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Source: US Dept of Defense
Chapter One: Key Developments
“The world today is undergoing extensive and profound changes, and
China today is undergoing extensive and profound transformations.” –
President Hu Jintao
Several significant developments in China over the past year relate to
the questions Congress posed in Section 1202 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (P.L. 106-65).
Developments in China’s Grand Strategy, Security Strategy, and
Military Strategy
- The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) convened the 17th Party Congress
on October 15-21, 2007. At the Congress, President of the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) and CCP General Secretary Hu Jintao reaffirmed
a long-term strategy of “opening and development,” which seeks to
maintain domestic and regional stability while China develops its
economic, military, scientific, and cultural power.
- Immediately following the Congress, Shanghai Party Secretary Xi
Jinping and Liaoning Party Secretary Li Keqiang were appointed to the
Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC), putting them in line for top
leadership positions at the next Party Congress in 2012. Party leaders
also endorsed inclusion of Hu’s ideological concept of “scientific
development” (ensuring balance between economic growth and social and
environmental needs) into the Party Constitution.
- Prior to the Congress, three of the 11-member Central Military
Commission (CMC) were replaced. The new CMC members are General Chang
Wanquan, Director of the General Armament Department (GAD); General Xu
Qiliang, PLA Air Force (PLAAF) Commander; and, Admiral Wu Shengli, PLA
Navy Commander. Defense Minister General Cao Gangchuan retired as
Vice Chairman of the CMC and as a member of the Politburo, and will
retain the title of Defense Minister until probably March 2008.
- Military leaders also appointed new commanders for five of seven
military regions (MR) in the months leading up to the 17th Party
Congress. These included Lieutenant General Fang Fenghui, Beijing MR;
Lieutenant General Zhang Qinsheng, Guangzhou MR; Lieutenant General
Zhao Keshi, Nanjing MR; Lieutenant General Wang Guosheng, Lanzhou MR;
and Lieutenant General Zhang Youxia, Shenyang MR. These new commanders
reflect the PLA’s modernization priorities and efforts to promote
officers who are younger, better educated, and trained according to
the PLA’s evolving professional military education guidelines.
- Regarding Taiwan, President Hu’s 17th Party Congress speech did not
emphasize military threats, but affirmed the importance of continuing
China’s military modernization and urged the Party to “accelerate the
revolution in military affairs with PLA characteristics [and] ensure
preparations for military struggles….”
- Hu’s speech also included an offer to hold consultations with
Taiwan, based on Beijing’s One China principle, toward “reaching a
peace agreement.” Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian rejected the offer.
- In an August 2007 speech celebrating the 80th anniversary of the
founding of the PLA, President Hu called for accelerating the
modernization of weapons and equipment, enhancing personnel training,
and strengthening combat skills through “coordinated development
between national defense building and economic construction.” China
began to use this language in the late 1990s, reflecting the CCP’s
strategy of balancing economic growth and military modernization, as
opposed to privileging one over the other.
- In December 2007, China announced the elevation of Hainan Province’s
Xisha Islands office to a county-level office named “Sansha City,”
which would hold administrative jurisdiction over the Paracel and
Spratly island groups, and Macclesfield Bank – claims disputed by
Brunei, the Philippines, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Vietnam. A PRC
spokesperson asserted that China has “indisputable sovereignty” and
effective jurisdiction over the islands of the South China Sea “and
the adjacent waterways.” In reaction to China’s declaration, hundreds
of Vietnamese protesters demonstrated outside the Chinese embassy in
Hanoi.
Developments in China’s Military Forces
China’s long-term, comprehensive transformation of its military forces
is improving its capacity for force projection and anti-access/area
denial. Consistent with a near-term focus on preparing for Taiwan
Strait contingencies, China deploys many of its most advanced systems
to the military regions opposite Taiwan.
China describes operating under “informatized” conditions and
improving “integrated joint operations” capabilities as the primary
objectives for the PLA’s build-up. Informatized conditions are
operating environments characterized by communications jamming,
electronic surveillance, and precision weaponry. “Integrated joint
operations” is the PLA’s term for multi-service, combined arms
operations.
Ballistic and Cruise Missiles. China has the most active ballistic
missile program in the world. It is developing and testing offensive
missiles, forming additional missile units, qualitatively upgrading
certain missile systems, and developing methods to counter ballistic
missile defenses.
- By November 2007, the PLA had deployed between 990 and 1,070 CSS-6
and CSS-7 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) to garrisons opposite
Taiwan. It is increasing the size of this force at a rate of more than
100 missiles per year, including variants of these missiles with
improved ranges, accuracies, and payloads.
- The PLA is acquiring large numbers of highly accurate cruise
missiles, such as the domestically produced ground-launched DH-10 land
attack cruise missile (LACM); the Russian SS-N-22/SUNBURN supersonic
anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) outfitted on China’s two SOVREMENNYY
and two SOVREMENNYY II-class guided missile destroyers (DDG), also
acquired from Russia; and, the SS-N-27B/ SIZZLER supersonic ASCM,
outfitted on the last eight of twelve total Russian-built KILO-class
diesel electric submarines China has acquired.
- China is developing an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) based on a
variant of the CSS-5 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) as a
component of its anti-access strategy. The missile has a range in
excess of 1,500 km and, when incorporated into a sophisticated command
and control system, is a key component of China’s anti-access strategy
to provide the PLA the capability to attack ships at sea, including
aircraft carriers, from great distances.
- China is modernizing its longer-range ballistic missile force by
adding more survivable systems. Most notably, the DF-31 and longer-
range DF-31A are now being deployed to units within the Second
Artillery Corps.
- China is also working on a new submarine- launched ballistic
missile, the JL-2, for deployment aboard new JIN-class (Type 094)
nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN). The JL-2 is
expected to reach initial operational capability (IOC) between
2009-2010.
Space and Counterspace. China is developing a multi-dimensional
program to limit or prevent the use of space-based assets by its
potential adversaries during times of crisis or conflict. Although
China’s commercial space program certainly has utility for
non-military research, it demonstrates space launch and control
capabilities that have direct military application.
- In January 2007, China successfully tested a direct ascent,
anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon, destroying a defunct PRC weather
satellite. The unannounced test demonstrated the PLA’s ability to
attack satellites operating in low-Earth orbit. The test raised
concern among many nations, and the resulting debris cloud put at risk
the assets of all space faring nations, and posed a danger to human
space flight.
- China launched its first lunar orbiter on October 24, 2007. The
Chang’e 1 orbiter reached lunar orbit on November 5, 2007. Successful
completion of this mission demonstrated China’s ability to conduct
complicated space maneuvers – a capability which has broad
implications for military counterspace operations. The Chang’e 1
mission completed the first of a three-stage plan for lunar
exploration which includes China’s desire to launch an unmanned lunar
rover mission in 2012 and a manned lunar landing by 2020.
- In October 2007, China launched the fifth in a class of Space Event
Support Ships (SESS), the Yuanwang 5, an ocean-going space tracking
and survey vessel intended to support China’s growing space program,
including its expanding space launch activities.
- China launched its 100th Long March series rocket in 2007, and
continues to put a more sophisticated and diverse set of satellites
into orbit. China is developing the Long March 5, an improved
heavy-lift rocket that will be able to lift larger reconnaissance
satellites into low-earth orbit or communications satellites into
geosynchronous orbits by 2012, and is constructing a new satellite
launch complex on Hainan Island. China expects to replace all
foreign-produced satellites in its inventory with indigenously
produced sun-synchronous and geo-stationary models by 2010, with life
expectancies of 5 and 15 years, respectively.
- China announced plans to launch 15 rockets and 17 satellites in
2008. Additionally, China announced its intention to launch a third
manned space mission, Shenzhou VII, in October 2008 on the heels of
the Beijing Olympics, underscoring space development as an important
symbol of national pride. The majority of the technology used in
China’s manned space program is derived from Russian equipment, and
China receives significant help from Russia with specific satellite
payloads and applications.
- China’s leaders remain silent about the military applications of
China’s space programs and counterspace activities.
Cyberwarfare Capabilities. In the past year, numerous computer
networks around the world, including those owned by the
U.S. Government, were subject to intrusions that appear to have
originated within the PRC. These intrusions require many of the skills
and capabilities that would also be required for computer network
attack. Although it is unclear if these intrusions were conducted by,
or with the endorsement of, the PLA or other elements of the PRC
government, developing capabilities for cyberwarfare is consistent
with authoritative PLA writings on this subject.
- In 2007, the Department of Defense, other U.S. Government agencies
and departments, and defense-related think tanks and contractors
experienced multiple computer network intrusions, many of which
appeared to originate in the PRC.
- Hans Elmar Remberg, Vice President of the German Office for the
Protection of the Constitution (Germany’s domestic intelligence
agency), publicly accused China of sponsoring computer network
intrusions “almost daily.” Remberg stated, “across the world the PRC
is intensively gathering political, military, corporate-strategic and
scientific information in order to bridge their [sic] technological
gaps as quickly as possible.” Referring to reports of PRC infiltration
of computer networks of the German government, German Chancellor
Angela Merkel said “we must together respect a set of game rules.”
Similarly, in September 2007, French Secretary-General of National
Defense Francis Delon confirmed that government information systems
had been the target of attacks from the PRC.
- In addition to governments, apparent PRC- origin network intrusions
targeted businesses. In November 2007, Jonathan Evans, Director-
General of the British intelligence service, MI 5, alerted 300
financial institution officials that they were the target of
state-sponsored computer network exploitation from the PRC.
Naval Power. China’s naval forces include 74 principal combatants, 57
attack submarines, 55 medium and heavy amphibious ships, and 49
coastal missile patrol craft.
- China has an active aircraft carrier research and design program. If
the leadership were to so choose, the PRC shipbuilding industry could
start construction of an indigenous platform by the end of this
decade.
- The PLA Navy is improving its over-the-horizon (OTH) targeting
capability with Sky Wave and Surface Wave OTH radars, and is
developing missiles with improved range and accuracy.
- Two new SHANG-class (Type 093) nuclear- powered attack submarines
(SSN) and one JIN-class (Type 094) SSBN may soon enter service
alongside four older HAN-class SSNs and China’s single XIA-class SSBN.
- China has an estimated ten SONG-class (Type 039) diesel-electric
attack submarines (SS) in its inventory. The SONG-class SS is designed
to carry the YJ-82 (CSS-N-8) ASCM. The YUAN- class SS is now assessed
to be in full production and will be ready for service by 2010.
- The PLA Navy has received seven new domestically produced surface
combatants in the past two years, including two LUYANG II-class (Type
052C) DDGs fitted with the indigenous HHQ-9 long-range surface-to-air
missile (SAM); two LUZHOU-class (Type 051C) DDGs equipped with the
Russian SA-N-20 long-range SAM, and three JIANGKAI II-class (Type
054A) guided missile frigates (FFG) to be fitted with the medium-range
HHQ-16 vertically launch naval SAM currently under development. These
ships reflect leadership’s priority on advanced anti-air warfare
capabilities for China’s naval forces, which has historically been a
weakness of the fleet.
- China is continuing construction of its new Type 022 catamaran-style
missile patrol craft, which likely will be armed with ASCMs.
Air and Air Defense. China bases 490 combat aircraft within
un-refueled operational range of Taiwan, and has the airfield capacity
to expand that number by hundreds. Many of these aircraft are upgrades
of older models; however, newer, and more advanced, aircraft make up a
growing percentage of the inventory.
- The modernized FB-7A fighter-bomber will augment other multi-role
and strike aircraft, such as the F-10 and Su-30MKK, already deployed
with China’s air forces.
- China is upgrading its B-6 bomber fleet (originally adapted from the
Russian Tu-16) with a new variant which, when operational, will be
armed with a new long-range cruise missile.
- The PLAAF received four battalions of upgraded Russian SA-20 PMU-2
long-range (200km) SAM systems in July 2007. Another four battalions
are expected to be delivered in 2008. The SA-20 system reportedly
provides limited ballistic and cruise missile defense capabilities.
- China’s aviation industry is developing several types of airborne
early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft. This includes the KJ-200,
based on the Y-8 transport, for AEW&C as well as intelligence
collection and maritime surveillance, and the KJ-2000, based on the
Russian A-50 airframe.
Ground Forces. The PLA has about 1.25 million ground forces personnel,
with approximately 400,000 based in the three MRs opposite Taiwan.
China is upgrading these units with modern tanks, armored personnel
carriers, and artillery. Among the new capabilities acquired by PLA
ground forces are the approximately 200 Type 98 and Type 99 main
battle tanks now deployed to units in the Beijing and Shenyang MRs.
Developments in PLA Military Doctrine
- In January 2007, the PLA General Staff Department (GSD) released its
yearly guidance on military training. For the first time, the guidance
focuses on training under “informatized” conditions.
- The PLA is compiling and validating a new Outline for Military
Training and Evaluation (OMTE) to align its military training with its
vision for transformation for warfare under “informatized conditions.”
The new OMTE will emphasize realistic training conditions, training in
electromagnetic and joint operations environments, and integrating new
and high technologies into the force structure.
- China’s militia forces are shifting from a ground forces-oriented
support element to a multi- service force supporting the ground,
naval, aviation, and missile forces. The PLA is also integrating
militia forces with active duty units in training for future combat
operations. China’s militia forces number 10-15 million; fully
integrating this force will be a challenge.
International Military Exchanges, Exercises, and Interaction
- In March 2007, two PLA Navy guided missile frigates participated in
the Pakistan-hosted multinational naval exercise, AMAN 07, in the
North Arabian Sea. Naval forces from the United States and seven other
countries participated in the exercise, which focused on maritime
counter-terrorism.
- PRC Premier Wen Jiabao paid his first official visit to Japan in
April 2007. During the visit, Wen and Japan’s then-Prime Minister Abe
agreed to expand economic ties and discuss military exchanges and
mechanisms for peace in the East China Sea, an area where China and
Japan hold competing sovereignty claims. PRC Minister of Defense
General Cao Gangchuan followed Wen to Japan in June 2007 for the first
senior-level defense visit in ten years. In November 2007, the PLA
Navy LUHAI-class destroyer Shenzhen conducted the PRC’s first port
visit to Japan.
- In August 2007, China conducted a first time transnational
deployment of 1,600 troops and equipment to Russia to participate with
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) member-states in a
highly-scripted exercise, PEACE MISSION 2007.
- Despite a tradition of allowing U.S. naval vessels to make port
calls in Hong Kong, in November 2007, Beijing at the last minute
denied entry into Hong Kong of the USS PATRIOT and USS GUARDIAN, two
small mine sweepers, seeking refueling and weather avoidance – a
decision that is inconsistent with international custom regarding safe
harbor. The following day, Beijing denied the USS KITTY HAWK carrier
strike group entry to Hong Kong harbor on the day it was scheduled to
arrive for the Thanksgiving holiday. The PRC’s subsequent reversal of
this decision following U.S. demarches came too late to be accepted by
the ships of the strike group.
- The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations named Major General
Zhao Jingmin as the first PRC commander of a UN peace operation, the
UN Mission on Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO). As of December
2007, China was engaged in 13 UN peace missions with 1,800 troops
deployed globally.
- In November 2007, China deployed 135 military engineers (of an
eventual 315-person force) to Darfur as the first non-African Union
troop contingent for the “hybrid force.”
- In December 2007, China and India staged “HAND-IN-HAND 2007,” a week
long counterterrorism exercise in China that involved 100 troops from
each country. Earlier, in April 2007, the PLA and Indian navies held a
combined force exercise in the South China Sea. These events stand in
contrast to the PRC’s November 2007 destruction of an abandoned Indian
bunker near the tri-border area in Bhutan, ignoring Indian protests.
Efforts to Acquire Advanced Technologies to Enhance China’s Military Capabilities
- Officials from the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) have
identified China as running an aggressive and wide-ranging effort
aimed at acquiring advanced technologies from the United
States. Similarly, officials from U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) have referred to China as the leading espionage
threat to the United States. Between 2000 and May 2006, ICE initiated
more than 400 investigations involving the illicit export of U.S.
arms and technologies to China.
- In December 2007, a California resident was sentenced to two years
in prison and fined for his role in a scheme to export night vision
technology illegally to the PRC.
- The former director of a research institute associated with Russia’s
space agency was sentenced to eleven and one-half years in prison for
passing classified technology to China. According to a Russian
spokesperson, the information could be used to create missiles capable
of carrying nuclear warheads.
Taiwan’s Defense Capabilities and Cross-Strait Stability
There were no armed incidents in the vicinity of the Taiwan Strait in
2007 and the overall situation remains stable, as it did in
2006. However, China’s military build-up and the deployment of
advanced capabilities opposite the island have not eased.
For its part, Taiwan recently reversed the trend of the past several
years of declining defense expenditures; it is also modernizing select
capabilities and improving its overall contingency training. But the
balance of forces continues to shift in the mainland’s favor.