capitals, the most important factor for peace and stability in the region is "the presence of the United States in Asia." Virtually all Asia-Pacific leaders agree with Prime Minister Hashimoto. They join in consensus with the leaders of our government that security, brokered primarily by U.S. military presence and engagement, underwrites the stable conditions upon which regional economic prosperity depends.
Pacific Command's strategic concept of Cooperative Engagement is designed to accomplish three major goals:
In peacetime, shape the regional environment to render conflicts and crises less likely.
In times of crisis, resolve specific situations on terms that advance our long-range interests.
In war, win quickly and decisively with minimum loss of life.
We believe a strategy that protects the nation's interests without fighting is far more effective and less costly than a strategy based on fighting. As a result, the preponderance of our activities today are aimed at conflict prevention -- making conflicts and crises in the region less likely by shaping the security environment. These peacetime activities are designed to accomplish a range of subordinate objectives including:
Sustaining regional peace and stability
Deterring the use of force and encouraging peaceful resolution to conflicts
Fulfilling security treaties and agreements
Ensuring freedom of navigation on the sea and in the air
Countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
Promoting security cooperation
Communicating U.S. interests and commitment
We accomplish these peacetime objectives through activities in two general categories, engagement and preparedness. Engagement involves bilateral and multilateral activities aimed at resolving security concerns in the region before they escalate to crisis or conflict, as well as demonstrating the steadfastness of U.S. commitment to the Asia-Pacific region. Engagement involves a wide range of activities including: multinational training exercises and operations, counterpart visits and exchanges at various levels, regional conferences and seminars.
Preparedness consists primarily of unilateral efforts to maintain readiness to respond to the full range of potential conflicts and crises in the region. Being prepared to respond is the best way to deter conflicts and crises. Preparedness activities include not only unit-level training, large-scale joint and combined exercises, but also prepositioning materiel, and surveillance of regional hot spots.
Successful engagement and preparedness require both presence and cooperation. Cooperation with our friends and allies is evidenced in our many bilateral arrangements. This cooperation is primarily bilateral and tailored for each relationship. Arrangements vary from long-standing treaty relationships with Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, Australia, and Thailand to nascent military-to-military relations with countries such as Mongolia. Multilateral military activities are slowly gaining wider appeal among regional countries as efficiencies are sought by all and confidence among militaries builds.
U.S. forward presence facilitates cooperation, increases responsiveness, promotes transparency, and provides more options to U.S. decision makers. Our forces in the area provide the foundation for the "shaping function" of our national strategy and are a critical component of the overall force structure determinations as they provide our ability to respond to crises. U.S. presence also is tangible evidence of our commitment to the region, the most visible form of which is the forward stationing of forces and families in East Asia. Other forms include adaptable rotational units and forces participating in specific training exercises and exchanges. Our forward-deployed force structure of about 100,000 troops is watched closely by regional players and is the metric for assessing U.S. commitment to the region.
In peace, our Cooperative Engagement strategy reduces the likelihood of conflict. The scope and depth of peacetime engagement activities are essential to continued U.S. success in the region. Our Security Assistance programs significantly contribute to regional security and our interests. These programs include defense sales -- both Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) -- as well as Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. IMET is the best vehicle to expose and influence future political and military leaders to democratic principles. These peacetime engagement activities, in concert with our readiness and preparedness, reinforce security and prevent conflict in the Asia-Pacific region. Supplemental Security Assistance Program information is included at Annex D.
Regardless of the effectiveness of our peacetime engagement activities, crises will occur. In PACOM we have developed a two-tiered command and control structure to employ resources efficiently and effectively in crises. Pre-designated commanders and their staffs are trained as Joint Task Force headquarters. In crisis, we augment them with a tailored cadre of joint warfighting specialists. These headquarters and forces from all services conduct periodic joint training and exercises to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of this command and control concept. This structure is highly adaptable and is used in joint (multiservice) and combined (multinational) scenarios. As a result, we have several headquarters trained and ready to support a wide variety of Joint Task Force operations. This effort is essential to effective response to regional crises.
Within PACOM, where distance is always a challenge, our forward infrastructure is pivotal to rapid, robust crisis response. To that end, Guam, by virtue of its proximity to potential trouble spots and its U.S. territorial status, has special strategic importance. Our assets there should be maintained.
In the past year, several events validated our response capability across a spectrum of military operations. These events included the China/Taiwan confrontation last March, humanitarian operations in support of Kurdish refugees (Operation PACIFIC HAVEN) on Guam, Chinese migrants (Operation MARATHON PACIFIC), and disaster relief to Palau (Operation PACIFIC BRIDGE).
We can never lose sight of our raison d'être: to be able to fight and win our nation's wars. Should crisis response fail, we are prepared to fight and win, multilaterally if possible, or unilaterally if required. In circular, but valid logic, our credible capability and will to fight and win underpin our peacetime engagement success. Our ready forces -- forward deployed, forward based and CONUS based -- are prepared to respond to crises across the spectrum of conflict. Realistic training combined with technologically superior equipment are essential to this capability.
Our Cooperative Engagement strategy is working well throughout the theater. The region is generally stable with increasing dialogue, transparency, and interdependence.
Japan. Events of the last year reemphasized the importance of our bilateral security relationship with Japan. During the Tokyo Summit, the President Clinton - Prime Minister Hashimoto Joint Security Declaration reaffirmed the commitments of our two countries to enhanced security dialogue and specific bilateral cooperation. The Declaration also specifically called for the continuing forward presence of "about 100,000" U.S. military personnel in the region. Our two governments agreed to continue maintaining about the current level of U.S. troops in Japan. Japan will continue to provide an exceptional measure of Host Nation Support (approximately $5.1 Billion per year.) Additionally, our two governments agreed to conduct a review of the 1978 Defense Guidelines. This ongoing review is likely to have far reaching implications for the U.S.-Japan relationship.
The April signing of the Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA) with Japan is improving reciprocal logistics support, supplies, and services between us. The issuance of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Final Report in December marked the culmination of intense effort between our two countries in reducing the impact of U.S. military presence on Okinawa while ensuring that critical military capability is maintained. Full implementation of the final report, particularly those aspects related to the return of Futenma Marine Corps Air Station, will take time. We will remain engaged in this ongoing bilateral process to promote our long-term regional security strategy and our shared interests with Japan.
Korea. A mutual beneficiary of the regional stability our presence has made possible, the Republic of Korea (ROK) is an emerging international economic power whose influence and partnership with us spreads well beyond the Pacific region. By contrast, North Korea's economy is in decline. Unfortunately, North Korea's military capabilities still present a real threat and the intentions of Kim Jong Il's regime are unpredictable. The September 1996 submarine incident is a clear example of the hostility. As we reaffirmed to the ROK at the October 1996 bilateral security meetings, the U.S. will continue to assist in deterring North Korean aggression through robust military and diplomatic cooperation. The physical presence of U.S. Forces in Korea, and PACOM's capability to quickly reinforce them remain the most important factors in deterring North Korean aggression. To help defray the U.S. cost of maintaining forces on the peninsula, the ROK has progressively increased its cost sharing contribution. The FY96 ROK government contribution to the U.S. was $330 Million. This is planned to increase by 10 percent per year in 1997 and 1998.
North Korea's decline runs counter to regional trends of interdependence, prosperity, and transparency. The North is in a downward spiral and collapse is widely predicted. However, timeline estimates vary because of the North's opaqueness, unpredictability, and record as a "survivalist" nation. While change in the next decade seems likely, even this estimate is the subject of debate. Our near-term concern is North Korea's ability to lash out should survival of the regime become threatened. PACOM and U.S. Forces Korea are working to keep that from happening. For the longer term, our efforts are directed toward shaping and dealing with eventual reconciliation.
China. China is a backdrop against which many regional activities are played. We share regional leaders' concern about China's military modernization and lack of transparency on security objectives. Recent air and maritime modernization programs are developing a limited force projection capability. In our estimate, it will be about one and one-half decades before China could field a military with a modernized, force projection capability. China's reticence to articulate a clear security strategy contributes to regional concerns. However, China's intent to improve their armed forces to play a stronger regional hand is manifest.
Because the United States and China share many common interests, we are attempting to engage China in a military-to-military relationship. Our contact with the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is important, not only to improve transparency, but also because of the PLA's influence on China's security policies. China realizes that peace and stability in the region benefit all countries.
We recognize how strongly China feels about Taiwan sovereignty. Likewise, Chinese leaders recognize from our response to events in the Taiwan Strait last spring that the U.S. is bound by our domestic law and is committed to peaceful resolution of the issue. We do not currently see China as a threat based on capabilities and intentions. However, greater efforts on their part toward transparency and confidence building would allay concerns about China's military modernization and goals.
We see Hong Kong as a harbinger of China's ability to integrate into the global community as a responsible player. China's intended "one country, two systems" approach will be tested. Members of the Department of Defense and representatives of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and PLA met in January to discuss technical details of post-reversion port calls by U.S. Navy ships. We look forward to concluding an agreement on post-reversion procedures in the next several months.
We have many opportunities to work with China on a host of matters affecting the region and the world and we must plan to work these issues for the long haul. By building mutual trust and confidence between our two militaries we will increase the likelihood of cooperation, stability, and peace in the region. We are better off now than a year ago. We are optimistic regarding China's participation as a responsible player in the global community. We have decades of steady work ahead to patiently engage China. The U.S. can best influence the situation from a position of strength and resolve, focusing on our interests while respecting China's.
Russia. Russia is also a Pacific nation with legitimate national interests in the Asia-Pacific region. We are hopeful that an economic rebound will bolster Russia's fragile political reforms. Although readiness has deteriorated considerably since 1991, the Russian military retains significant influence, a credible nuclear capability, and potential for contributing to regional security.
While smaller than in the Soviet era, today's Russian Pacific Fleet is built around a core of modern combatants. The Russian Pacific Fleet demonstrates continued resolve to increase combat readiness despite funding shortfalls. In 1996, Russian Pacific Fleet submarines carried out missions of strategic deterrence, protection of strategic assets, regional security, and training for anti-surface warfare. Additionally, surface operations were active and included two major training exercises and numerous smaller training events. The Russian Navy maintains the capability to carry out "defense of the homeland" operations and retains the force structure for out-of-area submarine and surface combatant operations.
PACOM supports the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Russia Program through engagement with the Far East Military District and Russian Pacific Fleet. It is in our interest to stay engaged with Russia, by continuing military-to-military exchanges, visits, exercises, and working groups. Our hope is that Russia will become a constructive participant in Asia-Pacific security and prosperity.
Australia. Australia is a staunch treaty ally and one of our most reliable and innovative friends. The Joint Security Declaration signed at the July 96 Australia-U.S. Ministerial and the November 96 Presidential visit reaffirmed the significance and vitality of this relationship. Australia offers consistent and timely support to the United States. Prime Minister Howard publicly endorsed our actions following Operation DESERT STRIKE in Iraq and during our deployments in the Taiwan Strait last Spring.
Our military-to-military program reflects the strength of our overall relationship. The March 1997 bilateral training exercise TANDEM THRUST 97 is the largest exercise ever held in Australia and involves over 22,000 U.S. and Australian personnel. Additionally, Australia has offered the use of large training areas in the Northern Territory. This could provide excellent combined arms and live fire training for our forces, especially Navy and Marine Corps units transiting the region. Australia remains a solid friend and regional supporter which highly values its defense relationship with the United States.
India. India is a rising regional player with the potential to assume a larger global role. By the middle of the next century, India will surpass China as the world's most populous nation. While Pakistan is India's near-term concern, its long-term security anxiety is clearly China. India is also seeking greater economic cooperation with Southeast Asian nations. India is definitely looking East.
We are concerned about developments in weapons of mass destruction and delivery means. Controlling proliferation is important to regional stability. We urge both India and Pakistan not to deploy ballistic missiles or to test nuclear devices.
In 1995, the United States government established formal military-to-military relations as part of the larger U.S.-India security dialogue. PACOM is the designated executor of this dialogue.
Thailand. Under the treaty umbrella of the Manila Pact, the U.S.-Thai security relationship makes a critical contribution to regional security and stability. Our relationship with Thailand is a model for access and training. Our bilateral relationship is also a model for counter-drug programs with other nations in the region. We enjoy mutually beneficial interactions and expect this relationship to continue.
Philippines. The 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty serves as the framework for our bilateral security relationship with the Philippines. We have maintained a healthy program of military-to-military activities during the five years after we left Subic Bay and Clark. However, our activities in the Philippines are currently "on hold" pending resolution of legal protection issues for U.S. forces. We seek conclusion of a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) or interim measures which provide adequate legal protection for our personnel prior to resumption of our military activities. Our relationship with the Philippine military is excellent and I look forward to a timely resolution of the SOFA issue.
Indonesia. Indonesia's role in the Asia-Pacific region cannot be overstated. Its strategic location, large Muslim population, and well established regional involvement make closer relations with Indonesia a strategic requirement. The U.S.-Indonesian defense relationship is tied to the broad interests we share -- stability, prosperity, and peaceful resolution of conflicts. Expanded-IMET is serving as a valuable tool to promote democratic values and to improve mutual cooperation and understanding. We look forward to continued progress in our relationship with Indonesia.
ASEAN. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations includes seven countries -- Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam. We are hopeful that this organization will assume a greater role in regional security affairs.
Increases in defense spending and military modernization by ASEAN nations reflect economic growth, rather than response to a perceived threat to the region in the immediate future. As domestic insurgencies have abated, emphasis has changed from counterinsurgency to improving conventional forces. Greater wealth prompts these nations to improve their ability to defend economic and security interests, including protection of territorial waters and sea and air lines of communications. Thus, ASEAN states are modernizing air and naval forces and developing ground forces with emphasis on rapid employment. Military modernization is balanced in the region and has not developed into an arms race.
The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), consisting of 20 countries, including the U.S. and the European Union, contributes to regional security. As the region's most productive multilateral forum, ARF is an outstanding venue to highlight and discuss security issues. However, we must be careful not to view ARF through western eyes -- it is not a NATO. It is uniquely Asian, and reflects Asian methods of working to achieve consensus on issues. The Forum deserves our continued support and active participation. Examples of the Forum's growing importance are inter-sessional meetings scheduled in Beijing, Singapore, New Zealand and Kuala Lumpur to discuss confidence building, peacekeeping, and search and rescue operations.
Pacific Island Nations. PACOM maintains U.S. presence throughout the Pacific island nations. Our goals are to maintain the good will and access which the U.S. has enjoyed through out these islands for the last 50 years. Under the Compacts of Free Association, PACOM maintains Civic Action Teams in Palau and the Federated States of Micronesia. These small teams provide vital construction and limited medical support to the governments of these developing nations.
Our humanitarian and disaster assistance programs provide support throughout the Asia-Pacific region when it is needed most. During 1996, PACOM deployed water purification teams to Palau when water lines supplying the major population center were destroyed in a bridge collapse. Operations such as this demonstrate not only our humanitarian concerns, but also U.S. commitment to the region.
Engagement and preparedness require resourcing that balances service, joint and combined requirements. We are committed to good stewardship of taxpayer dollars through innovative use of technology to support joint force and service training. Increased use of simulation is one ingredient in achieving training economies. This approach can increase efficiency while reducing costs and personnel tempo, but cannot fully substitute for regular unit exercises. Funding to support training for tomorrow's military leaders is critically important to ensure future readiness. Training conducted with our allies is especially useful, as it increases their self sufficiency, demonstrates our capability, and enhances combined interoperability.
Harnessing technological advances will be a key factor in future warfare. Recapitalizing the current force and exploiting the potential for revolutionary improvements in sensor, mobility, targeting, precision munitions, and command and control is critical to future military readiness. Employing Advanced Concepts Technology Demonstrations (ACTD) allows us to realistically exercise new technologies. ACTDs help fill key needs faster by using commercially available technologies. ACTDs can reduce risk and shorten acquisition time.
Modernization for future readiness must be balanced with current and near-term readiness requirements. Technology is not a panacea. Over-reliance on technology can divert attention from successful low-tech solutions such as options provided by Special Operations Forces and procedural innovations such as the theater Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) concept. Moreover, technical solutions can amplify friendly force vulnerabilities -- prime targets for asymmetric attack by adversaries.
Through participation in the Chairman's Joint Requirements and Oversight Council and the DOD budget process, Unified Commanders continue to have a voice in the decision process. This process helps to achieve the goals of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation and ensures a long-term joint perspective. Prudent risk in conducting efficient operations must be considered in balancing short-term operations with long-term modernization requirements.
Other important programs, activities, and initiatives which directly support our strategy and deserve continued budgetary and policy support are:
Operations in Southeast Asia to attain the fullest possible accounting for missing service members
Counter-drug operations in Southeast Asia and in the Eastern Pacific
Military Construction
Security Assistance Programs which support humanitarian demining assistance in Cambodia and Laos International Military Education and Training activities with key militaries in the region
The Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies
Assessments of these "tools" and their impact on promoting U.S. security interests in the region are addressed in appropriate annexes.
People remain the nexus of all our efforts. I am constantly impressed with the spirit and dedication of service members whom I meet. We must continue to attract intelligent, dedicated, motivated young Americans. This requires rewarding opportunities and quality of life commensurate with the high demands we place on our forces. Quality of life issues must remain a budget priority. PACOM strongly supports the Secretary of Defense and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the following quality of life priorities:
Maximum annual pay raises allowed by current law. The 3% pay raise and increase in dislocation allowance from 2 to 2.5 months are positive initiatives to improve quality of life. We must continue to ensure that military pay is attractive and competitive with the private sector as called for in the President's budget.
Protection of retirement benefits. Maintaining a stable retirement system protected against inflation is an important career incentive.
Adequate health care benefits. As we "right-size" the medical community, we must ensure we preserve an affordable, accessible health care system with emphasis on prevention of disease and efficient care. We should not allow privatizing of some services to become a reduction in the quality of care or a windfall for insurers.
Continued funding of military family housing and bachelor enlisted quarters operation, maintenance, upgrades and privatization. The 4.6% increase in the Basic Allowance for Quarters continues progress toward the Congressional intent of 15% out-of-pocket housing expense. Applying the new VHA floor approved by Congress in the FY97 defense authorization bill benefits our personnel living in high cost areas. Several areas in PACOM are among the most expensive areas in the world to live. A balanced replacement of government housing in PACOM is encouraging to our service members. We must continue to maintain living standards at an adequate level.
Quality of life includes workplaces and military communities free from discrimination and harassment of any kind and for any reason. Through command involvement, indoctrination and sustainment programs, we strive to maintain the highest standards of professional conduct. Another core requirement is to make duty stations as safe as reasonably possible from terrorist and other criminal threats. Antiterrorism and force protection are priority activities in PACOM. Force protection requires focused intelligence to produce predictive threat information, as well as physical and procedural deterrent and protection measures. Our initial estimates for force protection enhancements include $93.28 Million and 108 additional military personnel. We will continue to refine these estimates and will submit them to DOD for consideration and decision.
The security strategy in the Asia-Pacific region is working in our nation's interest. The region is at peace, but not conflict free. The prognosis is positive for peaceful resolution supplanting armed conflict as the mode for dispute resolution. Although security concerns such as the Korean Peninsula rightfully capture our attention and resources, the region as a whole is secure and nations are able to focus on economic development. This stability and the resulting prosperity we share are underwritten primarily by the consistent engagement and presence of U.S. military forces. Our strategy of engagement and presence is the right solution for shaping an uncertain future.
We support the Quadrennial Defense Review process to determine a correct strategy, equipment, and mix of forces needed in the years ahead for the full spectrum of tasks we face. We are actively involved in this effort to develop an approach that balances readiness and modernization and capitalizes on our core strengths and comparative advantages. Maintaining the capabilities of our forward-deployed, forward based, and CONUS forces is essential to our strategy's success in peace, crisis, and war. Forward-deployed forces of about 100,000 military personnel are about right to safeguard our commitment to the region.
Visits to the region by Administration and Congressional delegations reinforce mutual understanding and enhance the perception of our nation's commitment to the region. The continued support by Congress and the American people is vital and appreciated. With your support and the cooperation of our allies and friends, the United States will continue successfully advancing our national interests as an active partner and beneficiary in the Asia-Pacific community.
Illegal drugs pose a serious threat to the U.S. and the Asia-Pacific nations. Narcotics not only drain the strength and health of individual users, but that of nations as well. Drug production and trafficking are a multi-billion dollar business which pays no taxes. Drug trafficking insidiously encourages the corruption of government officials, addicts populations and destroys the basic fabric of society.
PACOM's counter-drug program supports the President's National Drug Control Strategy, specifically Presidential Goals 4 and 5. (Goal 4: Shield America's air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat. Goal 5: Break foreign and domestic drug sources of supply.) With the help of many nations throughout the Asia-Pacific region, PACOM continues to fight the scourge of illegal drug use and trafficking. PACOM's counter-drug standing joint task force, Joint Interagency Task Force West (JIATF West), has steadily increased its counter-drug support to many countries throughout the Pacific. By directly supporting greater regional cooperation and counter-drug efforts, PACOM helps regional governments reduce the amount of illegal drugs produced, consumed, and transported in the Asia-Pacific area. This support includes cooperating closely with U.S. and foreign law enforcement agencies, training civil counter-drug police, sharing intelligence, and providing DOD expertise in command and control activities. We intend to continue our counter-drug activities throughout Southeast Asia over the next several years. While PACOM is primarily focused upon heroin and Southeast Asia, we are working closely with USCINCSOUTH to combat the flow of cocaine in the eastern Pacific. Since the beginning of 1997, JIATF West's Eastern Pacific Campaign Plan has netted over 3.3 tons of cocaine.
Joint Task Force-Full Accounting (JTF-FA) continues a high OPTEMPO in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia with the goal of "fullest possible accounting" for missing service members in Southeast Asia. During the past year, JTF-FA completed 325 field investigations and 68 excavations. JTF-FA also sent a two-person investigation element to China in October 1996 to interview witnesses concerning losses in Vietnam and Hainan Island. These efforts resulted in the repatriation of 35 sets of remains associated with unaccounted for Americans. Vietnamese cooperation on the President's four key measures of progress continues to be good, and Lao cooperation is steadily improving. JTF-FA expects the current pace of operations to continue through 1999 in Vietnam and 2000 in Laos, followed by limited operations in both countries through 2001. Of course, these dates may change as new information comes to light. JTF-FA maintains forward detachments in Bangkok, Hanoi, Vientiane, and Phnom Penh. During FY97, there are five field activities scheduled in Vietnam, six in Laos, and one in Cambodia. These field activities last about 30 days and involve as many as 100 U.S. personnel in Vietnam and 40 U.S. personnel in Laos.
Cooperation from host nations continues to be good. For example, Vietnam continues to publicize a remains amnesty program in an attempt to get private citizens to turn over remains they may be holding. Trilateral cooperation continues to progress. Vietnamese witnesses now routinely enter Laos to assist JTF-FA investigations, and the first use of a Vietnamese witness in Cambodia occurred in February 1997. Cambodia and Vietnam have undertaken a bilateral initiative to investigate cases along the Cambodia-Vietnam border. In Laos, archival research continues and the Lao government recently agreed to expand the program to include archival holdings in key provinces. JTF-FA's current caseload, which includes historically-based projections for reinvestigations and new excavations, consists of 299 case investigations -- 244 in Vietnam, 44 in Laos, and 11 in Cambodia. There are 107 excavations or recovery operations to complete -- 39 in Vietnam, 66 in Laos, and 2 in Cambodia.
Our top military construction priorities are warfighting infrastructure and quality of life projects. The infrastructure in the Pacific is our platform for launching our Cooperative Engagement strategy in peace, crisis, and war. Over the last several years we have significantly reduced our military base footprint in the Pacific. Remaining vital infrastructure must be properly maintained and renewed with new facilities when mission or economics require that capital investment. The FY98 USPACOM MILCON program contains 45 projects totaling $559 Million (Figure 1).
The Host Nation Funded Construction (HNFC) program is an excellent example of burden sharing by Japan and Korea. Our investment in this program is only 1.6% of the approximately $1.1 Billion spent by the host nations. However, the Army's role as the executive agent for construction in Japan and Korea is critical to provide quality facilities. The Government of Japan (GOJ) provides approximately $1 Billion in construction each year under the Facilities Improvement Program (FIP). The GOJ does not pay for U.S. government quality assurance and criteria package development. The cost for Special Action Committee Okinawa (SACO) related construction is estimated to be $2.5 Million in FY98. This funding requirement will increase during the following 4 years. Without the additional funding, the FIP will be affected as resources will have to be diverted to support SACO construction requirements. As soon as final costs can be determined PACOM will coordinate through DOD to ensure requirements are adequately funded.
The Republic of Korea has proved an excellent burden sharing partner in the effort to improve our facilities. Under the November 1995 Special Measures Agreement, Korea will increase its $100 Million annual contribution to Host Nation Construction by 10% each year for the next two years. Unfortunately, our barracks in Korea are the worst in the military, and this contribution will not be enough to meet requirements. We need to do our share, and I request your support for $97 Million for FY98 for six barracks projects and a dining facility project.
Elsewhere, we continue to improve housing for our families. Service members and their families are gratified by the completion of replacement housing and housing improvements. This is a significant factor in retention of highly skilled career personnel. Most of the construction budget for FY98 is dedicated to improving family housing and barracks in Alaska, Hawaii, California and Washington.
Our en route infrastructure is reaching the end of its service life, particularly aging POL systems. Many facilities constructed in the 1940-1950 time frame need major repair or replacement. Real property maintenance accounts for essential facility repairs are "must pay" costs that continue to escalate. Readiness is degraded by hollow infrastructure when facilities fall into disrepair, or when we must shift funds to perform expensive, incremental or emergency maintenance on those facilities.
Warfighting Infrastructure $ Million
Construct Three 83,000 BBL Tanks, Elmendorf AFB, AK 21.7
A-10 Squadron Operations / AMU, Eielson AFB, AK 7.8
Upgrade POL System, Indian Mountain, AK 2.0
Replace POL Pipeline, Andersen AFB, Guam 16.4
Aeromedical Clinic, Andersen AFB, Guam 3.7
Fire Protection System Improvements, NCTAMS, Guam 4.1
Oily Waste Collection Treatment System, Pearl Harbor, HI
25.0
Renovate Existing DFAS Facility, Pearl Harbor, HI 10.0
Fire Training Facility, Kunsan AB, Korea 2.0
Environmental Prev Med Unit Add./Alt., San Diego, CA 2.1
Waterfront Operations Support Facility, Coronado, CA 7.5
Aircraft Maintenance Training Facility, Camp Pendleton, CA
4.3
Highbay Warehouse (Phase II), Camp Pendleton, CA 6.9
Emergency Spill Control, Camp Pendleton, CA 2.8
River Field Control San Margar, Camp Pendleton, CA 21.9
Bridge Replacement, Camp Pendleton, CA 5.6
Comm/Electronics Maint and Storage Facility, 29 Palms, CA
3.8
Ordnance Facility, El Centro NAF, CA 11.0
Maintenance Support Facility, North Island, NAS 15.3
Visual System Bldg. Addition, North Island, NAS 1.4
Seawall Upgrade, North Island, NAS 2.9
Tank Trail Erosion Mitigation, Yakima, WA 2.0
Medical/Dental Clinic, Everett, WA 7.5
Electronic Warfare Training Facility, Whidbey Island, WA 1.1
Quality of Life $ Million
Improve 82 Units Family Housing, Elmendorf AFB, AK 12.5
Fitness Center Addition and Renovation, Wahiawa, HI 3.9
Bachelor Quarters, MCBH, HI 19.0
Replace 132 Units Family Housing, Schofield, HI 27.0
Whole Barracks Complex Renewal, Schofield, HI 44.0
Improve 123 Units Family Housing, Hickam AFB, HI 23.8
Whole Barracks Complex Renewal, Camp Red Cloud, Korea 23.6
Whole Barracks Complex Renewal, Camp Stanley, Korea 7.0
Whole Barracks Complex Renewal, Camp Castle, Korea 8.4
Whole Barracks Complex Renewal, Camp Humphreys, Korea 32.0
Dining Facility, Camp Casey, Korea 5.1
Dormitory, Kunsan AB, Korea 8.3
Dormitory, Osan AB, Korea 11.1
Bachelor Enlisted Quarters, Camp Pendleton, CA 12.0
Family Housing 171 Units, Camp Pendleton, CA 22.7
Enlisted Dining Facility, Miramar, CA 8.7
Family Housing 166 Units, Miramar, CA 29.1
Family Housing Replacement, 29 Palms, CA 24.1
Family Housing Replacement, Lemoore NAS, CA 14.8
Whole Barracks Complex Renewal, Fort Lewis, WA 29.0
Child Development Center, NSY Puget Sound, WA 4.4
The Pacific Command strongly endorses a robust and responsible Security Assistance program. This program continues to play a key role in supporting our regional engagement strategy. USPACOM FY96 Foreign Military Sales were over $3 Billion while Direct Commercial Sales were over $1 Billion. In FY96 two countries in USPACOM received Foreign Military Financing grant funds for demining: Cambodia ($1 Million in support of demining activities and another $1 Million of unrestricted grants) and Laos ($500 thousand for demining). This humanitarian and non-lethal assistance warrants continued support.
IMET is one of our most cost effective activities promoting peace, security, democracy and interoperability. Our IMET program objectives are to gain country access, influence future leaders, and improve civilian control of the military. To ensure USPACOM and host country objectives are achieved, a robust and stable IMET program is a must for all eligible countries.
The Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) plays an important role in our theater strategy. In only its second year, the Center is expanding the linkages and common frames of reference vital to fostering cooperative approaches to security in the Asia-Pacific region. The Center's conferences focus on today's leaders, while its academic program focuses on tomorrow's leaders. The first 12-week security studies course in the Center's College of Security Studies (23 September to 13 December 1996) brought together 23 students from 12 nations. The second course started on 3 March. The seven conferences conducted to date by the APCSS provided superb venues for interaction between key leaders from 35 Asia-Pacific nations. APCSS is an excellent investment in regional security. We are extremely optimistic about its contributions and future possibilities.
The following provides a brief description of the key components of the APCSS:
College of Security Studies. As the primary component of the Center, future leaders from the region study past and present security issues and seek to identify potential security problems, the roles and missions of the military, and how governments shape their military forces to meet perceived threats. By 1998, the College will expand to three 12-week sessions per year with 75 - 100 participants per session. International participants will compose about 75% of each class. As one participant of the inaugural class stated, "The U.S. is uniquely placed in taking this lead, which is without a doubt, both timely and important."
Conference and Research Center. The six to eight conferences per year will be tailored to reflect specific issues such as "Asia-Pacific security in the 21st century." The international research staff contributes to defining relevant conference topics, identifying leading experts for presentations, and recommending appropriate participants. The research staff also provides conference results to appropriate audiences.
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