Source: US Dept of Defense
“In recent years, the situation of the Taiwan Strait has become increasingly complicated and severe … our army … has stepped up its efforts to prepare for military struggles to safeguard the security and unity of the state.” – General Cao Gangchuan, Minister of Defense
The security situation in the Taiwan Strait is largely a function of dynamic interaction between the United States, the mainland, and Taiwan. The U.S. Government has made clear that it opposes unilateral changes to the status quo by either side of the Taiwan Strait and supports peaceful resolution of cross-Strait differences in a manner acceptable to the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. China’s emergence as a global economic force has given it increased diplomatic clout and economic tools to coerce Taiwan without resorting to military force. At the same time, China has utilized some of its growing economy to fund enhanced military capabilities that can be brought to bear directly upon Taiwan. These new capabilities might be coupled with concepts China is developing to coerce Taiwan short of invasion, or to mount an invasion, if necessary. Taiwan, meanwhile, has allowed its defense spending to decline in real terms over the past decade, creating an increased urgency for the Taiwan authorities to make the necessary investments to maintain the island’s capability for self-defense. These trends pose challenges to Taiwan’s security, which has historically been based upon the inability of the PLA to project power across the 100-nm Taiwan Strait, the natural geographic advantages of island defense, the technological superiority of its own armed forces, and the possibility that the United States might intervene.
In accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act [Public Law 96-8, (1979)], the United States has taken steps to help maintain peace, security, and stability in the Taiwan Strait. In addition to making available defense articles and services to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability, the U.S. Department of Defense, through the transformation of the U.S. Armed Forces and global force posture realignments, is maintaining the capacity to resist any effort by Beijing to use force or coercion to dictate the terms of Taiwan’s future status. For its part, Taiwan has taken important steps to improve its joint operations capability, strengthen its officer and non-commissioned officer (NCO) corps, build its war reserve stocks, and improve crisis response capabilities. In June 2007, the Taiwan legislature passed a defense budget of $8.9 billion, which included funding for 12 P-3C maritime patrol aircraft, six Patriot missile system upgrades, three TP-3A airframes for spares, 144 SM-2 naval SAMs and to initiate a feasibility study for the purchase of eight diesel-electric submarines. Additionally, Taiwan approved funding for precision weapons over the next three years to include: 218 AMRAAM air-to-air missiles, 235 Maverick air-to-surface missiles, and 60 Harpoon Block II ASCMs. For 2008, the legislature in December 2007 passed a $10.5 billion budget, a twelve percent increase, including funding for a study that would produce a diesel submarine design to support follow-on production contract bidding. These improvements have, on the whole, reinforced Taiwan’s natural defensive advantages in the face of Beijing’s continuing military build-up.
Operationalizing PLA Concepts
The PLA’s use of military force during a Taiwan contingency, regardless of the specific military course of action engaged, would be shaped by the doctrine and conceptual framework first detailed in Chapters Three and Four of this report. In any such contingency, China faces the dual planning problems of rapidly degrading Taiwan’s will to resist while deterring or countering intervention by third parties. Numerous PRC statements describe the United States as the most likely outside power to intervene in a Taiwan Strait crisis, as well as the most difficult military to counter. It therefore is likely that China requires its military planners to assume and address U.S. military intervention in any future Taiwan Strait contingency.
Beijing appears prepared to defer unification as long as it believes trends are advancing toward that goal and that the costs of conflict outweigh the benefits. In the near term, Beijing aims to prevent Taiwan from moving toward de jure independence while continuing to hold out for a peaceful resolution under a framework that would purportedly provide Taiwan a high degree of autonomy in exchange for its unification with the mainland. China’s leaders are pursuing this policy through a coercive strategy that integrates political, economic, cultural, legal, diplomatic, and military instruments of power.
Although Beijing professes a desire for peaceful resolution as its preferred outcome, the PLA’s ongoing deployment of short range ballistic missiles, enhanced amphibious warfare capabilities, and modern, long-range anti-air systems opposite Taiwan are reminders of Beijing’s unwillingness to renounce the use of force.
The circumstances in which the mainland has historically warned it would use force against the island are not fixed and have evolved over time in response to Taiwan’s declarations and actions relating to its political status, changes in PLA capabilities, and Beijing’s view of other countries’ relations with Taiwan. These circumstances, or “red lines,” have included: a formal declaration of Taiwan independence; undefined moves “toward independence”; foreign intervention in Taiwan’s internal affairs; indefinite delays in the resumption of cross-Strait dialogue on unification; Taiwan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons; and, internal unrest on Taiwan. Article 8 of the March 2005 “Anti- Secession Law” states that Beijing would resort to “non-peaceful means” if “secessionist forces . . . cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession from China,” if “major incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession” occur, or if “possibilities for peaceful reunification” are exhausted. The ambiguity of these “red-lines” appears deliberate, allowing Beijing the flexibility to determine the nature, timing, and form of its response. Added to this atmosphere of ambiguity are political factors internal to the regime in Beijing that might affect its decision-making but are opaque to outsiders.
The PLA is capable of pursuing increasingly sophisticated military courses of action against Taiwan. Some analysts hold that Beijing first would pursue a measured, judicious, and deliberate approach characterized by signaling its readiness to use force in an attempt to coerce Taiwan, followed by a deliberate buildup of force, which would optimize speed of engagement over strategic deception. Others assess that the more likely course of action would be for China to sacrifice deliberate preparations in favor of strategic surprise to force a rapid military and/or political resolution before the United States or other countries could respond. If a quick resolution is not possible, Beijing would seek to deter potential U.S. intervention; or, failing that, delay such intervention, seek to defeat it in an asymmetric, limited, or quick war, or fight to a standstill and pursue a political settlement after a protracted conflict.
Figure 9. Taiwan Strait SAM and SRBM Coverage.
[full size: 1886x1492]
This map depicts notional coverage based on the range of the
Russian-designed SA-20 PMU2 SAM system, the CSS-6 and CSS-7
SRBMs. Actual coverage would be non-contiguous and dependent upon
precise deployment sites. If deployed near the Taiwan Strait, the
PMU2’s extended range provides the PLA’s SAM force with an offensive
capability against Taiwan aircraft.
Limited Force or “No War” Options. China might use a variety of lethal, punitive, or disruptive military actions in a limited campaign against Taiwan, likely in conjunction with overt and clandestine economic and political activities. Such a campaign could include CNA against Taiwan’s political, military, and economic infrastructure to target the Taiwan people’s confidence in their leadership. Similarly, PLA special operations forces infiltrated into Taiwan could conduct economic, political, or military sabotage or attacks against leadership targets. Air and Missile Campaign. Limited SRBM attacks and precision strikes against air defense systems, including air bases, radar sites, missiles, space assets, and communications facilities could support a campaign to degrade Taiwan’s defenses, neutralize Taiwan’s military and political leadership, and possibly break the Taiwan people’s will to fight. Maritime Quarantine or Blockade. Beijing could declare that ships en route to Taiwan ports must stop in mainland ports for safety inspections prior to transiting on to Taiwan. It could also attempt the equivalent of a blockade by declaring exercise or missile closure areas in approaches to ports with the effect of closing port access and diverting merchant traffic – as occurred during the 1995-96 missile firings and live-fire exercises.
Factors of Deterrence
China is deterred on multiple levels from taking military action against Taiwan. First, China does not yet possess the military capability to accomplish with confidence its political objectives on the island, particularly when confronted with the prospect of U.S. intervention. Moreover, an insurgency directed against the PRC presence could tie up PLA forces for years. A military conflict in the Taiwan Strait would also affect the interests of Japan and other nations in the region in ensuring a peaceful resolution of the cross-Strait dispute.
Beijing’s calculus would also have to factor in the potential political and economic repercussions of military conflict with Taiwan. China’s leaders recognize that a war could severely retard economic development. Taiwan is China’s single largest source of foreign direct investment, and an extended campaign would wreck Taiwan’s economic infrastructure, leading to high reconstruction costs. International sanctions could further damage Beijing’s economic development. A conflict would also severely damage the image that Beijing has sought to project in the post-Tiananmen years and would taint Beijing’s hosting of the 2008 Olympics. A conflict could also trigger domestic unrest on the mainland, a contingency that Beijing appears to have factored into its planning. Finally, China’s leaders recognize that a conflict over Taiwan involving the United States would give rise to a long-term hostile relationship between the two nations – a result that would not be in China’s interests.
Although a traditional maritime quarantine or blockade would have greater impact on Taiwan, it would also tax PLA Navy capabilities. PLA doctrinal writings describe potential lower cost solutions: air blockades, missile attacks, and mining or otherwise obstructing harbors and approaches to achieve the desired outcome at lower cost. Chinese elites could underestimate the degree to which any attempt to limit maritime traffic to and from Taiwan would trigger countervailing international pressure and risk military escalation.
Amphibious Invasion. China’s Joint Island Landing Campaign envisions a complex operation relying on interlocking, supporting, subordinate campaigns for logistics, electronic warfare, and air and naval support – all coordinated in space and time – to break through or circumvent shore defenses, establish and build a beachhead, transport personnel and materiel to designated landing sites, and then launch an attack to split, seize, and occupy key targets and/or the entire island.
The PLA currently is capable of accomplishing various amphibious operations short of a full- scale invasion of Taiwan. With few overt military preparations beyond seasonally routine amphibious training, China could launch an invasion of a small Taiwan-held island such as Pratas or Itu Aba. Such a limited invasion of a lightly defended island could demonstrate military capability and political resolve, would achieve tangible territorial gain, and could be portrayed as showing some measure of restraint. However, such an operation includes significant – if not prohibitive – political risk as it could galvanize the Taiwan populace and generate international opposition.
A PLA invasion of a medium-sized defended offshore island such as Mazu or Jinmen, while within China’s capabilities, would involve logistic and military preparation well beyond routine training.
Large-scale amphibious invasion is one of the most complicated and logistics-intensive, and therefore difficult, military maneuvers. Success depends upon air and sea supremacy in the vicinity of the operation, rapid buildup of supplies and sustainment on shore, and an uninterrupted flow of support thereafter. An invasion of Taiwan would strain the capabilities of China’s untested armed forces and would almost certainly invite international intervention. These stresses, combined with the combat attrition of China’s forces, the complex tasks of urban warfare and counterinsurgency – assuming a successful landing and breakout – make an amphibious invasion of Taiwan a significant political and military risk for China’s leaders. Modest targeted investments by Taiwan to harden infrastructure and strengthen defensive capabilities could have measurable effects on decreasing Beijing’s ability to achieve its objectives.
In one to two decades, the PLA will possess a contingent of command officers capable of directing informatized wars and of building informatized armed forces, a contingent of staff officers proficient in planning armed forces building and military operations, a contingent of scientists capable of planning and organizing the innovative development of weaponry and equipment and the exploration of key technologies, a contingent of technical specialists with thorough knowledge of new- and high-tech weaponry performance, and a contingent of NCOs with expertise in using weapons and equipment at hand. – China’s National Defense in 2004
The PLA’s ongoing military reforms emphasize building a qualified officer and NCO corps. Many of the PLA’s investments in human capital are described in the 2004 Defense White Paper as elements of the “Strategic Project for Talented People,” which focuses on personnel management, education, and training reforms. The 2006 Defense White Paper reiterated the importance of training and educational reforms in addition to improving morale and welfare in the military. Improvements in the quality of personnel will continue to parallel broader force structure, doctrine, and training reforms across the PLA as it seeks to build a force able to fight and win “local wars under conditions of informatization.”
China is attempting to transform its military from a force dependent upon mass to a streamlined information-based military with highly-qualified officers and soldiers. To meet these new requirements, the PLA has implemented programs to rejuvenate its officer corps, enhance professional military education, reform its NCO program, establish new guidelines for training and exercises, and improve the quality of life for its officers and soldiers. While the CMC began discussing the implementation of human capital programs almost 10 years ago, improvements in the PLA personnel system have only recently become evident.
Guidance identified in recent Defense White Papers reflects the PLA's focus since the late 1990s on increased integration of domestic and foreign training as well as of military and civilian education to support defense needs. The PLA has also begun focusing more attention on morale and welfare within its officer and NCO corps, and has implemented a series of measures to strengthen and modernize its personnel system, to include reforms to streamline the force, improve quality of life, strengthen political work, increase the education levels of members, and address corruption.
Development of NCOs. In 2005, the CMC approved the “Opinions on Strengthening the Noncommissioned Officer Corps,” which stipulated that as of 2005 candidates for the NCO corps must at least have a high school education, specialized skills, and must take continuing education and training courses. Some of the NCOs will also take over technical and administrative positions customarily held by officers, within the PLA.
Conscription in the PRC
The system of conscription used by the PLA differs from Western practices. Instead of a general requirement of service for citizens of a certain age, the PLA’s conscription system functions more as a “levy,” in which the PLA establishes the number of conscripts needed, which produces quotas that are imposed on local governments which are charged with providing a set number of soldiers or sailors. If the number of volunteers fails to meet quota despite efforts to cajole or convince candidates, local government officials may compel unwilling individuals to enter service. China does not release data on what share of recruits are compelled rather than volunteers. Annual quota numbers for both the PLA and PAP are estimated to be 500,000. The vast majority of NCOs come from conscripts who then elect to continue service in the PLA.
Revisions in the NCO corps structure are intended to compensate for the recent decision to decrease the length of conscription service to two years for all services, and will replace the earlier system which had allowed conscripts to voluntarily extend their service obligation. Enlisted personnel can now potentially serve for up to 30 years, which would establish a continuously available core of soldiers from which the PLA could draw expertise and experience.
Officer Accession & Development. To create a professional and technically proficient officer corps, the PLA is reforming its officer accession and promotion standards, areas historically prone to corruption. Bribery and nepotism not only breed discontent, but can lead to the promotion of unqualified officers. China’s 2006 Defense White Paper highlights PLA efforts to reform the evaluation, selection, and appointment process for commanding officers. These reforms are likely intended to increase professionalism, establish standard practices, and decrease corruption-based promotion.
Expanding Education. China’s rapid military build-up has necessitated a parallel effort to improve the education and training of its officers and soldiers responsible for operating its sophisticated equipment. Continued education through NCO schools and academies as well as unit training and distance learning have also been implemented, and night schools in barracks have grown rapidly. NCO education will take time to develop as many of the NCOs were previously conscripts with at most an 8th grade education. PLA reforms in education are underway to improve the computer-based military training, and the PLA has built virtual laboratories, digital libraries, and digital campuses.
China has expressed concerns that low education levels in the PLA negatively affect its operating capability and professionalism. The CMC-directed program “Strategic Project for Talented People” that began in 2003 is an attempt to develop a well- educated and technically capable officer corps by 2020. The project aims to train and retain highly qualified individuals from the military academies as well as to attract graduates of civilian universities. To do this, the PLA is implementing improved training programs, increasing cooperation with civilian universities, and increasing military pay to be more competitive with private sector salaries.
In addition to recruiting from the civilian sector, the PLA is attempting to supplement modernization and reforms of the curricula in its professional military education system by organizing programs for continuing education at civilian universities. In 2007, a representative from the General Political Department’s personnel department stated that, “more than 1,000 officers are studying for doctorate or master’s degrees in top-notch universities.” Although this number may seem insignificant compared to the overall size of the PLA, the program’s potential for growth when coupled with civilian graduate recruitment, is noteworthy.
Realistic Training. An equally important aspect of the PLA’s modernization is enhancing the realism and quality of military training. During the Army- Wide Military Training Conference in 2006, the CMC announced training would be more robust and information-intensive to better prepare the PLA to face technologically advanced adversaries.
The PLA General Staff Department (GSD) 2007 training guidelines indicate the PLA expects training scenarios to resemble actual combat conditions as closely as possible. The PLA is attempting to enhance the level of realism by incorporating opposing forces into its exercises and, in some cases, by designing training that compels officers to deviate from the scripted exercise plan. The PLA is also conducting more joint service exercises. Although these efforts tend to be based more on de-confliction than truly joint operations, they do signify that the PLA is attempting to prepare its officers and soldiers for the demands of the future battlefield. In addition, the PLA is utilizing simulators to increase training time and conducting more command post exercises to improve its officers’ planning and decision- making skills.
Quality of Life. China’s defense expenditures reflect in part increased salaries for military personnel and improved living conditions. The PLA has also focused on quality of life in the barracks, including improving the nutritional quality of service members’ meals, providing new uniforms and equipment, constructing more ecologically friendly barracks, and sustaining remote areas with better medical support. In addition, the PLA has made improvements in its benefits program, which includes insurance, medical needs, housing, and increasing pensions for retired officers.
China’s reforms are intended to satisfy the PLA’s need to staff the armed forces with competent officers and NCOs better able to use the modern equipment, weapon systems, and platforms being developed and acquired. A significant portion of the reforms focus on developing a modernized recruitment system that targets individuals with skill sets to fill the need for highly competent and qualified individuals. However, the PLA is likely to continue to face several problems as reforms are implemented. For example, the PLA itself acknowledges that military training continues to suffer from units “going through the motions,” heavy scripting, and a lack of realism. The PLA will need to address these deficiencies if the human capital reforms are to achieve any long- term improvements across the military.
Civilian Personnel. The PLA has focused on developing a modernized civilian personnel recruitment system, giving priority to the recruitment and retention of science and technology professionals and other technical experts. The PLA has also implemented an incentive mechanism to reward professional skill and performance, including budget increases for the employment of contract civilians. Early promotions, honorary medals, and extended leave programs have also been created for those individuals who make significant contributions to their field.
Streamlining the Force. As part of the effort to streamline the forces, the PLA has reduced the overall officer corps while increasing the number of NCOs and contract civilians. The PLA has also streamlined the educational system by cutting departments and closing some training organizations, while adjusting headquarters and regional command posts.
Political Work. The PLA places priority on political work, particularly regarding education in its historical missions, combined with a “combat spirit” along with the concepts of “honor and disgrace.” The PLA has emphasized improving the competence of political instructors and discipline within the force for accomplishing PLA tasks. Expected wartime tasks of the PLA’s political work system are not well understood among outside observers.
Addressing Corruption. The PLA does not publish specific data on corruption, but claims to target corrupt activity aggressively. The PLA claims that its audits during the Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001-2005) saved the PLA $840 million, some of which probably resulted from corruption investigations. Of the approximately 1,000 officers at regiment-level and above audited in 2004, 5.2 percent were determined to have unspecified irregularities. According to PRC literature, the majority of these missing funds are attributed to unauthorized contracts and projects. Another major source of corruption is bribery for advancement. These problems probably contributed to the strengthening of the PLA’s audit program for the Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006-2010), with which the PLA intends to audit 4,000 officers under an “anti-graft” campaign. Other official investigations range from corruption in the selection of noncommissioned officers, to construction project bidding and weapons procurement.
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