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| TOC | Letter | Introduction | Summary | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | Glossary |
Do the North Korean weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs pose a greater threat to U.S. security than five years ago?
North Korea's WMD programs pose a major threat to the United States and its allies. This threat has advanced considerably over the past five years, particularly with the enhancement of North Korea's missile capabilities. There is significant evidence that undeclared nuclear weapons development activity continues, including efforts to acquire uranium enrichment technologies and recent nuclear-related high explosive tests. This means that the United States cannot discount the possibility that North Korea could produce additional nuclear weapons outside of the constraints imposed by the 1994 Agreed Framework.
In the last five years, North Korea's missile capabilities have improved dramatically. North Korea has produced, deployed and exported missiles to Iran and Pakistan, launched a three-stage missile (Taepo Dong 1), and continues to develop a larger and more powerful missile (Taepo Dong 2). Unlike five years ago, North Korea can now strike the United States with a missile that could deliver high explosive, chemical, biological, or possibly nuclear weapons. The United States currently is unable to defend against this threat.
The progress that North Korea has made over the past five years in improving its missile capabilities, its record as a major proliferator of ballistic missiles and missile technology, combined with its development activities on nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, ranks North Korea with Russia and China as one of the greatest missile proliferation threats in the world.
A. Does the North Korean nuclear weapons program pose a greater threat to U.S. security than five years ago?
While North Korea's nuclear program at its Yongbyon and Taechon facilities appears to be frozen under the 1994 Agreed Framework, there is significant evidence that other nuclear weapons development activity is continuing.
North Korea started its nuclear program in the early 1950s when North Korean scientists began cooperating with the Soviet and Chinese nuclear programs. Pyongyang acquired its initial nuclear facilities in the 1960s, mostly from the Soviet Union, and built a significant nuclear complex in the 1970s and 1980s. Most experts believe that the main purpose of North Korea's nuclear program has been to acquire nuclear weapons.(1)
Plutonium and Uranium: The Soviet-supplied, 25 megawatt (MW) reactor at Yongbyon is well-suited to the production of plutonium for weapons. North Korea probably produced and separated in the range of six to twelve kilograms (kg) of plutonium before the reactor was shut down in 1994 in connection with the 1994 Agreed Framework with the United States.(2) The status and location of Pyongyang's undeclared plutonium remains a mystery, perhaps hidden inside one of the 8,000 underground structures estimated to exist throughout North Korea. The Department of Energy states that about six kg of plutonium is enough to make a nuclear explosive device.(3) These estimates are consistent with the U.S. government's statements that North Korea probably has enough plutonium for one or two nuclear weapons. The Rumsfeld Commission concluded that North Korea's ongoing nuclear program activity raises the possibility that it could produce additional nuclear weapons.(4)
Before Yongbyon's 25 MW reactor was shut down, North Korea removed fuel rods from the core of the reactor containing as much as 25-30 kilograms of plutonium -- enough for four or five additional bombs if it were extracted from the spent fuel. Pyongyang agreed, as part of the 1994 Agreed Framework, to allow the United States to package the fuel rods in sealed cans pending final disposal, although the ultimate disposal of the fuel remains unsettled. North Korea has an industrial-scale reprocessing plant (used to extract plutonium from used reactor fuel) and various laboratories and research centers, and was constructing two much larger reactors capable of producing even more plutonium if completed and operated.(5) North Korea also has uranium deposits (it maintains mines with four million tons of exploitable high-quality uranium) and uranium mining, milling, and fabrication capabilities. It has the natural resources to build large-scale uranium enrichment capabilities that would be necessary to enrich uranium for fission weapons.(6)
Nuclear Weapons: Based upon North Korea's efforts to acquire plutonium, most experts conclude that Pyongyang set out to build first-generation, implosion-type plutonium bombs comparable to the "Fat Man" bomb that the United States dropped on Nagasaki in 1945. "Fat Man" used 6.2 kilograms of plutonium and produced an explosive yield of 23 kilotons. It took the United States about four years to produce the first-ever plutonium bomb.(7) By comparison, North Korea has had decades to work on a bomb and has had ample opportunity to exploit large amounts of declassified information on U.S. and other countries' nuclear weapons programs.
With respect to weapon design, North Korea reportedly has produced and tested explosive triggers for detonating nuclear weapons as recently as November 1998.(8) There is, however, very little open-source information on North Korea's efforts to weaponize its plutonium into a deliverable weapon.
As a general rule, however, the biggest hurdle for a would-be nuclear power is the acquisition of fissile material -- enriched uranium or plutonium. While it is not certain that North Korea has the technology to weaponize these materials, it is reasonable to assume that North Korea has made or could make a nuclear explosive device capable of producing a significant nuclear yield.(9) While such a device might not compare favorably to the most modern weapons possessed by the five de jure nuclear weapons states in terms of size, weight, reliability, efficiency, or deliverability, even a few kilotons of yield could approach the level of destruction experienced at Hiroshima or Nagasaki.(10)
Little, if anything, is known about North Korean nuclear strategy, doctrine, or war plans, except that North Korea's collaborations with Soviet and Chinese military and nuclear programs probably influenced Pyongyang's approach toward nuclear weapons development and policy. It is also likely that North Korea has studied U.S. nuclear doctrine.(11)
Treaties and Agreements: North Korea signed the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985, but did not allow inspections until 1990. The initial inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) found evidence of undeclared nuclear activity related to plutonium production.(12) The IAEA's request for access to additional sites sparked a stand-off over inspections that continues today.
The 1994 Agreed Framework froze North Korea's declared nuclear program, but the status of undeclared activities remains a mystery. The administration maintains that North Korea has not violated the 1994 Agreed Framework.(13) However, discovery of undeclared nuclear activity, such as underground nuclear facilities, weaponization, or enrichment activities would be inconsistent with the 1994 Agreed Framework. The 1994 Agreed Framework obligates North Korea to remain a party to the NPT and to eventually come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement.
In 1991, North Korea signed a declaration with the Republic of Korea (ROK) to ban nuclear weapons, reprocessing or enrichment in either country. The 1992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula called for a bilateral inspection regime to verify the denuclearization of the peninsula. The 1992 Joint Declaration states that the two sides "shall not test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons," and that they "shall not possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities."(14) The 1992 Joint Declaration was never implemented, although North Korea agreed to "consistently take steps to implement" the 1992 Joint Declaration in the 1994 Agreed Framework.(15) There has been no progress achieved toward the establishment of an inspection regime, as required in the 1992 Joint Declaration, and there has been no known meaningful dialogue between the South and the North on this accord since 1992.
The FY98, FY99, and FY00 Foreign Operations Acts include conditions on the distribution of funds to KEDO regarding the 1992 Joint Declaration. Under these conditions, the President must certify to Congress that the parties to the 1994 Agreed Framework have taken demonstrative steps to implement the 1992 Joint Declaration. The President made the required certifications for FY98 and FY99.
North Korea acquired most of its nuclear infrastructure from the Soviet Union, but also has received equipment and know-how from China. Pyongyang has also attempted to acquire nuclear and dual-use equipment from Europe and Japan, both legally and through its extensive illegal smuggling operations.(16) North Korea continues to operate an extensive global smuggling network.
North Korea's sales of missiles and missile production equipment to Pakistan have raised concerns that North Korea could acquire nuclear expertise, information, equipment, or materials from Islamabad, perhaps in trade for missiles or missile assistance.(17) Pakistan operates uranium enrichment facilities that reportedly produce fissile material for its nuclear weapons program, and which could be of interest to North Korea. Pakistan is reportedly now producing plutonium at a newly completed Chinese-supplied reactor at Khushab.(18)
North Korea's extensive contacts with Russia's nuclear establishment raise the possibility of Russian nuclear assistance to the DPRK.(19) There have been reports that North Korea expressed interest in acquiring nuclear materials from Russia.(20) The administration has often acknowledged the dangers associated with weak security for nuclear weapons, materials, and expertise in Russia and other countries of the Former Soviet Union (FSU). Kazakhstan, for example, possesses extensive nuclear assets and recently sold MiG 21 jets to North Korea.(21) North Korea may be one of the countries most interested and best able to exploit those weaknesses.
External assistance from any of these sources could significantly advance North Korea's nuclear capabilities.
Uranium Enrichment: Among the many mysteries surrounding North Korea's nuclear program are its extensive uranium mining and milling activities. North Korea's interest in uranium dates back several decades, and North Korea is known to have attempted to acquire uranium enrichment equipment.(22) The capability to enrich uranium to weapons-grade would provide North Korea with a second path to nuclear weapons and, if realized, could add a dangerous new dimension to Pyongyang's nuclear weapons development activities.
Undeclared Plutonium or Uranium: The IAEA was unable to verify the operating records of North Korea's research reactors, and the extent of North Korea's nuclear dealings with Moscow and Beijing are not well documented. If North Korea received unreported fuel shipments from the Soviet Union or China, it could have irradiated the fuel to produce additional plutonium, or extracted weapons-grade uranium from the fuel. Pyongyang is capable of extracting plutonium or uranium from fresh or spent nuclear fuel.
Radiological Weapons: Regardless of North Korea's ability to build and deliver a nuclear weapon, North Korea could also attempt to construct a radiological weapon from various nuclear materials, including non-weapons-grade uranium, plutonium, or other materials, such as cobalt. This weapon uses conventional explosives to disperse radioactive materials, exposing troops and civilians to harmful radiation. However, a radiological device would not necessarily cause dangerous exposures, and is unlikely to constitute a militarily significant weapon, although it might incite terror and mass disruption, and could possibly undermine confidence in civil authority.
Spent Fuel from the Yongbyon Reactor: The fate of the 8,000 spent fuel rods from the 25 MW reactor at Yongbyon that are being stored in canisters remains unresolved. The 1994 Agreed Framework prohibits reprocessing of the fuel rods, but does not specify where they ultimately will be disposed. The rods contain about 25-30 kilograms of plutonium, enough for four to five bombs if North Korea decides to take action to reprocess them.
Spent Fuel from the Two Light Water Reactors: If the 1994 Agreed Framework is implemented and two LWRs are eventually built and operated in North Korea, the reactors could produce close to 500 kilograms of plutonium in spent reactor fuel each year; enough for nearly 100 bombs annually if North Korea decides to break its obligations and reprocess the material.(23) Such plutonium, while not weapons-grade, can be used to produce nuclear weapons and does not present an overwhelming barrier to those pursuing a dedicated nuclear weapons program.
As the quantity of plutonium in spent fuel North Korea could accumulate from these sources is so enormous, North Korea must provide transparency to ensure that diversion does not occur. Given its poor record of adherence to international agreements and to allowing foreign monitoring of its nuclear programs, there is little reason to believe that North Korea would not eventually use this plutonium for the production of nuclear programs.
While the United States could theoretically cripple the reactors by suspending the provision of reactor fuel, the DPRK could circumvent this problem by illicitly acquiring reactor fuel from Russia or China. Russia is already supplying the Iranians with reactor fuel, and given the potential for further political and economic disintegration within Russia, the incentives for covertly assisting the DPRK may be increasing at the same time that the ability to control illicit sales is decreasing. China, meanwhile, remains committed to the survival of the North Korean regime, and may be willing to support the DPRK's reactor fuel needs in the event of a cut-off of reactor fuel by the United States and its allies.
B. Do the North Korean chemical and biological weapons (CBW) programs pose a greater threat to U.S. security than five years ago?
The recent increase in the North Korean CBW threat is derived from its assumed efforts to develop CBW warheads for its long-range ballistic missiles, now capable of striking the continental United States.
While most of the attention regarding North Korea's CBW weapons has been focused on technological capabilities or stockpiles, an equally important element in considering the DPRK CBW threat is trying to understand how North Korea views the strategic utility of these weapons, and the consequences of using them.
The concept of international abhorrence regarding CBW carries little weight with the DPRK.(24) This could be attributed to North Korea's apparent belief that the United States and South Korea would use CBW in a conflict, international agreements notwithstanding. This belief is reflected in North Korean propaganda, but more significantly in the extensive CBW defense preparations undertaken not only for its military forces, but also for its civilian population. It is also frequently argued that the DPRK would consider any military conflict as a fight for its survival as a nation, and hence would adopt an "Armageddon" attitude, unconstrained by international law.
Reflecting Soviet military doctrine, the DPRK has traditionally viewed chemical weapons as an integral part of any military offensive. There are no indications this view has altered since the end of the Cold War. The most obvious tactical use of chemical weapons by the DPRK would be to terrorize South Korean civilians. Seoul lies within easy striking distance of North Korea's artillery and rocket systems and, today, the South Korean civilian population has no protection against CW attack.
Since the Aum Shin Rykio nerve agent attack in the Tokyo subway, the possibility of unconventional or terrorist CBW use by North Korea could be a real danger. Such an attack might play a role in an invasion scenario. North Korea might also use CW against Japanese facilities, in addition to ROK and U.S. facilities in South Korea, to discourage or impede Japanese cooperation with U.S. and South Korean armed forces.
Biological weapons can present significantly different considerations. For example, highly infectious diseases, e.g., smallpox, have the obvious potential to affect one's own forces or population if used in close proximity. Hence their more likely use would be strategic, i.e., as a threat against the United States or Japan. The less infectious diseases, e.g., anthrax, could be used as a destabilizing tactic or to interdict passage through certain areas in an invasion scenario. Outside of an invasion scenario, unconventional terrorist use of BW is a possibility, particularly of naturally-occurring diseases, which would make attribution difficult.
The U.S. government has released no specific details on North Korean CBW capabilities, but the Department of Defense has stated that the DPRK has a "sizeable stockpile of chemical weapons," and "has pursued research and development related to biological warfare capabilities."(25)
North Korea's CW program is generally assumed to have started in the mid-1950s with heavy dependence upon Russian and Chinese assistance. Development of an offensive capability appears to have been a lengthy process, with early detectable efforts concentrating on defensive preparations. An oft-quoted estimate of the DPRK CW stockpile in 1989 was about 180-250 metric tons.(26) By 1997, estimates placed the DPRK CW stockpile at about 5,000 metric tons.(27)
The DPRK is generally credited with possessing a full-range of chemical warfare agents, including nerve, blister, choking, and blood agents. The North Koreans have recently emphasized their work on nerve agents. It is also believed that the DPRK is interested in developing binary nerve agents.(28)
Estimates of the number of DPRK production, research, and storage facilities have remained stable over the last decade, with the ROK government estimating current peacetime annual production capability (if not actual production) at 4.5 tons, with the likelihood of a surge capacity.(29) A 1993 report estimates that the DPRK was operating eight CW and BW production plants, and that there were six storage facilities in the country, and three research institutes.(30)
The ROK government believes that the DPRK followed the Russian pattern of developing CW munitions for a wide range of weapons systems, including artillery above 82 mm, multiple rocket launchers, Soviet-derived FROGs, SCUD missiles, aerial bombs and spray tanks. Unconventional delivery means, e.g., clandestine aerosols and balloons, are also suspected.(31)
In terms of recent increases in the DPRK CW threat, it is not the types of agents or stockpile levels that have attracted the most attention, but rather the assumed efforts to develop CW warheads for its No Dong and Taepo Dong ballistic missiles. The ROK government assesses the No Dong as CW capable.
Even more unsettling, however, is the prospect of the coupling of a CW weapon with the Taepo Dong 1 or 2 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) under development, with the capability to strike Japan and virtually all U.S. military installations in East Asia, including Guam.(32) While testing of the Taepo Dong 2 has been suspended per the Berlin Agreement with the United States, a three-stage Taepo Dong 2 could strike the United States with a chemical or biological warhead.(33)
The efficient and accurate dispersal of chemical agents by a ballistic missile presents a number of technical challenges.
The North Korean BW program is thought to have begun in the 1960s, but did not attract attention until the 1980s. It appears to have developed slowly, owing to the poor state of biotechnology in the DPRK. Japanese officials, however, point out that DPRK scientists have recently won international recognition for the development of a new Hepatitis-B vaccine -- an event that could indicate a more sophisticated biotech capability than previously thought.(34) The DPRK BW effort is believed to have focused on the traditional agents: plague, typhoid, cholera, anthrax, smallpox, yellow fever, botulinum toxin, and hemorrhagic fevers.(35) There is no publicly available evidence that the DPRK has undertaken development of genetically-engineered BW agents. However, given that the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) was openly discussing interest in such agents 30 years ago, it seems reasonable to assume that the DPRK would explore this avenue to the extent possible.(36) There are no reliable public estimates of the DPRK's BW agent or munitions stockpile. It is generally assumed that, to the extent capable, the DPRK would seek to provide BW munitions for the same range of weapons as it does with chemical munitions, i.e., artillery, rockets, bombs, and missiles.
As with CW, any recent increase in the BW threat profile can be attributed to the DPRK's ballistic missile programs, and the assumption that BW warheads will be forthcoming. Long-range missiles are particularly attractive for biological warfare because they remove or reduce the chance of affecting one's own forces or population. However, even more than CW agents, BW agents present significant technological challenges for effective delivery by a missile warhead. Nevertheless, North Korea possesses biological weapons production and dispensing technology, including the capability to deploy chemical or biological weapons on missiles.(37) This is primarily because BW agents are live organisms and must be able to survive the stresses of missile flight and impact. As with CW, however, the psychological effect of BW strikes are likely to be so great that accuracy and efficient dispersal are not necessarily critical to having political or military consequences.
C. Does the North Korean missile program pose a greater threat to U.S. security than five years ago?
Today, North Korea ranks with Russia and China as one of the greatest missile threats in the world due to: the progress made over the past five years in improving its missile capabilities; its record as a leading proliferator of ballistic missiles and missile technology; and its development of high explosive, chemical, biological, and possibly nuclear weapons.
| SCUD A | SCUD B | SCUD C | No Dong | Taepo Dong 1 | Taepo Dong 2 | |
| Flight Test | 1984 | 1985 (?) | 1989 | 1993 | 1998 | |
| Range Km (Miles) | 280-300
(174-186) |
300
(186) |
500
(310) |
1300
(800) |
1500-2000
(930-1240) w/ 3rd Stage 5600 (3500) |
4000-10000
(2480-6200) |
| Payload Kg (Pounds) | 1,000
(2,200) |
1,000
(2,200) |
700-800
(1540-1760) |
1200
(2640) |
700-1000
(1540-2200) SLV 50-100 |
700-1000
(1540-2200) |
| CEP(39) meters
(Ft.) |
Unknown | 450-1000
(1475-3280) |
Unknown | 2000-4000
(6560-13120) |
Unknown | Unknown |
| Date Completed | 1984 | 1985 | 1989-1990 | Tested in 1993, Deployed mid-1990s | Tested as SLV 1998 | Unknown |
| Exports | 90-100 to Iran in 1987; few to UAE in 1989,
+ tech. |
~ 100 to Iran
~ 60 to Syria in 1991 + tech. |
Unknown | 10-12 to Pakistan
10-12 to Iran + tech. |
Unknown | Unknown |
| Sources: "North Korea: A Potential Time Bomb, North Korea's Ballistic Missile Programme," Jane's Intelligence Review, Special Report #2, 1994; Wright and Kadyshev, Arms Control Today, pp 9-12; Wright and Kadyshev, Science and Global Security, pp 129-160; U.S. Department of Defense, "Proliferation: Threat and Response;" Bermudez, Joseph. "The Rise and Rise of North Korea's ICBMs," Jane's International Defense Review, July 1999, p59. For export information, see Bermudez, Joseph. "Taepo-dong Launch Brings Dprk Missiles Back into the Spotlight," Jane's Intelligence Review, October 1998, p30;"The Rise and Rise of North Korea's ICBMs," Jane's International Defense Review, July 1999, p59; "The North Korean 'SCUD B' Programme," with W. Seth Carus, Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review, April 1989, p178. | ||||||
North Korean missiles, coupled with nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, now can strike U.S. troops and our allies throughout Northeast Asia, and could hit the United States. North Korea's SCUD B can reach most of the heavily populated portions of South Korea, and the SCUD C is capable of reaching the majority of South Korea. North Korea has the capability to use SCUD missiles to strike targets throughout Seoul, as well as South Korean airbases, logistic facilities, and the 37,000 U.S. troops stationed in South Korea. The No Dong missile, with a range of 1,300 km (800 miles), can strike targets throughout most of Japan. Referring to the Taepo Dong 1 and Taepo Dong 2, then-Director of the Central Intelligence Agency James Woolsey stated that the missiles could "put at risk all of North-East Asia, South-East Asia and the Pacific area."(40) The August 31, 1998, launch of a Taepo Dong 1 with a third stage indicates North Korea may now be able to bring the United States within range of its missiles to attack targets as far away as 5,600 km (3,500 miles), including Hawaii and parts of Alaska.
The U.S. territory of Guam and its population of 150,000 would be within striking distance of the North Korean Taepo Dong 1 or 2, if it successfully flies near a range of 3,500 km (2,175 miles).(41) More than 14,000 U.S. military personnel are deployed on Guam, with the majority stationed at Agana Naval Station and Andersen Air Force Base.(42)
This report specifically addresses the threat North Korea poses to the United States security over the past five years. Given the extraordinary progress made by North Korea in enhancing its missile capabilities in that time-frame, it is reasonable to conclude that the missile threat facing the United States will only increase, and probably dramatically so, over the next five to ten years, absent effective policy.
This is particularly true if one considers those factors which were heavily discounted in the 1995 NIE regarding the ballistic missile threat facing the United States.
Specifically, the 1995 NIE was criticized, among other reasons, for: basing its assessment on the vulnerability of only the United States' 48 contiguous states; for underestimating the time it would take a rogue nation to develop a long-range ballistic missile; for downplaying the impact of foreign assistance on the missile programs; for undervaluing the effect of space launch vehicle (SLV) development on missile proliferation; for being unrealistic about the potential sale of SLVs, and for dismissing the threat of an accidental or unauthorized ballistic missile launch.(43) Each of these factors has particular relevance for North Korea's missile programs.
The Rumsfeld Commission, formally know as the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, more fully analyzed these factors. The Commission also made recommendations for the Intelligence Community to consider as it prepared to issue its next ballistic missile threat assessment (the 1999 NIE, which was released in September 1999).(44)
North Korea's ballistic missile program dates back to the early 1970s when it tried to procure SCUD missiles from the Soviet Union. When this effort failed, North Korea began reverse engineering the USSR's FROG rockets and, in the mid-1970s, began a program of missile cooperation with the People's Republic of China (PRC). The two countries worked on the development of the DF-61 missile which would have had an estimated range of 600 km (370 miles) and a payload of 1,000 kg (2,200 pounds).(45) Although the DF-61 program was canceled due to the removal of its supporters in the Chinese regime, it provided North Korea with certain ballistic missile technology and served as a basis for its missile development.
In 1981, Egypt provided North Korea with a small number of Soviet SCUD B missiles, which Pyongyang reverse-engineered to gain knowledge needed for a self-sufficient missile program.(46)By 1984, North Korea had developed a variant of the Soviet SCUD B missile, known as the SCUD A. The SCUD A had an estimated range of 280-300 km (174-186 miles) and a payload of 1,000 kg (2,200 pounds). North Korea tested the SCUD A at least three times over the Sea of Japan between April and September 1984. Despite these flight tests, it is believed that North Korea has not deployed the SCUD A.(47)
In 1985, with financial assistance from Iran, North Korea developed its own SCUD B, an upgraded version of the SCUD A.(48) The SCUD B has an estimated range of 300 km (186 miles) and a payload of 1,000 kg (2,200 pounds). In 1989, North Korea developed the SCUD C as an elongated version of the SCUD B with a reduced warhead, thereby allowing it to carry more fuel and travel a greater distance. The SCUD C has an estimated range of 500 km (310 miles) with a payload of 700-800 kg (1,540-1,760 pounds) and entered full-scale production in 1991. The Department of Defense estimates that the North Korean Armed Forces have several hundred SCUD-like missiles and have exported many to other countries.(49)
During the 1980s, North Korea developed the No Dong, which has an estimated range of 1,300 km (800 miles) and a payload of 1200 kg (2640 pounds). The No Dong uses an expanded model of the SCUD C missile motor, giving it added thrust and longer range with a heavier warhead. In July 1998, Secretary of Defense William Cohen confirmed that North Korea had completed its development of the No Dong.(50) The Rumsfeld Commission reported in July 1998 that North Korea deployed the No Dong after just one successful test and long before the United States government knew.(51) During late 1998 and early 1999, a series of articles reported that North Korea had deployed six, then ten, then 30 No Dong missiles at more than ten bases, with at least five underground launch sites.(52) One author estimates that North Korea will have produced 50-100 No Dong missiles by the end of 1999, and that it exported one or two dozen and used another 15 in testing and training, leaving about 25-75 in the North Korean inventory.(53)
North Korea is in the process of developing longer-range ballistic missiles. The two-stage Taepo Dong 1 has a range of 1,500-2,000 km (930-1,240 miles) and at one point was expected to enter production in 1995. On August 31, 1998, North Korea used a Taepo Dong 1 with an additional solid-fuel third stage in an attempt to place a small satellite into orbit. Apparently, the first stage (based on the No Dong missile motor) and the second stage (based on the SCUD C motor) operated as planned, and the third stage separated and carried the payload a distance before becoming disabled. The test demonstrated North Korea's ability to integrate numerous components in building a multi-stage missile, building a guidance package, and using both liquid and solid fuel. The test did not demonstrate a capability to construct a reentry vehicle that could survive atmospheric reentry at the speed of an ICBM, nor did it show the capacity to build a fully operational solid-fuel third stage.(54)
DoD estimated that the Taepo Dong 1, with a properly functioning third stage, could have a range of 3,850-5,600 km (2,400-3,500 miles), enough to reach Alaska and Hawaii. One expert predicted that the Taepo Dong 1 with a third stage could reach Alaska and Hawaii with a small nuclear warhead, and could reach much of the continental United States with a lighter warhead, such as a biological or chemical weapon.(55) The 1999 National Intelligence Council estimate indicated that if the Taepo Dong 1 had a properly functioning third stage and a survivable reentry vehicle, it could strike targets in the United States with sufficient size for a chemical or biological weapon, but not for an early-generation nuclear weapon.(56)
It is not known where North Korea acquired the solid fuel third stage for the August 1998 test, but there are several possibilities. David Wright of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) said the solid fuel motor could have been acquired from Pakistan, which may have copied it from a French missile motor, or North Korea may have used, or copied, one stage of the Chinese M-11 short-range ballistic missile. Pakistan reportedly received M-11 missiles, components, and production technology from China. Iran received solid missile technology from Russia, and perhaps China, and may have passed it to North Korea in return for SCUD and No Dong missiles and technology. Another possibility is that North Korea might have modified a motor from an SA-2 surface-to-air missile, which North Korea reportedly produces as the HJ-2, or may have used an engine from an SS-21 SCARAB, which North Korea reportedly acquired for reverse engineering.(57)
The Taepo Dong 2's range would enable North Korea to strike portions of Alaska and Hawaii with a payload of several hundred kilograms (enough for an early generation nuclear weapon), and could deliver a lighter weapon to the western half of the United States. Some analysts even suggest that the size of the Taepo Dong 2 allows space for enough liquid fuel to carry a missile almost 10,000 kilometers (6,200 miles) if the construction materials and warhead were sufficiently light.(58) With such range, the missile could reach most of the United States. Multiple-stage technology would enable the missile to travel further or to carry a larger payload. It is estimated that a three-stage Taepo Dong 2 could deliver a payload of several hundred kilograms, equivalent to a first generation nuclear weapon, anywhere in the United States.(59)
U.S. security planners have placed new emphasis on theater missile defense, largely due to the theater missile and WMD threats emerging in the Middle East and North Korea. They have also placed increased emphasis on national missile defense largely due to the current inability of the United States to defend itself from the emerging North Korean threat. Contributing to the new policy emphasis are: continuing Russian and Chinese missile capabilities; the aspirations of numerous developing countries to develop long-range missiles; and the maturing missile defense technologies of the United States.
North Korea's missile capabilities have deeply concerned Japan. The 1994 Japanese Defense Ministry white paper, Defense of Japan, described the No Dong as a "main destabilizing factor."(60) The risk posed by the No Dong has already prompted Japan to proceed with theater missile defense cooperation with the United States, including the purchase of United States Patriot air defense systems and participation in the development of Navy Theater Wide missile defense. Some have speculated the military threat from North Korea might even prompt Japan to rethink its non-nuclear status.(61)
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