The international community has embarked on a new era of reconciliation and cooperation for coexistence and prosperity for all mankind under a new world order. Nevertheless, the ROK remains in confrontation with North Korea, and tension and enmity on the Korean peninsula remain unabated. However, for the achievement of peaceful unification, the ROK government intends to develop and implement arms control policies in order to resolve security problems, restore stable peace on the Korean Peninsula, and participate actively in international arms control activities.
Arms Control Environment
Since the demise of the Cold War, the international community has been striving to realize an era of arms control to attain maximum security at the minimum cost by expanding common security. International arms control activities are centered at the UN, especially to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear, chemical, biological weapons and missiles to deliver them. The NPT was extended indefinitely in May 1995 and the negotiation on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is to be concluded in 1996 to ban further nuclear testing including underground nuclear tests. The Convention on Chemical Weapons (CWC) is expected to come into force in 1997 to ban all weapons, and the amendment of Protocol of the Convention on Prohibition or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or To Have Indiscriminate Effect (CCW) adopted in May 1996 is expected to enhance the control over the use and transfer of landmines, booby traps, and other inhumane conventional weapons.
Despite the international trend of arms reduction, the countries in the Asia-Pacific region are engaged in arms buildup under the banner of modernization of armed forces. Arms buildup in the region, coupled with territorial disputes, has grown fierce and is expected to aggravate the security environment. Regional conflicts may occur. However, the recent UN staunch disarmament initiative has motivated Asian and Pacific rim countries to tout multinational security cooperation and confidence building, and such a phenomenon does not appear to be contributing somewhat to regional stability. That is, through such various security cooperation dialogues and channels as ARF, ASEAN-PMC, and NEACD, Asia-Pacific countries are trying to foster an appropriate arms control environment.
However, military confrontation on the Korean peninsula is tense and untenable enough to make arms control almost impossible. Fifty years of division, mutual distrust, and unending hostility are considered an enormous barrier which obstructs even minimal or remote arms control negotiations. Among other things, North Korea's aggressive intent to make the entire Korean peninsula communist by force is the most fundamental and foremost cause of impasse in inter-Korean arms control. In fact, even against the backdrop of the demise of the East-West confrontational structure, Pyongyang still regards South Korea as a target to destroy and communize. For that endeavor, North Korea has tried to and will continue to acquire more weapons and artificially create crises.
In the long run, North Korea must give up its scheme of communizing the ROK and dismantle the Cold War legacy. At any rate, North Korea has to be reformed one way or another because its economic bankruptcy of today cannot be negotiated without reforms. Its current crisis incurred from the regime's autocracy and irrational arms race. North Korea has to give up its intention of communizing the ROK to rid itself of the current predicament - in such case Pyongyang is expected to respond to South-North interlocution.
The first goal of the South-North arms control is to alleviate military tension and prevent the resumption of hostilities, and its eventual goals lies in the settlement of peaceful co-existence and the creation of a peaceful unification environment.
To attain those goals, the ROK will pursue its arms control policies under three principles.
First, the South-North Korean arms control must be implemented through mutual dialogue and negotiation according to the principle: settlement of the South-North Korean issues by the two subjects involved.
Second, South-North Korean arms control must materialize step by step according to the principle: confidence building before arms reduction.
Third, the South-North Korean arms control must be so realized so as to restore permanent stability on the Korean peninsula and contribute to the maintenance of peace in Northeast Asia and elsewhere in the world.
Taking the special security environment on the Korean peninsula into account, the forthcoming arms control would be promoted through three steps; confidence building, arms limitation, and arms reduction. Military confidence building is the most essential step to rid Korea of hostile confrontation. Elimination of distrust and belligerence incurred from years of division, alleviation of military tensions to ensure transparency, conclusion of a nonagression agreement, and a foolproof mechanism against accidental offensive are the most imperative prerequisites of South-North Korean arms control. A practical approach would include: South-North Korean reconciliation, guarantee of nonagression, and exchange of cooperation as delineated in the 1992 South-North Basic Agreement and, especially, "nonagression" guaranteed its Protocol II, which mandates both South and North Korea to install hot-lines, establish a joint crisis management system, observe the Armistice Agreement, realize the peaceful use of the MDZ, exchange military personnel and make prior notification of large-scale troops movements or exercises, and invite and dispatch observers to monitor each other's military exercises.
Upon entry into the stage of South-North coexistence, the ROK would offer "arms limitation" to North Korea to stop the arms race, reduce preemptive strike capabilities, balance each other's military strengthen, and implementation of the South-North Denuclearization Agreement, begin to control chemical weapons and long-range missiles, reduce both sides' preemptive strike weapons, restrict large-scale troop movements and drills and implement a security guarantee for the capital area. Once the peaceful coexistence is settled, an appropriate atmosphere would be fostered to discuss arms reduction to an agreeable level, redeployment of armed forces and means of peaceful unification.
South and North Korea have exchanged various proposals and counter-proposals to realize arms control on the Korean peninsula since the end of the Korean War. North Korea asserts "arms reduction before confidence building" in order to realize the withdrawal of the USFK, both sides' troop reductions, conclusion of a US-North Korea peace treaty and discontinuation of Team Spirit exercises. At the Geneva Convention in 1954, Pyongyang demanded the pullout of all foreign forces from the Korean peninsula, troop reduction to fewer than 100,000 troops and the conclusion of a peace treaty between the two Koreas. In 1984, North Korea demanded "US-DPRK peace treaty before adoption of a South-North nonagression declaration." Evaluation of the North Korean arms reduction proposal denotes the USFK pullout as its first prerequisite because the USFK obstructs North Korea's intention of communizing the southern half by force. The second item, troop reduction to fewer than 100,000 men implies North Korean intention of creating arms reduction sentiment to restrain South Korea and the USFK from augmenting their armed forces, as well as to create an image for itself as a peace-loving regime in the world community. The third element of the North Korean proposal - "US-DPRK peace treaty before South-North nonagression" - bears an obvious intention of neutralizing the US-ROK alliance which would eventually dismantle US-ROK combined defense posture and thus materialize the USFK pullout desperately sought by North Korea in order to communize the ROK. The particular proposal is also aimed at discontinuation of Team Spirit exercises to weaken the US-ROK combined defense capabilities.
Until the end of the 1960's, the South Korean government ignored North Korean proposals. In the 1970's, Seoul offered "confidence building before arms reduction" as a practical approach. On 23 June 1973, South Korea announced what was then called the "Diplomatic Policy Proclamation for Peaceful Unification" devised to guarantee nonagression. Thanks to this offer, the South-North Nonagression Agreement was concluded to embody thorough observance of the armistice plus nonagression and non-interference. In the 1980's, South Korea suggested means of attaining confidence build-up through exchange of military personnel, interchange of military information, mutual notification and observation of counterparts' military exercise and removal of defense positions in the DMZ.
It was a realistic and methodical arms reduction proposal characterized by its three phases-confidence building, nonagression agreement, and arms reduction negotiations.
Since the latter part of the 1980's, with the dissemination of post-Cold War sentiment throughout the world, the Korean peninsula experienced a very short-lived atmosphere of reconciliation and cooperation. In February 1989, Prime Minister Kang Yong-hoon offered that South-North premiers talks be held, and a first meeting was realized on September 5, 1990, after eight preliminary and two executive officials' meetings. A total of eight High-Level Talks (October 10-13, 1991) adopted the "Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" to go into effect December 31, 1991. The South-North Korean Agreement on Reconciliation, Cooperation, and Exchange (the "Basic Agreement") was concluded at the sixth round of talks (February 18-21, 1992) and the "Nonagression Protocol" was effectuated at the eighth South-North High-Level Talks (September 15-18, 1992).
Consequently, South and North Korea set up a systematic mechanism required to begin arms control negotiations, and the South-North Joint Nuclear Control Committee was established in accordance with Chapter 5, the "Joint Denuclearization Declaration." The South-North Military Committee was also effectuated in accordance with Article 14 of the South-North Basic Agreement after several working-level meetings. However, in late 1992, North Korea unilaterally withdrew from the South-North High-Level Talks on the pretext of the '93 Team Spirit Exercise, resulting in a complete suspension of inter-Korean dialogue until October 1993.
From October 5, 1993 to March 19, 1994, South and North Korean executive officials conferred eight times to work out the exchange of special envoys but it was abruptly suspended when the North Korean Representative Park Yong-soo declared that Seoul would be turned into a "sea of fire" at the eighth meeting. Former US President Carter called on Kim Il Sung to suggest a South-North summit meeting. The South Korean government accepted the summitry scheduled to take place from July 25 to 27, 1994, but this was also suspended due to Kim Il Sung's sudden death shortly before the meeting.
Mentioned in the above, although a South-North arms control mechanism was negotiated, unilateral North Korean withdrawal hampered further progress. However, it is predicted that North Korea will have to respond sooner or later to inter-Korean dialogue to discontinue the unnecessary arms race that aggravates the North Korean economic and social predicament and North Korean alienation from the international community.
Until the early 1970's, North Korea had been demanding at a series of South-North Red Cross and South-North Regulatory Committee meetings the conclusion of a peace treaty with South Korea, but it abruptly stopped inter-Korean dialogue upon realizing its comparative inferiority to enormous South Korean economic growth. Since then, Pyongyang began to demand that the US negotiate a peace agreement through direct bilateral interlocution.
In the 1990's, North Korea committed a series of armistice violations to neutralize the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Committee, each of which took part in administration of the Korean Armistice. On January 1, 1991, Czechoslovakia was divided and on April 3, 1993, North Korea coerced the Czech members to pull out from the supervisory committee. On April 28, 1994, North Korea withdrew its own armistice representatives to erect the "North Korean People's Armed Forces Panmunjom Representative Office" on May 24, 1994. On December 15, 1994, Chinese members of the armistice commission withdrew China as requested by Pyongyang. On February 28, 1995, under force, the Polish members, the last remaining, followed suit to vacate the central nations supervisory committee.
In conjunction with its attempts to dismantle the armistice apparatus, the North Koreans demanded: DPRK-US general-level officers' meeting (March 2, 1995), closure of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Committee office in Panmunjom, prevention of members of the armistice commission and the neutral nations supervisory committee from entering the North Korean side of the Joint Security Area (JSA) (May 3, 1995), announcement of unilateral abolition of the Armistice Agreement (June 22, 1995), deactivation of the UNC (North Korean Foreign Ministry Memoir, June 29, 1995) and follow-up action at the DPRK-US general-grade officers' meeting (July 5, 1995), and follow-up action at the DPRK-US general-grade officers' meeting (July 5, 1995). In addition, Pyongyang has repeatedly violated the armistice by sending troops across the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) and felling trees in the DMZ in further attempts to neutralize the armistice instrument.
On February 22, 1996, North Korea proposed to the US in a Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement to conclude a DPRK-US provisional agreement to organize a joint North Korea-US military apparatus to replace the existing Military Armistice Commission but continue to administer armistice affairs, and at the same time requested the US to hold a meeting discussing details on such provisional agreement and new military apparatus to be activated. On March 9, 1996, Radio Pyongyang aired an intimidating message stating, "The DPRK has been justified to take actions against US refusal to compromise." Failing to obtain a US response, North Korea declared in a Panmunjom delegation spokesman's statement that it would no longer be responsible for attending the MDL, maintaining the DMZ, and managing armistice affairs, and that the North Korean personnel and vehicles traveling to and from the JSA in Panmunjom would no longer carry proper identification. From April 5 to 7, 1996, North Korea deployed one or two company-size, heavily armed troops with mortars into the DMZ to demonstrate its firm stand.
The unilateral North Korean declaration, together with the military provocation along the MDL and in the DMZ insinuate that it will not bear any obligations mandated in the Korean Armistice Agreement to prevent accidental arms conflict and/or negotiate an imminent crisis. North Korea has, thus, totally rejected the existing armistice agreement.
The Korean Armistice Agreement can be replaced with a peace mechanism through bilateral consent based on mutual trust. North Korea does not treat South Korea as a subject based on mutual trust. North Korea does not treat South Korea as a subject of negotiation because the ROK did not sign the armistice agreement, and Seoul sees the North Korean perception as legally incorrect. The legal aspect of the Korean Armistice is that all nations engaged in the war are subject to the enforcement of the agreement even though the agreement was signed by the commander of each of the two warring parties.
The 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement was signed by General Clark, Commanding General, United Nations Command; Gen. Peng, Command-commander, DPRK People's Armed Forces. The agreement, however, was a principal participant of the UN forces comprising 16 nations, and the agreement was signed by the CG, UNC, because the UNC was operating under a unitary command system.
Practically, the ROK is the undisputed subject of the Korean Armistice Agreement since it was mandated to comply with it. The agreement definitely specified the "Warring two sides in Korea" as subjects that the agreement bind to observe the compulsory articles. Since the truce, South Korea has faithfully performed its duties as obligated by the armistice agreement and has taken appropriate actions whenever bilateral infraction has occurred. Until today, the Korean Armistice Agreement has been a unique legal document with defined rules to be observed by both South and North Koreas. For this obvious reason, the North Korean refusal to recognize South Korea as a subject of the armistice is totally improper.
The armistice applies to both South and North Korea, the sixteen participant UN nations and China, but Seoul and Pyongyang are the two principal subjects. Therefore, inter-Korean negotiations alone would enable the two sides to enact a new accord that can supersede the existing Korean Armistice Agreement. The South-North Basic Agreement concluded in February 1992 specified that both South and North Korea are obliged to endeavor jointly to transform armistice into a peace, but to observe the agreement until peace is properly secured. Article 61 of the Armistice Agreement specified that it can only be amended and/or supplemented when the commanders of the two warring factions agree to do so. Article 62 further delineated that the Armistice Agreement remains absolutely effective unless otherwise superseded by a peaceful resolution to be adopted through bilateral political negotiations. Thus, this unilateral North Korean withdrawal from the Armistice Commission is an obvious violation of the agreement and the South-North Basic Agreement. What is worse is that the DPRK continues provocations to this day, threatening peace on the Korean peninsula.
The South-North Basic Agreement articulates details about what has to be done to realize reconciliation, nonagression and cooperation. Both South and North Korea agreed in this accord to eliminate distrust and confrontation to restore bilateral conciliation and confidence, in a practical way. Therefore, practical enforcement of the South-North Basic Agreement will deter hostilities and ensure both South and North Korea a substantial peace.
On April 16, 1996, the ROK government proposed four-party talks in a joint communiqué to reduce tension on the Korean peninsula and embody permanent peace.
In this communiqué, the ROK and the US presidents reaffirmed the validity of the Korean Armistice Agreement until it be superseded by a permanent peace arrangement to be negotiated and attained through inter-Korean dialogue. They also made it clear that there would be no compromise between North Korea and the US alone. Both the ROK and the US presidents have since expressed their concern that the four-party talks among the two Koreas, China, and the US are being deferred due to North Korea insincerity, stressing that the four-way talks are the only solution for all the nations involved in the Korean Armistice Agreement and a valid alternative that would restore peace on the Korean peninsula.
The neighboring countries responded affirmatively to the four-party talks proposal. China volunteered to cooperate emphasizing the importance of inter-Korean dialogue. Russia would prefer to be included in multilateral negotiations, but has indirectly endorsed the four-way talks. Prime Minister Hashimoto of Japan released an official statement of personal support stating that he would closely cooperate with the ROK and the US to realize the four-party talks.
The ROK government readily announced that it would reconsider economic cooperation with North Korea provided that it accept the proposal. Seoul keeps trying to invite North Korea to the quadripartite talks because it is the North who would benefit most from the talks.
The US-DPRK Geneva Accord on October 21, 1994, (the "Agreed Framework") has provided the momentum to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. Based on the Agreed Framework, the ROK government is trying its best, along with its allies such as the United States and Japan, to urge North Korea to implement fully the provisions specified.
For the implementation of the Agreed Framework, on November 18, 1994, a DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman announced that North Korea had shut down its nuclear plant in Yongbyon in compliance with the US-DPRK nuclear agreement, and the IAEA acknowledged this on November 28, through its resident inspector in North Korea. On March 9, 1995, the ROK , Japan, and the US activated the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) to give North Korea two light-water reactors, plus 50,000 tons of heavy oil by 1995 and an additional 500,000 tons annually starting from 1996. On January 21, 1995, the US partially lifted trade and investment sanctions long levied against Pyongyang and held US-DPRK diplomatic meetings to open respective liaison offices. On June 13, 1995, the Kuala Lumpur Agreement was concluded to facilitate KEDO projects.
Since August 1995, in compliance with the Kuala Lumpur Agreement, KEDO survey teams have visited North Korea five times to inspect the site of the light-water reactors, and the local infrastructure such as railroads, communications and electricity. The team also checked on basic requirements such as construction of a road linking with the road outside the plant, billets for laborers, and availability of gravel and other construction material.
On September 11, 1995, KEDO began meeting with the North Korean counterpart to lay out necessary framework regarding scope of assistance, conditions of reimbursement, technological norms, dates of concession, access routes, and other issues of conflict. On December 16, 1995, KEDO and the DPRK signed a contract to commence the work, and, in June 1996, KEDO acquired a protocol concerning legal privileges of exemption, travel, and communications.
As of now, if KEDO concludes the follow-up protocol regarding concession of the land, and the issue of cost sharing between the ROK, the US and Japan is resolved, initial work such as ground breaking may take place by the end of 1996. It is so evaluated that North Korea has been abiding by the Geneva agreement. However, Pyongyang remains irresponsive to inter-Korean nuclear inspections, considered most essential for materialization of the Joint Denuclearization Declaration. North Korea refused IAEA inspection of radioactivity of the spent fuel rods it extracted from its graphite speed reduction reactor, thus suspicion remains about North Korean nuclear development.
North Korea would not benefit from its nuclear development because the world community tends to oppose nuclear proliferation, and such an antinuclear movement has been centered at the UN since 1990. North Korea would be further isolated from the international community, making it even more difficult for the regime to cope with economic impoverishment. Unless Pyongyang gives up its nuclear ambitions, the ROK government must seek an international punitive action through consultation with UN and IAEA and presiding nations such as the US, Japan, China, and Russia to have them persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear development. On the other hand, the ROK and the US military alliance, together with the guarantee of the US nuclear umbrella, has to be strengthened as means of preventing nuclear proliferation.
The ROK has been striving hard to cope with the North Korean military threat, and has thus remained irresponsive to international arms control. Upon the end of the Cold War, a conciliation and cooperation tendency began to prevail among the nations throughout the world. As international interdependency grew deeper, in 1990 the ROK government decided to participate positively in the international arms control movement for coexistence and prosperity of mankind not only to fulfill its part of responsibilities heightened by its economic growth, but also to protect its security interests.
The ROK government's arms control policy calls for it to take the role of enhancing the national image as a peace-oriented nation in the world community and foster a favorable environment needed for arms reduction on the Korean peninsula and eventual unification. The particular arms control policy was formulated in relation to the security and political situation on the Korean peninsula, diplomatic movement, economy, science and technology to determine our scope of participation in international armament control activities.
The ROK government presided over a ministerial conference including the Ministry of National Defense and decided to participate in international arms control, especially in the task of realizing non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It amended several domestic laws to renovate export/import procedures in 1995, and in October it joined the Nuclear Supply Group (NSG) and the Zanger Committee, which dealt with international exports of nuclear technology and component parts. In April 1996, the ROK entered the Wassenaar Arrangement which replaced COCOM and is presently engaged in negotiations with concerned nations in order to join Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Australian Group (AG) that handles issues of chemical weapons technology.
The international community has been working sincerely to prevent the use of chemical weapons since World War I because they are not only formidable but inhumane. It took twenty years to conclude the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. On January 13, 1993, concerned nations met in Paris and signed the treaty. The CWC has either been ratified by each of the signatory nations or is under the process of ratification. The CWC prohibits development, production, possession, transfer, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and is furnished with a stringent inspection system and the authority that enables the Convention to impose sanctions against non-party states. The CWC is known to be the most influential and powerful in the arena of international arms control. In November 1991, the ROK government announced "Declaration of Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and Restoration of Peace" to publicize its affirmative participation in the international endeavor being directed towards elimination of all chemical weapons, and in 1993, it signed the CWC. Coordinating studies regarding implementation of the convention with the relevant ministries, the ROK military began dispatching weapon specialists to the CWC preparatory committee to voice its position in the decision making, and is consulting with other international inspection agencies.
The CWC was ratified by the ROK National Assembly in July 1996 and is awaiting submission tot he UN. On the other hand, North Korea stockpiles a large quantity of chemical weapons; what is worse it remains unaffiliated with the CWC and did not sign the treaty.
The ROK government dispatched its military specialists to the international conference to complement inspection procedures outlined in the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and has coordinated with the UN about the UN Register of Conventional Weapons. With the conclusion of amendment of the Protocol II the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (or CCW), which prohibits or restricts the use of anti-personnel landmines in May 1996, the ROK is positively considering to become a member of the CCW.
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