3 March 1999
Mr. Chairman and members of this Committee, on behalf of the men and women of the United States Pacific Command, thank you for this opportunity to present my perspective on security in the Asia-Pacific region.
There are five points that I would like to make with this committee.
First, Pacific Command's goal remains a more secure, peacefully developing Asia-Pacific region. Achieving this goal is the best way of advancing U.S. interests in the area. It is the benchmark we use for recommending policies and operations to the Secretary of Defense, for determining our resource requirements, and for making recommendations to this committee.
Second, the foundations of security and peaceful development throughout the region remain steady. These foundations are: deployed, ready, and powerful Pacific Command forces; the linchpin, a solid U.S.-Japan security alliance; continued development of the U.S.-China relationship; deterrence on the Korean Peninsula; recovery by American allies and partners affected by the Asian economic crisis; and establishing stable security relationships in South Asia.
Third, 1998 was a tumultuous year in the Asia-Pacific region. Key events coming on top of the continuing economic crisis eroded progress towards our goal. These events included the continued construction of what may well be underground nuclear facilities in North Korea; North Korea's continued infiltration attempts of the South, and its attempted satellite launch; the social and political unrest in Indonesia; and nuclear tests in South Asia.
Fourth, U.S. military resources for both engagement and deterrence are essential to achieving our goals and missions. The key resources are: national support for powerful, forward forces in the Pacific Command; funding to maintain readiness for all forces - forward, rotating, and reinforcing; a well developed and responsive intelligence capability to understand activities in the region in peace and support combat operations in war; security assistance for key friends and allies in the region; funding for International Military Education and Training; and innovative organizations such as the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, and the Center of Excellence for Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance.
Fifth, I expect 1999 to be no less challenging and full of activity than last year.
I will begin my testimony by discussing the events of the past year and how they have affected the security situation in the Pacific Command. I will then discuss our primary areas of focus for the coming months, and will conclude with several specific areas requiring attention.
1998 was a tumultuous year in the Asia-Pacific region. A number of events altered the strategic landscape and will likely have lasting impact. They may very well shape the emergence of a "new" Asia. There are four major events in particular that merit this Committee's attention.
Before discussing North Korean activities of 1998, we need to take a step back and review this unique country's overall predicament. 1998 continued a deteriorating trend of both its international and internal position. North Korea has not compensated for the loss of the economic, political, and ideological pillars on which it had previously relied. Its former major allies, Russia and China, have turned away from the social and economic systems that North Korea espouses, though the PRC continues to provide economic support in the form of food and fuel to prevent a North Korean economic collapse. The juche philosophy of self-reliance has been eroded by a permanent dependency on the outside world for roughly a quarter of its food. The country has had to shelve its strategic ambitions of reuniting the Peninsula on its terms and is reduced to making desperate and dangerous tactical displays of military power to threaten its neighbors. Finally, although it maintains a damaging capability in forward-stationed artillery, tactical ballistic missiles, and special operations forces, North Korea's overall military readiness has deteriorated over the past year. Its exercise schedule was limited, troops again were diverted to agricultural purposes, and deliveries of new systems continued to decline. Regardless, the DPRK still maintains the fifth largest military in the world.
Against this backdrop, we need to examine the series of dangerous actions that the North Korean regime took during the past year.
As this committee is aware, the United States has detected an underground facility in North Korea that may represent a continuation of North Korea's nuclear program. The facility is still four to six years from completion, but if completed could give North Korea a hidden and secure capability to produce material for nuclear weapons. Thus far, North Korea not granted access to this site. Access to this site is important to ensure the DPRK is in compliance with commitments under the Agreed Framework. It is important to remember that this facility has been under construction for the past ten years and does not represent a new decision by North Korea. However, the continuation of work on this facility makes it clear the Agreed Framework may require strengthening to reach its goal of halting further development of North Korean nuclear weapons.
On 31 August 1998, North Korea launched a modified, three-stage Taepodong ballistic missile over Japan on a trajectory consistent with a satellite launch. Intelligence analysts had predicted the launch of this missile, and the depth of our understanding of the flight is a tribute to the intelligence community--both collectors and analysts. Although the missile did not function correctly, the existence of the third stage was a surprise to us, and it is clear that North Korea will be able to bring a militarily significant ballistic missile payload to bear on the United States within the next few years.
To put the military significance of North Korean actions into context, North Korea has now demonstrated the capability to range the entire territory of South Korea and Japan, as well as large portions of China and Russia, with the Taepodong 1 missile. With an ability to deliver several hundred-kilogram payloads about 2,000 kilometers, this missile poses a threat to U.S. allies and interests in the region. Used as potential terror weapons of the sort Iraq used against Israel in the Gulf War, with chemical, biological, or nuclear warheads, these missiles constitute mass terror weapons; they also leave an unmistakable signature of origin, a "return address." Should North Korea use these weapons, they would be open to retaliation by the United States that would far exceed any damage they would have caused.
Beyond these military implications, this event resulted in heightened concerns for security in North East Asia. With its vulnerability to North Korean missiles apparent, Japan has questioned its participation in the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), and is reviewing its defense posture. Despite the provocation of the missile launch, the Republic of Korea has maintained support for KEDO and its engagement policy. China has expressed concerns over increased tensions and potential Theater Missile Defense (TMD) deployment in North East Asia.
Continued Infiltration Attempts
The North continues to send forces to infiltrate the South. In 1998 there were three detected infiltration attempts. In 1999 thus far we have detected none, however, our clearest evidence is when they do not succeed, leaving dead troops and destroyed delivery vehicles near the beaches.
The way forward in dealing with North Korea will be neither simple nor short. Dr. Bill Perry is currently leading a review of U.S. policy. Much has changed since the Agreed Framework was negotiated in 1994, and we should review and evaluate our policies in the light of the current situation.
Asia continues to struggle through the economic crisis. Key economic indicators in several countries show that some individual sectors have stabilized, particularly in Thailand and South Korea. However the crisis continues to have negative direct and indirect effects on security policies of countries in the region important to the United States. Asian defense austerity programs have resulted in slowed modernization, reduced operations, pressures to reduce U.S. burden-sharing/Host Nation Support, and fewer interactions among friends and allies.
The countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have had to focus inward, and the promising security initiatives that were taken in the past in the South China Sea, for example, are notably absent this year. As a result, Spratly Island sovereignty claims continue to fester and remain a source of tension.
The country most affected by the economic crisis is Indonesia. The internal pressures of the economic crisis and the subsequent riots led to the May 1998 resignation of President Suharto. Vice President B. J. Habibie assumed the presidency and has begun to initiate political and economic reforms to address many of Indonesia's problems. Throughout this process, the Indonesian Armed Forces, ABRI, have played a difficult but generally positive role. While there were instances of individual or small unit violence against Indonesian citizens, ABRI leadership firmly supported the constitution. Moreover, the incidents of abuses, shootings, and kidnappings that were reported are now being investigated and the perpetrators punished.
The United States has a special interest in a secure, stable, and prosperous Indonesia. Indonesia has traditionally played a leadership role in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). With the world's fourth largest population, including the world's largest Islamic populace, and a location astride shipping lanes linking Asia to the Persian Gulf, Indonesia is strategically important.
The United States must continue to encourage the reform process. The outcome we seek is a more democratic Indonesia with its armed forces fully in support of its constitution and the rule of law, and with an economy again raising the living standards of its citizens. Steady support and encouragement from the United States is important to Indonesia reaching these goals. In Pacific Command's contacts with ABRI, we have encouraged ABRI's reform efforts and encouraged lawful conduct in maintaining civil order. To assist in this change, we have also shifted our military-to-military engagement program to put emphasis on humanitarian assistance and civil-military reform.
In May 1998, India conducted five nuclear tests. Pakistan responded with its own series of tests. These tests have altered the strategic landscape in South Asia and greatly increased the consequences of any strategic miscalculation on the part of either India or Pakistan. In addition, they have seriously undermined the international community's goal of reducing the total number of nuclear weapons in the world and the number of countries that possess them.
As the United States and the rest of the world work out policies to deal with this new strategic situation, it is in the interest of all parties to ensure that neither India nor Pakistan uses their nuclear status to settle old scores. Equally important, these two rivals must be extremely careful not to miscalculate each other's intentions. We should do what we can to ensure both India and Pakistan handle their weapons safely and that they establish appropriate export controls.
I do not see how these goals can be achieved unless we actively engage the Indians and Pakistanis at all levels, both private and government, with our executive and legislative branches and the armed forces. I therefore recommend strongly that we continue to be selective and judicious in imposing penalties and sanctions on both countries. We need more contact with these countries, not less.
The priorities for the Pacific Command fall into four groups: readiness, regional issues, Revolution in Military Affairs, and resources. Let me discuss them in turn.
As was true throughout the armed forces last year, earlier reports of individual unit readiness problems have become firm trends of declining readiness. While I have no reservations about the Pacific Command's ability to do its job today, I have doubts about its ability to continue to do so in the future unless these trends change.
The single largest factor affecting readiness is the quality of our people. I strongly support the funding in the fiscal year 2000 budget for a base pay increase; for elimination of the REDUX retirement system, returning to 50% base pay after 20 years of service; and for pay table reform that will reward achievement more than longevity. I strongly urge the Congress to pass these provisions to show our people that, while duty in the armed forces will not make them rich, it will equitably and fairly compensate them both on active duty and in retirement.
Pay and retirement are not the only areas of concern. We must also emphasize that while we recruit individuals, we retain families. In addition to expectations of available and affordable medical care, our men and women in uniform consider the same quality of life factors as those in the civilian community--quality of schools, security in the community, affordability/adequacy of housing, duration of commute to work, etc. These quality of life issues are especially important now as increasing operational tempo generates more frequent family separations. On-base family housing, especially overseas, provides a living environment geared to support the special demands of military life. Family housing, and the associated sense of community that accompanies it, assures our troops that their families are taken care of while deployed. In short, it is a family decision to stay in the military, and if we care for the families of our troops, we stand a better chance of retaining service members--and our investment in their training.
The President's budget for fiscal year 2000 contains a sizable increase in Operations and Maintenance funds that affect readiness. Within Pacific Command, our priorities for additional O&M funds are depot level maintenance, repair parts stocks, and base operations and maintenance. My service components have not yet been allocated their individual increases, but I am confident that the additional funds will begin to turn around the adverse trends in maintenance and training.
My current readiness concerns are recruitment and retention of quality people in specific skill areas, logistics and sustainment shortfalls, and an aging fuels infrastructure.
For the Pacific Fleet, the problem manifests itself as a decline in the readiness of units that are between deployments. Carrier airwings in particular are dropping below levels of readiness we are used to seeing and their return to peak readiness is coming later in the pre-deployment training cycle. In some cases, airwings have not reached peak readiness until after they are deployed.
For the Air Force, the problem is pilot retention. Although cockpits in the Pacific Air Forces are adequately filled, many key staff billets are empty.
For the Army, attracting and retaining quality soldiers in specialized fields such as intelligence, communication and electronics, and linguists will also be a challenge. The U.S. Army, Pacific is adequately manned at present, but Army recruiting goal shortfalls will affect that manning in the future unless enlistment and retention bonuses are maintained.
The logistics and sustainment shortfalls manifest themselves across a number of areas. One key area involves Army Propositioned Stocks (APS-4) located in Korea and Japan to support Pacific theater contingencies. Although this budget improves inventory levels, crucial shortages exist in sustainment stocks that impact our ability to replace combat losses.
The most serious infrastructure problems are aging fuel systems in Alaska, Hawaii, Guam, and Japan, which in conflict or crisis would slow strategic airlift across the Pacific. The fuel infrastructure problems center on Fuel Hydrant Systems and Fuel Storage Tanks.
One last readiness concern is the Y2K issue. Pacific Command has been working diligently to ensure that our operations will not be affected before, during, and after 1 January 2000. In October 1998, the command stood up a full-time task force to focus exclusively on this problem. Our component commands are also focusing resources on the problem. In early 1999, we will conduct two operational evaluations to test the ability of our critical systems to support a joint task force and to deploy forces for a major theater war in a Y2K environment. Additionally, in concert with the Joint Staff, we are evaluating our ability to perform our mission even if critical systems fail. I believe we are on top of this challenge but it will take a sustained effort over the next nine months.
The U.S. alliance with Japan remains the linchpin to security in the region. Today, the alliance is in excellent shape and we will be addressing important issues with the Japanese in the course of the coming year.
This year, the government of Japan will take up the issue of the Defense Guidelines. Passage of Defense Guidelines legislation will enable Pacific Command and our Japanese military counterparts to begin working out the specific military measures to implement them. In particular, we need to define the measures authorized in the event of a regional crisis.
In the wake of North Korea's missile launch last August, Japan is taking another look at its security requirements, both in the area of intelligence capabilities with reconnaissance satellites and ballistic missile defense. In both these areas we will work closely with Japan to ensure we move forward with capabilities that meet mutual defense needs, are interoperable, and make good use of the strengths each side brings to the alliance.
We will continue to work closely with the Government of Japan to reduce our footprint on Okinawa and to resolve the situation with the incinerator near Naval Air Facility, Atsugi.
It is important to point out when discussing our relationship with Japan that, although Japan's economy is in its deepest recession since World War II, Japan continues to provide the United States with more than $4.5 billion annually in host nation support for our forces there.
At the June 1998 summit, President Clinton and President Jiang committed the United States and China to building a constructive relationship. The President's visit put U.S.-China engagement on a more stable foundation, a positive development toward the goal of a more secure, peacefully developing Asia-Pacific region.
China is not a military threat to U.S. interests today. Given the current priority within Chinese national resource allocation, and the expected level of Chinese technological and training development, it will be many years before the People's Liberation Army fields capabilities to project significant power across the region or to present a major challenge to United States forces beyond its borders.
Whether the Chinese armed forces ever become a threat to American interests will be a function of our overall relationship with China. Mutual knowledge and respect on the part of the two armed forces will contribute in future years to growing military capabilities being used to promote peaceful development. The objective of our military-to-military relationship with the Chinese is to build knowledgeable, professional respect on the part of the PLA for the fighting power of the U.S., and to demonstrate that American soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines can work in concert with their Chinese counterparts to address mutual security concerns. We will continue a measured military-to-military program that supports these goals.
There is no question that China, within limited resources, is pursuing military modernization of its force in a determined, savvy, and methodical way. China's conventional force modernization will continue at a measured pace, with emphasis on greater power projection and selective modern warfighting capabilities. In addition, China will place emphasis on developing a more credible military threat against Taiwan (though not the large amphibious capability necessary for invasion), and protecting claims in the South China Sea against Southeast Asian rivals. China will continue to actively seek advanced technology through sending students abroad, purchases from cooperative nations (like Russia), and commercial partners. The PRC will proliferate some technical capabilities as it sells selected weapons systems to other countries. For our part, we should protect the weapons and technology we depend on for our warfighting advantages, and make case-by-case decisions on the sale of dual-use technologies available on world markets.
From the Chinese perspective, Taiwan is the most controversial aspect of the U.S.-China security relationship. U.S. fundamental interest is for China and Taiwan to resolve their sovereignty issue peacefully. The deterrent power of Pacific Command is fully capable of supporting the firm U.S. policy that it is in no country's interest to resolve the issue by force.
The greatest potential for war in the Asia-Pacific region is on the Korean Peninsula. U.S. forces would be under fire in the opening minutes of any conflict there. Reconciliation between the two Koreas, i.e., an agreement to reduce tensions and establish normal relations, is the best way of moving towards a peaceful solution. Achieving that will require continued U.S. military presence on the peninsula and, to the greatest extent feasible, a dialogue with the North.
I have already discussed most of the aspects of the Korean situation. What I have not discussed is what I cannot predict. There are likely to be tensions in the coming months from North Korea as it desperately grapples with internal and international problems using the few, but dangerous, tools it possesses: missile and nuclear programs, inflammatory rhetoric, and brinkmanship tactics. As the United States reviews and evaluates its policies via the Dr. Perry review, and deals with new North Korean provocation, we need to keep these essentials firmly in mind:
Deterrence of North Korean military action must be kept strong, on the basis of U.S.-ROK unity and real military capability.
Time is on the side of the United States and the Republic of Korea and against North Korea.
The Asia economic crisis has had enormous impact on the Asia-Pacific region. Economies are in recession, unemployment has increased, and nations are more focused on internal than regional security. The crisis has raised security issues in Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines and reduced the cohesion of ASEAN. ASEAN nations have canceled or delayed contracts for imports of military equipment as they have cut their defense budgets.
After more than a year of bad economic news, there are some hopeful signs today. Asian currencies are more stable than they were last year, foreign currency reserves are starting to increase, and interest rates are starting to decline. Economists tell us it will probably be several years until significant economic improvement resumes in the region as a whole and even then far more moderate economic growth is expected. For long-term growth, it is critical that Asian governments stay the course of economic reform.
As this nation's military commander in the Asia-Pacific region, I can still provide military security as the region struggles to recover from the economic crisis; what I cannot ensure with military security is the economic growth that is key to the goal of a more secure, peacefully developing Asia-Pacific region. I therefore strongly support continued U.S. efforts, both bilateral and through multilateral financial institutions, to support South Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, and other affected countries as they make the structural reforms necessary to restore economic growth.
As laid out in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's "Joint Vision 2010", warfare is undergoing a transformation and the armed forces of the United States are committed to leading the change. We plan to be just as dominant a fighting force in 2010 as we are today.
Joint Vision 2010 is a vision of armed forces dramatically different from today's forces, taking advantage of exploding information technology, new weapons effects, and advances in stealth technology; concentrating effects, not mass; speeding up tempo of the battlefield to win more decisively and quickly.
To reach the vision, we must invest in our people so they all continue to be the best; we must also invest in technologies such as smart weapons, intelligence systems, and information technology. Most of all, we must boldly experiment to integrate people and technology into new operational concepts to find out what will work--how we will lead this revolution.
The U.S. Atlantic Command is the Department's executive agent for joint experimentation. In the Pacific Command we are conducting complementary experiments both in service and joint areas. Fleet Battle Experiment Delta in Korea used ground and Navy forces in new mutually supporting ways. Pacific Command has lead for the Extending the Littoral Battlefield (ELB) Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD). The ELB ACTD, if it works, will give Joint Task Force commanders the ability to use their forces across traditional service lines for much greater warfighting effectiveness.
Achieving Joint Vision 2010 is essential to protecting American security interests in the 21st century. Several members of Congress have been active in pushing us to pursue this program and we need your continued support and leadership.
Pacific Command's mission is to promote peace, deter conflict, respond to crises, and if necessary, fight and win to advance U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Our ability to do this is dependent on the resources that Congress, and ultimately the American taxpayers, provides to us. In this section, I will discuss resources in several key areas that are important to the Pacific Command's ability to carry out its mission.
The forward presence of U.S. military forces in Asia is essential to achieving a secure, peacefully developing Asia-Pacific region. Currently, U.S. military presence in Asia consists of the Seventh Fleet, Fifth and Seventh Air Forces, the Eighth U.S. Army, U.S. Army Japan/9th Theater Army Area Command, the III Marine Expeditionary Force, and a small number of special operations forces. These forces total approximately 100,000 U.S. military personnel. With the release of The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region in 1998, the Secretary of Defense reaffirmed the United States' commitment to maintain these forces and this level of presence in Asia. Our presence is welcomed in the region and nations continue to use our troop strength as a gauge of U.S. commitment.
Quality intelligence underwrites our military capabilities in the Pacific. I rely on human intelligence for both insight into intentions and for vital force protection information. Continued support for human intelligence capability is a wise, low-cost and high pay-off investment. Airborne reconnaissance provides equally vital indications and warnings, situational awareness and input to our intelligence databases. Since fully capable unmanned aerial vehicles remain years in the future, we need to maintain and upgrade our manned reconnaissance capabilities. I also endorse current efforts to upgrade intelligence infrastructure and to restructure to perform missions in a world of exploding information technology. This process is critical for us to keep our edge in the new threat environment. Finally, Pacific Command's ability to task, exploit, process, and disseminate intelligence to the warfighter depends on a robust theater intelligence capability. The warfighters' reliance on visible and timely intelligence will continue to grow, and I support the Committee's efforts to strengthen our intelligence capabilities.
Security assistance is a critical tool for ensuring that allied and friendly nations in the Asia-Pacific region are capable of defending themselves and of operating alongside U.S. military forces in coalition operations. Right now the process for foreign military sales is tortuous. It leaves our allies and friends in the region unable to make firm plans as they wait for decisions on sales. I support the Defense Security Cooperation Agency's and Military Services' efforts at re-engineering the Foreign Military Sales process to make it more streamlined and customer oriented. A more streamlined and reliable decision process will enhance Pacific Command's theater engagement program.
International Military Education and Training
International Military Education and Training (IMET) is one of our most cost-effective programs and is a key part of our theater engagement program. Not only does it provide training, but more importantly, it exposes future foreign leaders to the American way of life, democracy, civilian control of the military, and basic human rights. It leads to cooperative relationships, access, and influence throughout the region. Many of the top military leaders in the Asia-Pacific region today are IMET graduates and are also among the strongest advocates of continued U.S. presence and engagement in Asia. Examples of IMET graduates include the Supreme Commander, Royal Thai Armed Forces and the Chief of Defense Force, Singapore. I believe unrestricted IMET programs are a must for all eligible countries and support returning Indonesia to a full IMET status. IMET is a modest, long-term way of investing in a secure, peacefully developing Asia-Pacific region.
IMET funding for nations in Pacific Command's area of responsibility in fiscal year 1999 is $6.8 million; the proposed amount for fiscal year 2000 is $7.05 million. I urge this committee to continue to support this modestly increased IMET funding for this vital program with Asia-Pacific nations.
Anti-terrorism/Force Protection
Pacific Command's anti-terrorism/force protection goal is to reduce the chances of a terrorist incident inflicting significant casualties or damage to Americans and American facilities in the region. Although the overall terrorist threat in Pacific Command's area of responsibility remains low, the possibility exists that terrorist groups centered in other regions such as the Middle East could strike at American targets in Asia. The terrorist threat to Eastern Africa was also evaluated as low last year before the bombings outside the embassies in Nairobi and Dares Salaam.
We can never be completely confident we have adequately protected our forces from attack, but we can make the terrorists' job a lot harder by keeping them on the defensive and protecting areas where we have large numbers of Americans in confined spaces. To that end, we have focused our efforts in U.S. Pacific Command on providing anti-terrorism training to all of our personnel, completing vulnerability assessments of our installations, and building and training to anti-terrorism plans to respond to the potential threats.
In a vast area of operations dominated by oceans, U.S. military forces in the Pacific rely heavily on satellite communications to maintain situational awareness, move information, and exercise command and control. Although today's satellite systems meet our requirements in peacetime, we have limited surge capacity and few effective means to overcome system outages. Over the next four years, scheduled launches of satellites such as Milstar, upgraded Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS III), Ultra High Frequency Follow-on (UFO) with Global Broadcast Service (GBS), and Wideband Gapfiller will significantly improve our satellite communications capabilities and reduce risk in our theater. Funding for these critical systems must remain intact to meet our requirements.
Warfighters must have assured frequency spectrum access to accomplish the full range of military training and operations. As the federal government continues spectrum reallocation in the United States, in many cases the armed forces are required to modify equipment and training to match available frequencies for peacetime operations. In addition to cost, there is a direct readiness impact; if we cannot train as we fight, our warfighting capabilities suffer. To compound the problem, a number of Asia-Pacific nations are beginning to mimic U.S. spectrum policies, limiting U.S. military access. This is quickly becoming a serious operational concern. The solution to this problem is a U.S. national strategy on frequency spectrum use and allocation that balances economic interests with national security needs.
Pacific Command requires a new headquarters. The current building is a 57-year old hospital that has deteriorated to the point where financing a new building is more cost effective than maintaining the old. The planning for a new building is now in the final design stage. Funding is provided in the Future Years Defense Plan beginning in fiscal year 2000. I ask for this committee's continued support for the new headquarters.
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea
U.S. ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) will greatly empower UNCLOS as an authoritative force to guide and restrain the behavior of nations in the Asia-Pacific region. While protection of robust navigation rights is critical to regional security and economic development, many Asia-Pacific countries assert excessive maritime claims that challenge these rights. Ratification will strengthen our hand in demanding compliance with UNCLOS requirements and in countering excessive maritime claims. In short, ratification will guarantee protection of navigation rights vital to executing our missions and carrying out our policies.
Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies
The Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) is a regional studies, conference, and research center located in Honolulu. Its mission is to enhance cooperation and build relationships through mutual understanding and study of security issues among military and civilian representatives of the U.S. and other Asia-Pacific nations. The APCSS is a significant investment in the Asia of the future -- it is both a confidence-building measure and demonstration of long-term U.S. commitment to the region. Crucial to its success is pending legislation that would allow waiving certain expenses for attendance as an incentive for countries to participate that could not otherwise afford to attend, and authorizing acceptance of donations to provide an alternate source of income to help defray costs. These proposals are still in the clearance process within the administration. The APCSS is an excellent investment in regional security and merits this committee's support.
Center of Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance
The Center of Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance was created in 1994. It works in a unique partnership with Pacific Command, the Pacific Regional Medical Command, the University of Hawaii, and the U.S. Center for Disease Control. The Center does research, collates information on humanitarian emergencies and disaster management, trains our military staff personnel, and when a crisis occurs, can provide expert advice. It is an innovative way to address emerging security threats. I urge this committee to continue supporting this initiative.
Joint Task Force-Full Accounting
Joint Task Force-Full Accounting's (JTF-FA) mission is to achieve the fullest possible accounting of Americans still unaccounted for as a result of the conflict in Southeast Asia. During 1998, JTF-FA investigated 268 cases and performed 62 excavations (37 in Vietnam, 21 in Laos, and 4 in Cambodia). Forty-seven remains repatriations were conducted (Vietnam-29, Laos-16, and Cambodia-2). During fiscal year 1999, JTF-FA will conduct eleven joint field activities (JFAs), five each in Vietnam and Laos, and one in Cambodia. JTF-FA's current caseload of joint investigations consists of investigations on 389 unaccounted-for individuals -- 285 in Vietnam, 98 in Laos, and 6 in Cambodia.
U.S. Pacific Command Counter-drug Efforts
U.S. Pacific Command is involved in multiple activities that support the President's National Drug Control Strategy. Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) West is U.S. Pacific Command's counter-drug operational agent. Theater counter-drug efforts include: intelligence analyst support to the Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA) international operations, disrupting the North/South cocaine and East/West heroin flows, providing training to Thai and Malaysian counter-drug units, and providing helicopter support for DEA's marijuana eradication effort.
In summary, 1999 and 2000 will be challenging years for the United States in the Asia-Pacific region.
Our fundamental goals of security and peaceful development endure, but will be tested by North Korean actions, by the continuing economic crisis, by the outcome of political and economic reform in Indonesia, and by a new strategic situation in South Asia.
Our foundation of ready forward forces to deter aggression, strong regional alliances, and active engagement with other countries in the region will continue to serve us well in reaching those goals.
For the future, our areas of emphasis will be readiness, regional issues, the revolution in military affairs, and resources. The President's budget for 2000 gives us the tools to make progress in all these areas, and we ask for continued Congressional support.
Finally, I urge this committee to travel to the Asia-Pacific region. It is in our nation's interests for members to see this large and diverse area and to understand the security dividends our nation reaps from the military resources it allocates to this region.
Annex A. Military Construction
Military construction and infrastructure are key components of Pacific Command's readiness. Much of the infrastructure is old and needs replacement--this is a necessary investment. Infrastructure conditions on critical bases have deteriorated over the last year, particularly in Korea. The total FY00 program, as submitted by the President, is about $1.1 billion authorization and $296 million appropriation for the Pacific Command AOR (Figure 1).
We must continue to build new or replacement projects on bases of enduring value, evaluating the need for, and providing adequate support for, those bases that will sustain our military readiness into the next century. The key bases for us will be the ones that allow us to deploy our forces to contingency operations around the Pacific.
The Host Nation Funded Construction (HNFC) program is an excellent example of burden sharing by Japan and Korea. Our investment in this program is only 2% of the approximately $1 Billion (FY98) spent by the host nations. However, the U.S. Army's role as the executive agent for construction in Japan and Korea is critical to provide quality facilities. The Government of Japan (GOJ) provides approximately $900 million, of the $1 Billion total, in construction each year under the Japan Facilities Improvement Program (JFIP). The GOJ does not pay for U.S. government surveillance and criteria package development, which ensure the facilities meet U.S. quality and safety standards. The Army has requested $21.3 million in FY00 for the worldwide (Pacific and Europe) HNFC program. The majority of this amount is required to support the HNFC program in the Pacific. The return on our $19.3 million investment in the Pacific is about 50 to 1.
The Republic of Korea (ROK) has proved an excellent burden sharing partner in the improvement of the military facilities in Korea. In addition to the host nation support provided by the ROK, Congress has funded essential facilities in Korea over the past 4 years. New barracks, dining facilities, and support facilities have made a significant difference to the soldiers stationed in Korea. We still need MILCON dollars in excess of the $120 million annual contribution by the ROK. We request your support for the eight facility infrastructure projects in Korea.
Safe, adequate, well-maintained housing is a top readiness, force protection, retention, and quality of life concern overseas. Throughout the Pacific we continue to correct the housing problem that our military families and unaccompanied personnel have endured for so long. The completion of new and replacement housing is encouraging, but much more remains to be done. This is a significant factor in the satisfaction of our career personnel -- quality of life affects retention, which impacts readiness. Again this year a substantial portion of the Pacific Command projects support quality of life initiatives.
Our transportation infrastructure across the Pacific is reaching the end of its service life, particularly our aging POL systems at air stations. Many facilities that were constructed during the 1940-1950 time frame are in need of major repair or replacement. Emergency repair projects cost much more in precious resources and costly environmental clean up than a judicious replacement program. Our requests in FY98 and FY99 were funded and fully funding the FY00 program through the FY00 appropriations request and associated advanced appropriations is essential to support the Pacific Command POL en route infrastructure requirements.
Real property maintenance accounts for essential facility repairs are "must pay" costs that continue to escalate. Readiness is degraded by hollow infrastructure. When we shift funds to perform expensive incremental or emergency maintenance on facilities it costs us more than if we perform maintenance on a scheduled basis. As facilities age, requirements will continue to increase. Readiness and quality of life will suffer if funds designated for repair are cut. Under our agreements with Japan and Korea, real property maintenance is a U.S. responsibility.
Figure 1 FY 00 USPACOM MILCON AND FAMILY HOUSING
| Project | Auth | Approp |
|---|---|---|
| Emissions Reduction Facility, Ft Wainwright, AK | 15.5M | 2.3M |
| Repair KC-135 Parking Ramp, Eielson AFB, AK | 4.0M | 0.9M |
| Weapons Release Systems Facility, Eielson AFB, AK | 6.1M | 1.5M |
| Repair Runway, Eielson AFB, AK | 14.0M | 3.3M |
| C-130 Parking Ramp, Elmendorf AFB, AK | 17.0M | 4.0M |
| Hospital Replacement Phase 1, Ft Wainwright, AK | 133.0M | 18M |
| Replace Hydrant Fuel System PH 2, Elmendorf AFB, AK | 23.5M | 4.7M |
| Replace Hydrant Fuel System, Eielson AFB, AK | 26.0M | 9.0M |
| Air Traffic Control Tower, Kaneohe MCAS, HI | 5.8M | 1.5M |
| Berthing Wharf, Pearl Harbor, HI | 29.5M | 7.5M |
| Abrasive Blast and Paint Facility, Pearl Harbor, HI | 10.6M | 2.7M |
| CINCPAC HQ (Phase 1), Camp Smith, HI | 86.1M | 15.9M |
| Fire Training Facility, Hickam, HI | 3.3M | 0.8M |
| Aircraft Intermediate Maint Facility, Diego Garcia | 8.2M | 2.1M |
| Power Plant Roi Namur - Phase 2 FY99 | 35.4M | |
| Landfill Closure, Andersen AFB, Guam | 8.9M | 2.1M |
| Replace Hydrant Fuel Sys PH 1, Andersen AFB, Guam | 24.3M | 2.6M |
| Electrical System Upgrade, Camp Stanley, Korea | 3.7M | 1.1M |
| Water System Upgrade, Camp Howze, Korea | 3.1M | 0.9M |
| Hospital Addition / Alteration, Yongsan, Korea | 38.6 | 9.6M |
| Medical Supply Warehouse, Yongsan, Korea | 2.6M | 2.3M |
| Land Acquisition for Ord Storage, Yuma MCAS, AZ | 14.4M | 3.7M |
| Magazines Modernization, Yuma MCAS, AZ | 7.6M | 1.9M |
| Rotational Unit Facility Maint Area, Fort Irwin, CA | 13.4M | 3.3M |
| Test Track / Test Pond Facility, Barstow USMC, CA | 4.7M | 1.2M |
| Armory Expansion, Camp Pendleton, CA | 2.6M | 0.7M |
| Integrated Telecomm Fac, Camp Pendleton, CA | 3.8M | 1.0M |
| Tactical Vehicle Maint Facility, Camp Pendleton, CA | 9.0M | 2.2M |
| Staff NCO Academy BEQ, Camp Pendleton, CA | 9.7M | 2.4M |
| Combined Arms Staff Trainer, 29 Palms, CA | 1.7M | 0.4M |
| Tactical Vehicle Maintenance Facility, 29 Palms, CA | 14.0M | 3.4M |
| Aircraft Ordnance Loading Facilities, NAS Lemoore, CA | 11.9M | 3.0M |
| Strike Fighter Weapons Tng Fac, NAS Lemoore, CA | 4.0M | 1.0M |
| Engine Maintenance Shop Add, NAS Lemoore, CA | 2.4M | 0.6M |
| Aviation Armament Facility, NAS Lemoore, CA | 5.8M | 1.5M |
| Berthing Wharf Phase I, NAS North Island, CA | 54.4M | 40.7M |
| Med/ Dental Clinic Replacement, Los Angeles AFB, CA | 13.6M | 2.4M |
| Naval Special Warfare C2 Addition, Coronado, CA | 6.0M | 2.3M |
| Tank Trail Erosion Mitigation - PH 5, Fort Lewis, WA | 12.0M | 2.0M |
| Ammunition Supply Point, Yakima, WA | 5.2M | 1.6M |
| D5 Missile Support Facility, Bremerton, WA | 6.3M | 1.6M |
| Dredging, Puget Sound, WA | 15.6M | 4.0M |
| Tomahawk and Inert Mags, Port Hadlock, WA | 3.4M | 0.9M |
| North Dental Clinic Replacement, Fort Lewis, WA | 5.5M | 5.0M |
| Aircrew Water Survival Tng Fac, Whidby Island NAS, WA | 4.7M | 1.3M |
| Project | Auth | Approp |
|---|---|---|
| Whole Barracks Renewal, Ft Richardson, AK | 14.6M | 2.2M |
| Enlisted Dormitory, Elmendorf AFB, AK | 15.8M | 3.7M |
| Whole Barracks Renewal, Schofield Barracks, HI | 95.0M | 14.2M |
| Bachelor Enlisted Quarters Mod, Pearl Harbor, HI | 18.6M | 4.7M |
| Family Housing, Kaneohe MCB, HI | 26.6M | 5.3M |
| Family Housing, Pearl Harbor, HI | 19.2M | 3.8M |
| Family Housing, Pearl Harbor, HI | 30.2M | 6.0M |
| Andersen Elementary School, Andersen AFB, Guam | 44.2M | 10.0M |
| Whole Barracks Renewal, Camp Casey, Korea | 31.0M | 4.7M |
| Enlisted Dormitory, Osan Air Base, Korea | 12.0M | 3.5M |
| Add Alter Physical Fitness Fac, Osan Air Base, Korea | 7.6M | 2.2M |
| Family Housing, Phase 1, Camp Humphreys, Korea | 24.0M | 4.4M |
| Child Development Center, Yuma MCAS, AZ | 2.6M | 0.6M |
| Physical Fitness Center Addition, Camp Pendleton, CA | 3.2M | 0.8M |
| Bachelor Enlisted Quarters, 29 Palms, CA | 19.1M | 4.8M |
| Bachelor Enlisted Quarters Mod, San Diego, CA | 21.6M | 5.5M |
| Bachelor Enl Quarters, Naval Hospital, 29 Palms, CA | 7.6M | 1.9M |
| Physical Fitness Training Center, Fort Lewis, WA | 6.2M | 1.9M |
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