HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
JUNE 12, 2001
Serial No. 107-15
Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international-relations/
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250
Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001
STATEMENT OF JAMES A. KELLY, ASSISTANT
PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMES A. KELLY,
-- Regional Overview: Economic and Political
-- Developing Regional Consciousness
-- U.S. Regional Presence
-- Indonesia
-- China
-- Korean Peninsula
APPENDIX
-- Material Submitted for the Hearing Record
-- Korean Peninsula
-- China: Engage and Hedge
-- China: Competitor
-- China: Implementation of UN Sanctions on Iraq
-- China: Olympics
-- China: Tibet Policy Act
-- Taiwan: Conditions for U.S. Defense Commitments
-- Taiwan: U.S. Policy on Taiwan
-- Taiwan: U.S. Assistance in Procuring Submarines
-- Taiwan: End of Arms Talks Process
-- Cambodia
-- East Timor: Registration of East Timorese Refugees
-- Indonesia: Leahy Amendment and Military to Military Contacts
-- Enhanced Strategic Dialogue with Japan
-- Japan's Participation in Peacekeeping
-- Japan's Military Force Structure
-- Japan's Security Horizon
-- Article 9 of Japan's Constitution
-- Regional Support for a Greater Security Role for Japan in the Asia-Pacific Region
-- Burma/Myanmar
-- Vietnam
-- Li Shaomin
Mr. KELLY. The old press the button trick. I am very happy to do that, Mr. Chairman, and I very much appreciate this opportunity that you have offered me to testify before this Subcommittee today. I very much thank you, sir, for your remarks, as well as those of the Ranking Member and other Members here today.
Very much the charter that I had when I returned to government after 12 years away is to get to the Hill as often as possible and consult and consult and consult. The same task from Secretary Powell and the President comes with respect to this very large region; to get out to the region and speak to the people there.
Now, I have, sir, a fairly long statement for the record. If it is suitable to the Chair, I will offer that for the record and then give here as an introduction and perhaps in partial response to some of the comments and questions that were made a shorter version if that is okay, and then we can get to the questions and answers.
Mr. LEACH. Mr. Secretary, without objection. Your full statement will be placed in the record, and you are free to proceed in any manner you see fit.
Mr. KELLY. It is almost trite to observe that change is a constant in East Asia and the Pacific. At the moment, I think we are seeing more of it than usual in some of the region's most important nations and some of its most important issues. Perhaps I might, Mr. Chairman, add a little foreword.
A little over a month ago, I pledged in my confirmation statement before your colleagues on the Senate side that I intended to consult frequently and regularly with the Congress on matters of U.S. policy in East Asia and the Pacific. Of course, that pledge was directed to both the Senate and the House of Representatives. This is my first opportunity as the Assistant Secretary to testify before the House, and it is fully appropriate that it be before this distinguished Subcommittee.
Let me add that I had hoped to have accomplished this earlier, but the confirmation, of course, took until the first of May. I spent most of the month of May in East Asia. Deputy Secretary Armitage and I were dispatched by the President to brief allies and others in the region on the President's concept on transforming deterrence, including missile defense. I went with Mr. Armitage to Japan and to Korea.
Following that, I went on my own trip on that task and others to Australia, to Singapore, to Vietnam, to Thailand and then on to Beijing, both to articulate the logic of which the opportunities for missile defense are a part and to listen carefully to Chinese perspectives on that subject.
Additionally, I have had meetings since being confirmed about the Korean Peninsula policies with our Japanese and Korean allies, the venue this time being the so-called Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group or TCOG. An important part of this is to develop and re-establish personal relationships which are going to be invaluable as we craft and work to implement our policy in the region.
Perhaps, sir, if I can just begin by offering a broad look at the region focused on general political, economic and security trends, our interests in the region and what we are doing to realize them.
The overall picture is positive--guardedly. There is a mixture. Some of what we see is quite positive and much of it very much less so. Interestingly, though, there is not much that we see developing irretrievably in a distinctly negative direction. Much of what we are seeing today--China's emergence as a regional and global power, Indonesia's ongoing effort to democratic transformation, Japan's struggle with economic reform and the situation on the Korean Peninsula to offer a few examples--are tales in the telling.
I would add the caution that our ability to influence events in these four areas varies widely. We are, nonetheless, proactive in each one of them, working hard to encourage the most positive outcome. The region's economy is no exception to this pattern. There is plenty on the positive side of the ledger.
The East Asia and Pacific region is a place of enormous opportunity, and the U.S. has very large trade and economic interests in the region. It is our second largest trading partner after NAFTA with nearly $500 billion in two-way trade, over a third of the U.S. total.
Just to cite a local example, the Port of Baltimore handles over $3 billion in two-way trade with East Asia every year and about $2.5 billion in trade with Japan and China alone. Local or national, these are big numbers, and they reflect the fact that East Asia and the Pacific now account for over a quarter of the world's gross national product.
Of course, there is a less encouraging side to this ledger even on just the economic terms. While most countries in the region have recovered at least partially from the devastating 1997-1998 financial crisis, unresolved problems remain. In some of the larger economies, bad debt and corporate restructuring remain as significant areas of concern, and that is especially true in Japan and Korea, and I would also add in China.
So, too, is the restructuring of China's financial and state owned enterprises. More work needs to be done through the region on structural reform to ensure that sustainable growth can be achieved.
The recovery from the financial crisis of 1997 was largely driven by the phenomenal growth of the American economy. We kept our markets opened for East Asian progress. Unfortunately, Asian market liberalization was incomplete, and we have much more work ahead to encourage further reform.
Trade is good for the U.S. economy, and more access to Asian markets would assist U.S. exports. We intend to step up our efforts through our trade compliance initiative approved by the Congress to ensure that our trading partners comply with their international trade obligation to reduce and eliminate unfair obstacles to exports from the United States.
On the political front, too, it is not hard to find the positive. The trends are clear. The development and consolidation of democratic governance in South Korea and the Philippines, Taiwan, Mongolia, Thailand and Indonesia is a profoundly important and positive trend. U.S. relations with our five Asian allies--Japan, South Korea, Australia, Thailand and the Philippines--are good. We also have excellent and important bilateral relations with Singapore.
We intend to nurture our key alliance relationships in the region and to make them even better. These are countries which share with us certain basic beliefs in democratic governance, open markets, the rule of law and human rights. Countries that share these beliefs tend to view the world around them and the events that fill it in similar ways.
Within the East Asia-Pacific region there is U.S. presence, diplomatic and military, which provides a crucial element of stability in a place that is undergoing such profound and dynamic change. The region faces continuing challenges to its economic and political stability and remains a place in which armed conflict could occur with little warning. That is not true of Europe, at least not on a large scale basis.
The region's overall stability and our own national interest depend in great measure on our own willingness and ability to maintain and apply successfully all dimensions of our regional presence. This allows us to play a key role as a regional balancer and security guarantor to allies. The United States is committed to continuing this role indefinitely. Overwhelmingly, the states of the region welcome and support our presence.
The U.S.-Japan alliance is the linchpin of U.S. security strategy in East Asia. Both nations have moved actively in recent years to update the framework and structure of joint cooperation and strengthen the bilateral relationship.
Over the next few years, we hope to build with Japan an enhanced strategic dialogue encompassing both economic and security issues, a dialogue built on the foundation of a wide range of beliefs and perspectives that we share with Japan and which tap the full potential of our alliance relationship.
We also look forward to working with Japan's new Prime Minister, Mr. Koizumi, who will meet with President Bush on June 30 at Camp David. During his early spring campaign for presidency of the Liberal Democratic party and since his election to that post and assumption of his duties as Prime Minister, Mr. Koizumi has placed considerable emphasis on reform, both economic and political.
A strong Japanese economy is critical to the regional and global economy, and we are prepared to do whatever we can to support Japan's structural and other reform efforts. We are especially encouraged by Mr. Koizumi's views on reforming and restructuring the economy, and we look forward to seeing more details on this when they emerge.
When Prime Minister Koizumi visits the President at Camp David on June 30, the leaders will announce, I expect, a new mechanism to promote mutual prosperity, and it will provide a broad framework to more effectively address the key issues--regular high level review of important bilateral and multilateral issues, new focus on Japan's financial sector, regulatory reform, openness to foreign investment and on sectoral and trade issues.
This year marks the one hundredth anniversary of the Australian Federation and the fiftieth anniversary of the U.S.-Australia alliance. As such, this is an appropriate time to be reminded that Australians and Americans have fought side by side in every war this past century. We continue to work together to promote shared values and common interests and to coordinate closely on all regional security issues.
More generally, enhanced relationships with friends and allies will strengthen our efforts to build stability not only in Northeast Asia, but also in Southeast Asia where we will continue to work closely with allies.
I would mention here that today is Independence Day for the Republic of the Philippines and that there is apparently some very sad news of the possible execution of an American hostage seized by terrorists in the western and southern part of the Philippines. The news is not clear, but this is another example of an American citizen being seriously mistreated.
In this case, of course, the government of the Philippines more than shares our concern. They are determined to do something about this serious problem, but the fact is that it remains a matter of very great concern for us. If this sad news is true, this would be something about which we would feel very seriously concerned, not to mention sympathetic for the family of the American citizen of Filipino ancestry who may well have suffered.
I would add that two additional American hostages are retained by these thugs and crooks, in addition to their being terrorists, and this is not an attractive situation.
I will move into another situation that is quite difficult, which is Indonesia. This country has experienced great turbulence since the onset of the Asian financial crisis. It is the fourth largest country in the world, and it is still Southeast Asia's largest economy. It will continue to confront a very difficult political and economic transition in this year and beyond.
U.S. support for Indonesia's transition to democracy is unwavering. We hope to see Indonesia achieve a timely resolution of the political crisis which now besets it, ideally in a way that promotes reconciliation and effective governance. Whatever the outcome, we are prepared to support any resolution that can be achieved through peaceful and constitutional means. It is difficult to exaggerate the importance for Indonesia's future of avoiding violence or incitement to violence.
Our engagement with Indonesia must be with a view to the long term. As outsiders, we can exert little influence over immediate events and daily crises. A reformed, but accountable, military is going to be vital if Indonesia's democracy is to prosper in the long term, and we will work to support those within and without the Indonesian military who are working for reform. Both by legislative restriction and by policy, full military relations will not be possible until the Indonesian military makes substantial progress.
Our task in dealing with the world's third largest democracy, a nation of 210 million people, is to assist, to facilitate and to provide support in these critical years as Indonesia works to establish the foundation for the institutions that will provide a lasting democratic and unitary nation with a transparent market economy. We want Indonesia to succeed, and we will do whatever we can to help it succeed.
If I may, I would turn briefly to U.S.-China relations. Our relationship with China is firmly grounded in pursuit of tangible U.S. national interests. We understand, and we believe that China also understands, that our relationship will have a profound impact on the security of East Asia. The U.S. seeks a constructive relationship with China that contributes to the promotion of our shared interest in peace, stability and prosperity in the region.
Recent events have called into question where we stand in our relationship with China and where we want to go. They have highlighted the importance, as was cited by the Ranking Member, of the remarks that Secretary Powell made earlier in which he said we do not view China as an enemy. We view it as a partner on some issues and a competitor for influence in the region and perhaps even an adversary on some of the issues very seriously mentioned to this Committee.
This is a very complex situation. It is in my view neither black nor white. It has various strands of gray. The trick for the Administration and the task which I have undertaken on behalf of the Secretary and the President is to try to work out a balanced relationship with China that holds it properly to account for things like human rights violations, recognizes the changes that are going on within China, both positive in terms of its economy and the openness of people day to day, with the contrasting restrictions on religious practice and some of the non-transparent developments of the People's Liberation Army, which are of considerable concern to us as well.
From promoting peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula to nonproliferation and to trade, we do share some common interests with China that are best served by a productive and forward looking relationship. Taiwan, of course, has been an important difference. Arms sales around the world and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are also important issues about which we have expressed concern to China.
We do support China's WTO entry as soon as China is ready to meet WTO standards and the breakthrough in negotiations between the Trade Representative, Ambassador Zellick, and his Chinese ministerial counterpart last weekend is something about in which the Congress will, I suspect, soon receive greater detail. Taiwan, of course, is also ready for membership in the WTO, and we expect both to enter, hopefully this year.
Last, but by no means least, I want to talk a little bit about Korean Peninsula issues. The U.S. and the Republic of Korea, of course, enjoy a very strong relationship across the board. Our security alliance remains strong. President Kim's historic June, 2000, summit with the north's Kim Jong Il raised the world's hopes that improved north/south relations could enhance the prospects for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.
The DPRK, however, continues to pose a military threat to the south, and the U.S. remains committed to its treaty obligation to assist in the defense of the Republic of Korea. President Kim has worked assiduously to strengthen the U.S.-ROK alliance through meetings with President Bush, Members of the Congress and Cabinet officials.
President Kim has made it clear both publicly and privately that a strong bilateral relationship will continue to be key to progress in north/south relations and a central element of the Republic of Korea's diplomatic and security strategy.
Our economic relationship with South Korea also remains vital. Korea quickly pulled out of the financial crisis of 1997 with GDP growth reaching 10 percent in 1999 and nine and a half percent in the year 2000. However, this resumption of growth masks an insolvent financial sector and some highly leveraged conglomerates, both of which could threaten Korean economic prospects, particularly as the economy slows to perhaps as slow as a projected 4 percent for this year.
Now, very importantly, the Administration has just last week completed a thorough, deliberate review of our North Korea policy. The President has directed us to undertake serious discussions with North Korea on a broad agenda, including improved implementation of the Agreed Framework, a verifiable end to the DPRK's missile production and export program, and a less threatening conventional military posture. We will thus be pursuing a comprehensive approach with North Korea.
If the DPRK takes positive actions to demonstrate the seriousness of its desires for improved relations, we will expand our efforts to help the North Korean people, ease sanctions, and perhaps take other political steps.
Now, several principles guided our thinking. First, as President Bush has made clear, we strongly support President Kim's reconciliation efforts with North Korea. Tension on the Korean Peninsula is ultimately an issue for the Koreans themselves to resolve, and any U.S.-North Korea contact should be and must be supportive of and consistent with north/south rapprochement.
Second, we will continue to implement our commitments under the Agreed Framework while looking for ways to better achieve our nonproliferation objectives. We expect North Korea to honor its commitment to that agreement as well, and we want to explore ways of improving the implementation of the Agreed Framework first, with allies and then with North Korea.
Third, our national security interests remain consistent. We want to see an end to the north's missile program and its proliferation activity. We also want to explore ways of reducing tension on the Korean Peninsula caused by confrontation of conventional forces. We are now prepared to enter serious discussions with the North Koreans to achieve these ends.
Fourth, effective verification will be a prerequisite for any agreements with North Korea.
Finally, continued close consultations among the U.S., the Republic of Korea and Japan are essential to maintaining a coordinated approach to North Korea. We have conducted two trilateral meetings with our allies this year.
Mr. Chairman, with your permission I would be pleased to address any further questions that you may have. Thank you again for this opportunity to come and represent the Administration and the State Department.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kelly follows:]
Mr. Chairman, thank you. I appreciate the opportunity you have offered me to testify before this subcommittee today. I am eager to do so; while it is almost trite to observe that change is a constant in East Asia and the Pacific, at the moment we are seeing more of it than usual, in some of the region's most important nations and on some of its most important issues.
Before I address these issues, Mr. Chairman, let me add a short foreword. A little over a month ago, I pledged in my confirmation statement before your colleagues on the Senate side that I intended to consult frequently and regularly with the Congress on matters of U.S. policy in East Asia and the Pacific. My pledge was directed to both the Senate and the House of Representatives.
This is my first opportunity as Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs to testify before the House, and it is wholly appropriate that it be before this distinguished subcommittee. Let me add that I had hoped to accomplish this earlier in my five-week tenure as Assistant Secretary. That I was unable to do so is not from want of opportunities offered by the subcommittee or, for that matter, from a strong desire on my part to accept them.
I spent most of the month of May in East Asia. Deputy Secretary Armitage and I were dispatched by the President to brief allies and others in the region on the President's concepts on transforming deterrence, including missile defense. I visited seven countries and used the opportunity of this mission to build associations with our colleagues in each country, men and women with whom we will work closely in the coming years, and to discuss a wide range of bilateral and regional issues with them.
After meetings in Singapore, I traveled to Beijing, both to articulate the logic of which the opportunities for missile defense are a part, and to listen carefully to Chinese perspectives on this subject. As in other capitals, I also had discussions on bilateral and regional issues with my Chinese hosts. From Beijing I traveled to Hanoi to participate in the Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) to prepare the way for the ASEAN Regional Forum Ministerial meetings in late July. The Hanoi visit was an especially useful opportunity to renew friendships and acquaintances with officials from many of the 23 countries participating in the SOM. I spent the last several days of a very busy month as I began it, in meetings about Korean Peninsula policies with our Japanese and Korean allies, the venue this time being the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group, which we call TCOG.
These personal relationships--contacts and friendships re-established or forged anew--will be invaluable as we craft and implement our policy in the region. The earlier they are established, in my view, the better. I have not yet completed this critical first round of introductory visits and will look for early opportunities to travel to the capitals in the region that I was unable to visit during this first trip.
Let me first offer you a broad look at the region, focused on general political, economic and security trends as we see them, our interests in the region and what we're doing to realize them. Having sketched out this ''scenesetter,'' we could move on to some specifics about our policy in China, including the cross-Strait relationship, Korea, and Indonesia. In keeping with my understanding of the subcommittee's interests on this particular occasion, I would like to focus on these areas today, possibly at the expense of offering you a more detailed overview in which every country in the region gets mentioned.
The overall picture of the Asia-Pacific region in 2001 is positive--guardedly. I have to add the word ''guardedly,'' because in a region as vast and diverse as East Asia and the Pacific, all trends could not possibly move in the same direction. There's a mixture--some of what we see is quite positive, some less so. Interestingly enough, though, there is not much that we see developing irretrievably in a distinctly negative direction.
Much of what we are seeing today--China's emergence as a regional and global power, Indonesia's ongoing efforts at democratic transformation, Japan's struggle with economic reform and the situation on the Korean Peninsula, to offer just a few examples--are tales in the telling. I would add the caution that our ability to influence events in these four areas varies widely. We are, nevertheless, pro-active on all of them, working hard to encourage the most positive outcomes.
The region's economy is no exception to this pattern. There's plenty on the positive side of the ledger. The East Asia and Pacific region is a place of enormous economic opportunity. The United States has enormous trade and economic interests in the region. It is our second largest trading partner after NAFTA, with nearly $500 billion in two-way trade--over a third of U.S. total trade. Just to cite a local example, the Port of Baltimore handles over $3 billion in two-way trade with East Asia every year, and about $2.5 billion in trade with Japan and China alone. Local or national, these are big numbers, and they reflect the fact that East Asia and the Pacific now accounts for over a quarter of the world's gross domestic product.
The region hosts some of the fastest growing economies and best markets for American products. The United States is working closely with countries in the region who share our views on trade liberalization, such as Singapore, with whom we are engaged in negotiations for a free trade agreement (FTA). The region provides millions of jobs to American workers and billions of dollars of income to American investors, from large institutional investors to individual owners of mutual funds. In addition, the flow of U.S.-sourced direct investment is enormous and is directly responsible for a large portion of our exports to the region. For example, in 1997, sales by U.S. affiliates in Japan were almost double export sales--$114 billion versus $65 billion. Bearing in mind that Japan has been relatively inhospitable to U.S. direct investment, this is still a startling figure. There have been dramatic increases over recent years in U.S. investment in Japan.
But there is a less encouraging side of the ledger. While most countries in the region have recovered at least partially from the devastating 1997-98 financial crisis, unresolved problems remain. In some of the larger economies, bad debt and corporate restructuring remain as significant areas of concern, especially in Japan and Korea. So, too, is the restructuring of China's financial and state-owned enterprises. More work needs to be done throughout the region on structural reform to ensure that sustainable growth is achievable.
The recovery from the financial crisis of 1997 was largely driven by the phenomenal growth of the American economy. We kept our markets open for East Asian products. Unfortunately, Asian market liberalization was incomplete and we have more work ahead of us to encourage further reform. Trade is good for the U.S. economy and more access to Asian markets would assist U.S. exports. We intend to step up our efforts, through our trade compliance initiative approved by the Congress, to ensure that our trading partners comply with their international trade obligations to reduce and eliminate unfair obstacles to exports from the United States.
As growth slows in the United States, so it will in Asia as well. That makes it all the more essential that countries in the region accelerate the pace of reform this year. That said, the region is clearly and significantly better off today than we could have imagined only a couple of years ago. If governments rededicate themselves to their commitments to economic reform, the chances are reasonably good that we will be able to say the same thing two years from now.
On the political front, too, it is not hard to find the positive. The trends are clear: the development and consolidation of democratic governance, in South Korea, the Philippines, Taiwan, Mongolia, Thailand, and Indonesia is a profoundly important and positive trend. U.S. relations with our five Asian allies, Japan, Korea, Australia, Thailand and the Philippines, are good. We also have excellent bilateral relations with Singapore.
We intend to nurture our key alliance relationships in the region and make them even better. These are countries which share with us certain basic beliefs in democratic governance, open markets, the rule of law, and human rights. Countries that share these beliefs tend to view the world around them and the events that fill it in similar ways.
The region is as diverse as it is vast. Technology and the communications revolution have given birth to a number of transnational interests among the Asia/Pacific states; yet its regional consciousness--a collective sense of identification and of common cause--remains relatively undeveloped and, far, far short of what Europe has achieved.
One consequence of this has been the absence of centripetal forces that Europe enjoys and that stem from the development of common strategic goals and objectives. I think over the longer term, more and more regional states will recognize and act on what they share in common, especially a lengthening tradition of democratic governance but also globalization, which increasingly will present the region with common challenges and opportunities.
The full effect of these trends is, for the most part, confined to the future, though perhaps not the very distant future. And, while we can be optimistic about the future, the present calls for a little more patience.
Today, the principal engines of regional coherence are multilateral organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. These, however, do not address security issues per se. Only recently, with the emergence of the ASEAN Regional Forum, called the ''ARF,'' has there been much regional attention paid to multilateral security cooperation on transnational problems such as smuggling, the environment, piracy, and conflicting territorial claims such as those in the South China Sea. And ARF is a limited forum, though one worth U.S. engagement and support. Progress both in deepening the debate on security issues and in sharpening its focus has been slow, but there has been progress.
The broader, regional political infrastructure that supports multilateral efforts to address these and other problems is undergoing profound change--beyond the democratization process I mentioned a moment ago.
In Northeast Asia, four major powers intersect. Three of them--China, Russia and Japan--are experiencing significant economic and political change. At the very heart of this intersection of powers, on the Korean Peninsula, there is important work being led by our ally, the Republic of Korea, toward the possibility of a dramatic change in the status quo. And in Southeast Asia, Indonesia's struggle to develop a functional democracy has diverted its attention away from its traditional leadership role in ASEAN. ASEAN, an important pillar of regional stability over the past three decades, recently expanded its membership to include the states of Indo-China as well as Burma, and as such has suffered a lack of focus. There are also potential flash points in the South China Sea and in the Taiwan Strait.
The U.S. presence, diplomatic and military, in the region provides a crucial element of stability in a region undergoing such profound and dynamic change. The region faces continuing challenges to its economic and political stability and remains a place in which armed conflict could occur with little warning.
The region's overall stability--and our own national interests--depend in great measure on our willingness and ability to maintain and apply successfully all dimensions of our regional presence. This allows us to play a key role as a regional balancer and security guarantor to allies. The United States is committed to continuing this role indefinitely. Overwhelmingly, the states of the region welcome and support our presence.
Today, in addition to 41 embassies and consulates from Sapporo in the north to Wellington in the south, the United States maintains about 100,000 forward-deployed military personnel in the region. Roughly half of these U.S. forces are stationed in Japan, and close to 40% are stationed in the ROK.
The U.S.-Japan alliance is the linchpin of U.S. security strategy in Asia. Both nations have moved actively in recent years to update the framework and structure of joint cooperation and strengthen the bilateral relationship. Over the next few years we hope to build with Japan an enhanced strategic dialogue encompassing both economic and security issues, a dialogue built on the foundation of the wide range of beliefs and perspectives we share with Japan and which taps the full potential of our alliance relationship.
We look forward to working with Japan's new Prime Minister, Junichiro Koizumi, who will meet with President Bush on June 30 at Camp David. During his early spring campaign for the presidency of the Liberal Democratic Party, and since his election to that post and assumption of his duties as Prime Minister, Mr. Koizumi has placed considerable emphasis on reform, both economic and political.
A strong Japanese economy is critical to the regional and global economy, and we are prepared to do whatever we can to support Japan's reform efforts. We are especially encouraged by Mr. Koizumi's views on reforming and restructuring the economy, and we look forward to seeing details as they emerge. These, of course, are up to the Japanese government to develop, but they will have to be convincing to the markets and the Japanese people. As I noted a bit earlier, restructuring and cleaning up the banking sector in Japan will provide long term benefits--not just to Japan but also to the global economy. Along with continued deregulation and restructuring, we think Japan's further opening to direct foreign investment will promote Japan's growth and strengthen our economic relationship. When Prime Minister Koizumi meets the President at Camp David June 30, the leaders will announce a new mechanism to promote mutual prosperity. It will provide a broad framework to more effectively address the key issues: regular high level review of important bilateral and multilateral issues, and new focus on Japan's financial sector, regulatory reform, openness to foreign investment, and on sectoral and trade issues.
We also place enormous value on our long and durable alliance relationship with the Republic of Korea, which I'll address in more detail in a moment.
This year marks the 100th year of the Australian federation and the 50th anniversary of the U.S.-Australian alliance. As such, this is an appropriate time to be reminded that Australians and Americans have fought side by side in every war this past century. We continue to work together to promote shared values and common interests and to coordinate closely on all regional security issues. President Bush will welcome Prime Minister Howard to Washington on September 10, 2001 in order to reaffirm the strength and vitality of the U.S. partnership with Australia.
More generally, enhanced relationships with friends and allies will strengthen our efforts to build stability not only in Northeast Asia, but also in Southeast Asia, where we will also continue to work closely with our allies Australia, Thailand and the Philippines, as well as with Singapore. Although not a treaty ally, we have a robust defense partnership with Singapore that facilitates our forward deployment and our overall strategy in the region. Southeast Asia is an area of growing economic and political importance, which has felt its share of the turbulence experienced by the region as a whole over the past few years.
Without question, the country that has experienced the greatest turbulence since the onset of the Asian financial crisis is Indonesia. Indonesia, the world's fourth largest country and still Southeast Asia's largest economy, will continue to confront a difficult political and economic transition in 2001 and beyond.
The United States' support for Indonesia's transition to democracy is unwavering. We hope to see Indonesia achieve a timely resolution of the political crisis, ideally in a way that promotes reconciliation and effective governance. Whatever the outcome, we are prepared to support any resolution that can be achieved through peaceful and constitutional means. It is difficult to exaggerate the importance for Indonesia's future of avoiding violence or incitements to violence.
Indonesia will remain a high priority for U.S. assistance programs. Our bilateral assistance is focused on the development of civil society and democratization, strengthening the rule of law, and civilian control over the military. We continue to work with locally-based NGOs on good governance, human rights, and conflict prevention and resolution. We also coordinate our aid with the international community to ensure the most leverage for our assistance. Indonesia's central government is in the process of devolving political and fiscal powers to the provinces. As devolution proceeds, we are shifting our police training programs, designed to teach human rights and non-violent crowd control techniques, to the provinces.
While Indonesia grapples with the profound complexities of creating a democracy, it is also engaged in transforming its economy and decentralizing political power. Each task by itself is daunting; together they guarantee that change will be incremental and complicated, with no simple blacks and whites. Indonesia is dealing with multiple crises: in its political leadership, its constitutional institutions, its budget, in civil society and rule of law, in seeking redress for violations of human rights, in the role of the military, and in basic questions of national identity.
We have urged all parties to the current crisis not to allow the political drama to distract the government from the necessity of addressing pressing economic issues which, if not dealt with now, will only present a greater threat to the government as it emerges from the crisis. In the face of political uncertainty and the lack of progress on economic reform, economic growth remains minimal. Rupiah depreciation and resulting higher interest rates further burden the nation.
Our engagement with Indonesia must be with a view to the long term. As outsiders, we can exert little influence over immediate events and daily crises. A reformed and accountable military is vital if Indonesia's democracy is to prosper in the long term. We will work to support those within and without the military who will work for reform. Both by legislative restriction and by policy, full military relations will not be possible until the Indonesian military makes substantial progress.
Our task, in dealing with the world's third largest democracy--a nation of 210 million people spread across an archipelago comprising thousands of islands dotting vital sea lanes--is to assist, to facilitate, and to provide support in these critical years as Indonesia works to establish the foundations for a lasting, democratic, and unitary nation with a transparent, market economy.
We want Indonesia to succeed, and we will do whatever we can to help it succeed.
Let me turn now to U.S.-China relations.
Our relationship with China is firmly grounded in pursuit of tangible U.S. national interests. We understand, and we believe China also understands, that our relationship will have a profound impact on the security of Asia. The United States seeks a constructive relationship with China that contributes to the promotion of our shared interests in peace, stability, and prosperity in the region.
Recent events have called into question where we stand in our relationship with China and where we want to go. They have highlighted the importance of not allowing our relationship to be damaged by miscommunication, mistrust, and misunderstanding about our respective intentions and objectives. We do not view China as an enemy. We view China as a partner on some issues and a competitor for influence in the region. The Secretary of State has been clear about our vision of this relationship, stating that ''China is a competitor and a potential regional rival, but also a trading partner willing to cooperate in the areas, such as Korea, where our strategic interests overlap. China is all of these things, but China is not an enemy and our challenge is to keep it that way.''
From promoting peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula to non-proliferation to trade, we share common interests with China that are best served by a productive--and forward-looking--relationship.
Clearly, we have some differences. Taiwan has long been one; human rights is another, particularly freedom of expression and freedom to express and practice one's personal faith. Arms sales around the world and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are also important issues about which we have expressed concern to China.
We have been, and will continue to be, clear and straightforward with China about our interests, including our commitment to peaceful resolution of differences with Taiwan, to the Taiwan Relations Act, and to freedom of navigation in international waters and airspace.
We want to work both with the current leadership and with the coming generation of leaders in China. We will hold China to its bilateral and international commitments. If China chooses to disregard its international obligations in areas as diverse as security issues, human rights, nonproliferation or trade, we will use every means available to the Administration to persuade it to move in more constructive directions.
The cutting edge of reform and positive social development in China is our trade relationship. We do have a significant trade deficit with China. In 1999, the deficit was $69 billion. In CY 2000, we exported $16 billion to China, but China exported $100 billion to the United States, leaving us with a net trade deficit with China of over $84 billion.
Nevertheless, our trade with China and our investment there are, without any doubt at all, in our interest. The marketplace promotes American values; trade encourages more freedom and individual liberties. U.S. investment establishes higher standards of enterprise behavior--in regard to corporate governance, labor relations, or even environmental attention. You can see that happening today in China, where trade and investment have led to greater openness and fewer government controls on day-to-day life, particularly in the coastal region most affected by international trade and investment.
We therefore support China's WTO entry as soon as China is ready to meet WTO standards. Taiwan is ready for entry now, and we expect both to enter the WTO.
For the same reasons, we look forward to China's hosting of this year's APEC summit in October. The President has said that he plans to go to Shanghai and Beijing in the fall. His presence at the APEC Leaders' Meeting will speak volumes about our commitment to market-oriented economic reform in China.
Beyond the Korean Peninsula, non-proliferation, and open markets, there are additional areas where we share interests with China and would like to see it continue or expand constructive policies. We want to build on cooperation against narcotics trafficking; China realizes that drugs are a threat to the Chinese people. We want to work with China to combat the spread of HIV/AIDS. And we will continue to work together where possible to protect the environment and promote sustainable development.
China is in a position to chart a mutually beneficial course for our future relationship. This Administration wants a productive relationship with Beijing that promotes our interests and those of the entire Asia-Pacific region. The ball is in the PRC's court. We encourage China to make responsible choices that reflect its stature in and obligations to the community of nations.
We will have to see how China deals with its own growth as a rising member of the community of nations and with the obligations and responsibilities that come with it. For our part, a productive relationship with China can only be based on a true reflection of our values, including human rights and religious freedom. These are our greatest strengths.
Turning to Taiwan, I think this Committee is quite familiar with our policy regarding cross-Strait issues. Let me say simply: the abiding interest of the United States is that differences be resolved peacefully. This interest lies behind the commitments undertaken in the three communiques, and it is at the heart of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA).
The PRC continues to deploy forces across the Taiwan Strait specifically aimed at Taiwan--and at U.S.--capabilities. Some have suggested that our commitment to assist Taiwan in maintaining a sufficient self-defense capability, as articulated in the TRA, is at odds with our commitments in the three communiques. I disagree. The President disagrees. The defensive systems that we provide Taiwan do not make the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait differences more difficult. On the contrary, they make such a resolution more likely. It is worth noting that Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian has repeatedly expressed his continuing commitment to cross-Strait dialogue in statements this Spring.
The central question is how cross-Strait relations can move from a focus on the military balance toward a focus on ways to begin resolving differences between Taipei and Beijing. It seems to me that the answer lies in three areas.
The first priority for the PRC and Taiwan ought to be the resumption of direct dialogue. Both have said they support such dialogue, and such dialogue between authorized representatives has taken place several times over the past decade, including the meeting in Singapore in 1993 and the meetings in Shanghai and Beijing in 1998. The United States does not have a formula for resolving cross-Strait differences, and we do not seek to play a role in this process. But we do have an abiding interest in seeing that the process is pursued only by peaceful means. The prospects are good for cross-Strait progress if the PRC has the political will to advance these important talks. The parties must be clear with regard to their actions in the area of the Strait to avoid any miscalculations--that is a start. But we would like to see not just a start but real accomplishments in cross-Strait dialogue.
Even while progress on political dialogue seems stalled, economic relations across the Strait are growing exponentially. Taiwan businessmen have invested billions of dollars in the PRC. Annual cross-Strait trade is estimated to be approximately $32 billion. There were over two million visits from Taiwan to the PRC last year. Thousands of Taiwan businessmen and their families live and work in the PRC. Revenues generated by these businesses are fueling the growth of a wide range of Taiwan businesses. Taiwan is also taking initial steps to open its market to businesses from the PRC. The entry of both the PRC and Taiwan into the WTO may well accelerate the economic cooperation between the two sides.
The third area I would highlight is what I would call mutual understanding. Both sides need to have a better understanding of the other side and what it seeks from a closer relationship. In particular, we have urged the PRC to shift from seeking to put pressure on--even intimidate--Taiwan and instead appeal to the people of Taiwan. Beijing needs to explain to Taiwan the benefits of a closer relationship rather than the perils of a more distant one.
This is part of the challenge in working with a democracy. The PRC can not ignore the elected representatives of the people of Taiwan if cross-Strait dialogue is to resume and be revitalized. Instead, it must offer a case that is attractive to a democratically elected leadership.
A combination of political dialogue, economic cooperation and mutual understanding offers the prospect that both sides will find they have increased interests in common and therefore increasing reasons to find practical ways to resolve their differences.
A key provision of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), to which the United States remains committed, requires that the United States ensure that Taiwan has sufficient self-defense capability. We believe the TRA is working well.
Let me conclude with some remarks about the situation on the Korean Peninsula.
The United States and the Republic of Korea enjoy a strong relationship across-the-board. This relationship has grown warmer as democracy has taken root in the ROK. Kim Dae-jung's push for further democratization has been a hallmark of his presidency. We strongly support this effort and believe President Kim's successes will strengthen stability and prosperity not only on the Korean Peninsula, but also throughout the region.
Our security alliance remains strong. President Kim's historic June 2000 summit with the North's Kim Jong Il raised the world's hopes that improved North-South relations could enhance the prospects for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. The DPRK nevertheless continues to pose a military threat to the South, and the United States remains committed to its treaty obligations to assist in the defense of the ROK.
President Kim has worked assiduously to strengthen the U.S.-ROK alliance through meetings with President Bush, members of Congress, and cabinet officials. He has made it clear both publicly and privately that a strong bilateral relationship will continue to be key to progress in North-South relations and the central element of ROK diplomatic and security strategy. President Kim has also stated that, should reconciliation on the Peninsula be realized, a U.S. military presence on the Peninsula would still be needed--an idea he has underlined in his talks with Kim Jong Il in Pyongyang last summer.
Our economic relationship with the ROK also remains vital. Korea quickly pulled out of the financial crisis of 1997 with GDP growth reaching 10% in 1999 and 9.3% in 2000. However, this resumption of growth masks an insolvent financial sector and highly leveraged conglomerates, both of which could threaten Korean economic prospects, particularly as the economy slows to a projected 4 percent this year. During the past year, the ROK has moved slowly to act on President Kim's plans for corporate restructuring and financial sector reforms to ensure continued economic growth and stability. The challenge for the ROK government is to change its traditional interventionist policy and allow market discipline freer play. We are working with the ROK and with American industry to address specific trade issues with Korea, including trade in steel, beef, and automobiles, as well as broader issues related to the protection of U.S. intellectual property.
The Administration has just completed a thorough, deliberate review of our North Korea policy. The President has directed us to undertake serious discussions with North Korea on a broad agenda, including improved implementation of the Agreed Framework, a verifiable end to the DPRK's missile production and export programs, and a less threatening conventional military posture. We will thus be pursuing a comprehensive approach to North Korea.
If the DPRK takes positive actions to demonstrate the seriousness of its desire for improved relations, we will expand our efforts to help the North Korean people, ease sanctions, and take other political steps.
Several principles guided our thinking. First, as President Bush has made clear, we strongly support President Kim's reconciliation efforts with North Korea. Tension on the Korean Peninsula is ultimately an issue for the Koreans themselves to resolve, and any U.S.-DPRK contacts should be supportive of and consonant with North-South rapprochement.
Second, we will continue to implement our commitments under the Agreed Framework while looking for ways to better achieve our non-proliferation objectives. We want to explore ways of improving implementation of the Agreed Framework, first with our allies and then with North Korea.
Third, our national security interests remain consistent: we want to see an end to the North's missile program and its proliferation activity. We also want to explore ways of reducing tensions on the Korean Peninsula caused by conventional deployments. We are now prepared to enter serious discussions with the North Koreans to achieve these ends.
Fourth, effective verification will be a prerequisite for any agreements with North Korea.
Finally, continued, close consultations among the United States, the ROK, and Japan are essential to maintaining a coordinated approach to North Korea. We have conducted two trilateral meetings with our allies this year, one, in Honolulu, just last week. The Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) is designed to ensure that cooperation among the United States, Japan, and South Korea on Korean Peninsula issues functions as smoothly as possible.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I have tried today to provide both a broad overview of the region and a more detailed perspective on the challenges and priorities we face in several key relationships there. Mr. Chairman, I would be pleased to address any issues you and the Members of the subcommittee might care to raise.
Let me also express my thanks once again to you and the subcommittee for the opportunity to testify today, and my strong interest in continued close cooperation with you, the subcommittee, and the full committee.
QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO ASSISTANT SECRETARY JAMES A. KELLY BY THE HONORABLE JAMES A. LEACH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF IOWA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
Question: What areas of the Agreed Framework need ''improved implementation?''
Answer:
Our policy offers North Korea the opportunity to demonstrate the seriousness of its desire for improved relations.
One important area where the DPRK could convey that seriousness would be in renewing its efforts to cooperate with the IAEA, as soon as possible.
As you know the Agreed Framework calls for the DPRK to come into full compliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement before the delivery of Light Water Reactor (LWR) key nuclear components can occur.
Although that date is in the future, work should begin as soon as possible in areas the IAEA and the DPRK have discussed in their safeguards meetings. Otherwise completion of the LWRs will be delayed.
The DPRK's cooperation with the IAEA is central to successful implementation of the Agreed Framework in the coming years, and a prerequisite for completion of the LWR Project.
The Agreed Framework also requires the DPRK to remove its spent nuclear fuel from the country. An agreement on a timetable and mechanism for spent fuel removal would constitute an element of improved implementation.
Question: Do the linkages and milestones for normalization of relations between the U.S. and North Korea that were laid out in the ''Perry Report'' still reflect U.S. policy? If not, why not?
Answer:
The Perry Report recommended a two-path strategy focused on our priority concerns over the DPRK's nuclear weapons- and missile-related activities. It noted that ''[i]f the DPRK moved to eliminate its nuclear and long-range missile threats, the United States would normalize relations with the DPRK, relax sanctions that have long constrained trade with the DPRK and take other positive steps that would provide opportunities for the DPRK.''
Our Administration has broadened our agenda, which includes improved implementation of the Agreed Framework, verifiable constraints on North.Korea's missile programs and a ban on its missile exports, and the North's conventional military posture. Appropriate action by Pyongyang would lead us to expand our efforts to help the North Korean people, ease sanctions, and take other political steps. We have not specifically offered the normalization of relations, but such a move could be considered if warranted by North Korea's actions.
Question: Will the Administration provide Congress with a classified and/or unclassified ''roadmap'' for normalization of relations with North Korea? If so, when? If not, why not?
Answer:
This Administration recognizes the importance of working closely with the Congress in crafting successful foreign policy initiatives. We intend to hold frequent consultations and briefings with interested members and staff on the progress of our discussions with North Korea.
The President's June 6 statement on our North Korea policy review provided an outline of our key goals, stating that if North Korea responds positively and takes appropriate action on missile, nuclear, and conventional forces issues, we will expand our efforts to help the North Korean people, ease sanctions, and take other political steps.
We have not yet developed a detailed roadmap, but we will gladly brief the Congress on its provisions when we do.
Question: In the past, South Korean President Kim Dae-jung has proposed a ''package deal'' approach to North Korea which ties together North Korean compliance with the Agreed Framework with food and economic aid, an end to the U.S. economic embargo, and normalized relations between Pyongyang and both Washington and Tokyo. Does the U.S. have a comparable package deal as part of its ''comprehensive'' approach to North Korea?
Answer:
The President has said that if North Korea responds positively and takes appropriate action on missile, nuclear, and conventional forces issues, we will expand our efforts to help the North Korean people, ease sanctions, and take other political steps.
We continue to abide by our commitments under the Agreed Framework and we expect North Korea will do the same.
We are prepared to enter serious discussions with the DPRK on a comprehensive approach to a fundamentally changed bilateral relationship.
On food assistance specifically, we are currently providing North Korea only with humanitarian food assistance. This assistance is in response to the World Food Program's appeal. We have not linked humanitarian food assistance to other political steps by North Korea.
We will continue to coordinate our North Korea policy with South Korea, Japan, and other friends and allies.
Question: The curtailment of North Korea's missile program is one of the major, announced priorities of the Administration's recently unveiled North Korea policy. As between the major components of the goal of reducing North Korea's ballistic missile threat--missile development, internal deployment, and foreign export--which is the most important? Which is the most verifiable? And how does the Administration intend to integrate these missile-related priorities to the other emphases of its new policy, such as conventional force reduction and improved implementation of the Agreed Framework?
Answer:
North Korea's indigenous missile program (i.e., production, development, and deployment) and its related exports threaten the U.S., and our friends, forces, and allies. We believe each of these threats needs to be addressed.
As the President said, we are seeking serious discussions with North Korea on a broad agenda, including verifiable constraints on North Korean missile programs and a verifiable ban on its missile exports. We will pursue these discussions in the context of a broad approach. We will encourage progress in all areas, including on Agreed Framework and conventional forces issues.
President Bush has made clear that any agreement with North Korea would have verification at its core. However, the standards and requirements for verification would depend largely on the details of particular agreements. At this stage, it would be premature to specify or rank-order verification measures for hypothetical deals.
Question: What is that status of the so-called Four Party Talks among South and North Korea, the U.S. and China? As I understand it, the express purpose of those talks was ''to initiate a process aimed at achieving a permanent peace agreement.'' If the Four Party Talks are no longer useful, by what mechanism will a permanent peace agreement on the Korean Peninsula come about?
Answer:
The Four Party Talks structure brought the United States, South Korea, China and North Korea together for six rounds of intensive discussions on a wide range of security issues at a time when North-South contacts were moribund.
The talks have not reconvened since August 1999.
The Four Party process did not bring any significant breakthroughs in the search for a permanent peace. However, it did serve as an important avenue for North-South contact until the June 2000 inter-Korean summit.
One key focus of the Four Party process was on diminishing the conventional security threat on the peninsula and instituting military confidence building measures. Our North Korea policy now envisions pursuing those concerns in our bilateral dialogue with the DPRK, and South Korea has stated its intent to address these concerns in its discussions with North Korea.
However, we continue to believe that a four-party dialogue mechanism bringing together the United States, China and the two Koreas could, at the appropriate time, serve a valuable role in creating a permanent peace mechanism on the Korean Peninsula.
Question: Should U.S. humanitarian assistance to North Korea be conditional or unconditional on progress toward ''comprehensive engagement'' with Pyongyang?
Answer:
Since 1996, the U.S. has provided humanitarian food assistance to help alleviate starvation in North Korea. This assistance has been provided in response to appeals by the World Food Program (WFP), which monitors the assistance's distribution and seeks to ensure it is provided to targeted segments of the population.
We will continue our policy of providing humanitarian food assistance in response to international appeals based on humanitarian need without conditioning such aid. This Administration already has provided 100,000 metric tons of food aid to the WFP for North Korea.
Question: Is human rights both inside North Korea and for the growing number of North Korean refugees in China a priority for this Administration? Will human rights be on the table in the renewed engagement with the North Koreans, even if they find the topic distasteful?
Answer:
Human rights are a priority for the Administration.
We will make clear to the North Korean government our strong interest in respect for human rights. We also will continue to make our views clear through such publications as our Country Report on Human Rights Practices and our Report on International Religious Freedom.
In China, we are working closely with the UNHCR, both as a donor and as a partner, to try to ensure that the needs of North Korean asylum seekers are met. We support the position of the High Commissioner against refoulement.
Question: Is the Administration pursuing an ''engage and hedge'' policy toward China, one that preserves the hopeful potential of an engagement policy while hedging against the possible inability of the United States to avert a future Chinese challenge to U.S. interests and objectives?
Answer:
The U.S. seeks constructive relations with China while working closely with our friends in the region to promote peace and prosperity. China is our competitor in some areas, and we have shared interests in others, but is not our enemy, and should not view us as an enemy. China's leaders should understand, however, that our desire for constructive relations does not mean that we will ignore our security interests in the region.
Question: In what ways does China's competition for influence, or ''rivalry'' with the United States in East Asia threaten U.S. interests? To the extent U.S. interests are threatened, please specify precisely those interests that are jeopardized.
Answer:
Our relationship with China in the Asia-Pacific region has elements of cooperation as well as competition. In the latter instance, where Chinese actions are not consistent with international law and practice and where important U.S. interests are at stake, we have made our views clear to the Chinese and to other countries in the region. However, we welcome improvement in China's relations with countries such as India or Thailand. To the extent these relations reduce regional tensions, they also support our interest in a peaceful, secure Asia-Pacific region.
Question: Is China fully cooperating with the U.S. and the UN in fully implementing the UN Sanctions against Iraq?
Answer:
We have strongly conveyed our concerns about the activities of Chinese companies in Iraq. The Chinese told us that they are committed to enforcement of the UN's controls on Iraq and have taken the required actions to stop or prevent violations. We were pleased that we and the Chinese agreed to a new list of goods to be reviewed before export to Iraq. The Chinese are aware that illegal exports, especially as they might affect Iraq's command and control capabilities, will damage Sino-U.S. relations.
Senior U.S. officials in Washington and Beijing have called on Chinese officials, including Vice Premier Qian Qichen during his March visit to the United States, to make sure that PRC firms adhere scrupulously to relevant UNSC resolutions. They appear to have taken necessary steps in response to our concerns and we continue to monitor the situation.
Question: On balance, would Congressional passage of H. Con. Res. 73, expressing the sense of Congress that the 2008 Olympic Games should not be held in Beijing, be helpful or hurtful to the development of stable, constructive Sino-American relations? Does the Administration have a position on this resolution?
Answer:
The State Department does not support H. Con. Res. 73. The U.S. government plays no role in the International Olympic Committee's selection process for the host city of the 2008 Games and takes no position on any of the five candidate cities. However, we do share the concerns of those in Congress about China's poor human rights record and support calls by the international community for immediate improvement.
If the International Olympic Committee chooses Beijing, China's desire to hold a successful Olympiad will provide the international community with important leverage with which to press China to take steps to bring its human rights practices into compliance with international norms. We also believe that a Congressional resolution opposing Beijing's bid would likely elicit widespread anti-American sentiment among the Chinese people.
Question: Does the Administration have a position on H.R. 1779, the Tibetan Policy Act of 2001?
Answer:
The State Department does not support H.R. 1779, which raises a number of constitutional concerns while simultaneously raising political problems. For example, the U.S. government recognizes Tibet as a part of China, and we oppose funding earmarks and language that would encroach on the President's constitutional authority to conduct foreign policy. However, we do support the intent of the legislation and share the concerns of those in Congress about China's continuing human rights abuses and violations of religious freedom in Tibet and note that the U.S. government is already implementing many of the measures called for in this bill. Working with Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs Paula Dobriansky, the new Special Coordinator for Tibet, I will continue to raise these issues with the Chinese and press them to start talks with the Dalai Lama and preserve Tibet's unique cultural, religious, and linguistic heritage.
Question: Is the U.S. commitment to Taiwan's security conditional or unconditional?
Answer:
It is, as was stated in the Taiwan Relations Act, ''the policy of the United States to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means to be a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.''
We have furthermore insisted to the PRC that any resolution of the Taiwan question must be acceptable to the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.
Beyond that, I do not wish to address hypothetical scenarios. The range of circumstances that might develop on either or both sides of the Taiwan Strait is too large.
Question: During his summit visit to China in June 1998, President Clinton made statements about Taiwan that some interpreted as being a change in U.S. policy. According to a White House transcript of his remarks during a roundtable discussion in Shanghai on June 30, 1998, President Clinton said in response to a question about Taiwan: ''I had a chance to reiterate our Taiwan policy, which is that we don't support independence for Taiwan, or two Chinas, or one Taiwan-one China. And we don't believe that Taiwan should be a member in any organization for which statehood is a requirement.'' Does this statement still reflect U.S. policy?
Answer:
The United States continues to abide by our one China policy, as spelled out in the three US-PRC communiques and the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). In that context, the United States does not support or encourage Taiwan to seek independence. Rather, our abiding interest remains the peaceful. resolution of differences between the two sides, and we support resumption of cross-Strait dialogue as the best way to peaceful resolution.
The Administration has been active in supporting Taiwan's participation in international organizations where possible and where statehood is not a criteria for membership. The Congress has asked that the President report on these efforts every six months. The next report will be delivered soon.
Question: Has the Administration been able to secure the means to produce the eight diesel-powered submarines the United States offered to Taiwan in late April? Can we deliver the submarines to Taipei without securing the cooperation of a third country? If we cannot deliver the submarines, will the Administration reconsider its postponement of a decision on the Aegis battle radar systems or offer of other military sales?
Answer:
The U.S. approval of Taiwan's April request for diesel-electric submarines was in earnest. We have made a good and energetic start with the interagency group to determine how to carry this program out.
The U.S. approval in April was to support Taiwan's acquisition of diesel-electric submarines, not for any specific model. We are currently in the process of examining all the possibilities.
Apart from our stipulation that the U.S. provision of submarines should be ''conditional upon Taiwan investing to develop a layered, integrated approach to anti-submarine warfare'', there was no linkage in the April Talks between subs and any other specific weapons system. We consider each weapons system on its own merits and, in accordance with the TRA, independent of all considerations other than Taiwan's security needs.
Question: Has the United States decided to end its annual review of Taiwan arms sales? If so, why? Will the Administration continue to consult closely with Congress on Taiwan's defense needs?
Answer:
The arms talks, which have been held each year since 1981, began as a means to fulfill American Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) responsibilities at a time of uncertainty for Taiwan. In recent years, the talks have become an annual occasion for speculation from industry and the press and criticism from the People's Republic of China (PRC) and its friends and allies. The result has all too often been distortion before the world of U.S. policy on the PRC and Taiwan and heightened tensions between the United States and the PRC.
In addition, the talks, which have traditionally been held each April, have forced an artificial deadline on USG decisionmaking with regard to arms sales to Taiwan. No other U.S. arms sales abroad, including to our closest friends and allies, carry such a built-in, self-imposed timeline.
The President expressed in April his commitment to fundamentally change the Taiwan arms talks process. We told the Taiwan delegation on April 24 that we wished to consider moving to ''a normal, routine consideration of Taiwan requests'' similar to that used worldwide.
As we have assured the Taiwan authorities many times, the Administration's decision to seek a more normal approach in arms sales to Taiwan does not reflect any desire to reduce the opportunities for high-level interaction between U.S. and Taiwan military and national security leaders. On the contrary, we think such interaction can serve valuable ends and should and will be maintained. Any changes to the structure of the arms talks would include the continuation of such interaction.
The United States has an abiding interest in the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait differences. The Administration remains committed to make available defense articles and services to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability, as provided in the TRA. We regularly consult with Taiwan on its defense requirements and will continue to do so. The Administration also remains eager to continue periodic consultations with the Congress and will carefully consider your views on how best to provide for Taiwan's self-defense needs.
Question: The annual donor conference for Cambodia will take place in Tokyo on June 11-14, hosted by the World Bank. What issues do you think are important to highlight at this meeting with the Cambodian Government? Does the Administration favor increased U.S. funding for NGOs providing humanitarian and other activities in Cambodia?
Answer:
At the June 11-14 Consultative Group meeting in Tokyo, donors highlighted the slow pace of governance reform. Needed reforms include judicial and legal reform, public administration reform, improving tax and customs administration, anti-corruption measures, and the establishment of a tribunal to try former leaders of the Khmer Rouge. The donors proposed a number of specific actions or benchmarks in these areas. Prime Minister Hun Sen's opening statement recognized that ''good governance is the backbone'' of the reform process.
The United States pledged increased funding for Cambodian humanitarian assistance and support for democracy and human rights, totaling $40.1 million for FY 2002. This includes $7 million for reproductive and child health, $18 million for good governance and human rights, $1.4 million for aid to war victims and humanitarian assistance, $11.5 million for an HIV/AIDS program, and $2.225 million for humanitarian de-mining. All USG assistance will be channeled through NGO's, with the exception of some HIV/AIDS assistance, rather than through the Cambodian Government.
Question: According to the official Indonesia media Center Registrasi, the recent registration effort of East Timorese refugees in West Timor identified over 194,000 such refugees, approximately 98 percent of whom chose resettlement within Indonesia. To what extent did that registration result in an accurate assessment of refugee intent? More specifically:
Does the Department believe that the number of total East Timorese refugees in West Timor is accurate. Has the Department received reports that non-refugees were paid to vote in the registration?
Does the Department believe that some refugees were threatened with kidnapping or murder if they chose repatriation to East Timor? If such intimidation occurred, how widespread was it?
Was there an active disinformation campaign regarding the situation in East Timor aimed at the refugees prior to the registration?
What role does the Administration expect the United States to play in East Timor after independence? What plans are being made for an international presence in East Timor after UNTAET's mandate expires in January 2002?
Answer:
All international humanitarian assistance workers were evacuated from West Timor after East Timorese militia members murdered three UN High Commission for Refugees staff in Atambua in September 2000. For security reasons, our Embassy in Jakarta has not been in a position to send representatives to West Timor since that time. Therefore, the Department has no first-hand information upon which to estimate the number of East Timorese refugees in West Timor. Estimates from other sources ranged from a low of 50,000 to a high of 130,000. Indonesian government planners before the registration had estimated the number of displaced persons at about 130,000, including former civil servants of the Indonesian administration in East Timor, those associated with Indonesian security forces, and East Timorese. However, registrations exceeded 295,000. The Department has no reports that persons who were non-refugees were paid to vote.
There were disturbing reports of intimidation and confusion related to the registration process and questions have been raised about the validity of the results. Ten countries, the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor, and the International Organization for Migration sent a representative each to observe the registration. The observers were able to travel but visited fewer than half of the over 400 registration sites, which severely limited the effectiveness of the monitoring process. As a result, we feel the registration exercise was seriously flawed.
The government of Indonesia, with UN High Commission for Refugees technical and financial assistance, engaged in a multimedia information campaign targeting refugee and local community leaders with a balanced message regarding the local settlement and repatriation options. However, there were press reports that many persons in West Timor complained they did not understand the two choices before them and that local authorities had not clarified when they would be repatriated to East Timor if they so opted, or what would happen to them if they chose to remain in Indonesia. Observers who monitored the registration say that the Indonesian campaign to inform refugees about the registration effort was only marginally successful and that often the government's message was successfully countermanded by UNTAS, the militia political organization.
The United States expects to engage in an active and supportive bilateral relationship with East Timor after independence. We anticipate a UN peacekeeping mission to follow-on to UNTAET after independence although the size and tasks are not yet defined. Discussions are underway within the Administration and the UN, with other donors and with the East Timorese about the role of the international community after independence, with the Secretary-General to make recommendations at the end of July.
Question: Will the Administration continue to insist that the Indonesian military meet the statutory requirements of the ''Leahy Amendment'' (regarding human rights and military accountability) before it resumes military assistance to Indonesia? Has Indonesia yet met any of those requirements? What is the current state of U.S. military-to-military contacts with Indonesia, and does the Administration have plans to change those contacts?
Answer:
We will continue to implement Leahy amendment restrictions on military-to-military ties with Indonesia. Resumption of military cooperation will depend on the government of Indonesia's meeting the benchmarks set out in the legislation regarding accountability by the Armed Forces (TNI) for human rights abuses and adherence to the rule of law. TNI must be held to international standards for democratic, civilian-controlled militaries.
To date, the GOI has not met the requirements of the Leahy amendment in pursuing accountability for human rights abuses by the TNI in East Timor or elsewhere. However, there have been some steps taken by the GOI and TNI that indicate that there are persons within both institutions who would like to pursue professionalization and reform of the military. For instance, the police have been separated from the military, a civilian was appointed Defense Minister, and the TNI and police have refused to take sides in the current political crisis.
The TNI remains a crucial national institution with a capacity to foster as well as undermine Indonesian unity. It is important that we not ignore TNI as we assist Indonesia with its difficult democratic transition, as military reform is critical to our overall objectives with Indonesia. Therefore, we plan to continue modest-level interactions with TNI, completely within the parameters of existing legislation. These interactions will be on a more routine basis and in areas that support U.S. policy objectives as well as that hold the promise of being able to influence TNI in positive directions.
Many of these activities are not new. We will continue to interact with TNI through multilateral conferences and exercises, defense policy/military visits, subject matter experts exchanges, and educational exchanges. Expanded activities, such as bilateral conferences, high-level visits, port visits and operational contacts in areas oriented toward disaster relief, humanitarian assistance and external security, will be considered on a case-by-case basis and only as Indonesian Government and TNI actions warrant.
We are aware of the need to avoid sending the wrong signal through our military-to-military relations. We engage in these activities to further our national interests consistent with reform and civilian control of the military. We will continue to make clear to the TNI and GOI that a return to normal mil-mil relation would require meeting the conditions outlined in the Leahy Amendment.
In the future, depending on developments in Indonesia, we will review allowing additional defense trade ''carve-outs'' for commercial sales on a case-by-case basis of non-lethal defense articles. We will consult with the Congress on the details, which we are in the process of determining. We will make clear to the GOI and the TNI that any increase in the levels or types of activities will require clear progress on reform, most notably in the area of accountability. These activities and interactions are not a signal that we have abandoned the goal of accountability for human rights violations committed in East Timor. Nothing covered under the Leahy amendment is available, including IMET.
Question: You state in your testimony that the U.S. hopes to build an ''enhanced strategic dialogue'' with Japan. What are the economic, political, and security elements of the dialogue?
Answer:
At their June 30 Summit, President Bush and Prime Minister Koizumi announced the U.S.-Japan Partnership for Security and Prosperity. They decided to intensify foreign policy consultations on the Asia-Pacific region and other areas of the world. Our security dialogue will focus on the regional security environment, force structure, force posture, security strategies, bilateral roles and missions during contingencies, and cooperation in peacekeeping. On the economic side, this initiative establishes a structure for cooperation and engagement on bilateral, regional, and global economic and trade issues.
Question: Does the Administration favor Japan's full participation in peacekeeping and humanitarian relief missions? Does the Administration support the removal of Diet restraints on Japan's current participation in peacekeeping and humanitarian activities?
Answer:
The Administration welcomes Japan's participation in peacekeeping and humanitarian relief efforts. As you know, Japanese participation in peacekeeping is politically sensitive and restricted to some extent by constitutional interpretation. The extent of Japanese participation in peacekeeping operations and whether the Diet would authorize greater Japanese participation than it has in the past are internal Japanese matters. Japan is not restrained legally or constitutionally from participating in humanitarian operations. The Japanese Government is a major contributor to international humanitarian assistance organizations, and Japanese humanitarian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are active in many humanitarian crises around the world.
Question: Does the Administration support the development in Japan of a military force structure that has the characteristics of versatility, mobility, flexibility, diversity, and survivability?
Answer:
The U.S.-Japan security alliance is the cornerstone of U.S. security policy in the Asia-Pacific. Accordingly, the U.S. is interested in close consultation with Japan on a host of security issues including force structure. Nonetheless, the size and shape of Japanese forces are matters for Japan to decide.
Question: Does the Administration favor Japan expanding its security horizons beyond territorial defense?
Answer:
Japan's current interpretation of its constitution limits its security posture to self-defense. Whether Japan chooses to redefine its security horizons is ultimately a matter for it to decide.
Question: Does the Administration support efforts to revise Article 9 of the Japanese constitution, which among other things renounces war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes?
Answer:
Whether or not to amend Japan's constitution is an issue for the Japanese people to decide.
Question: Given the ongoing schoolbook textbook controversy in Japan and all that it symbolizes, would other countries in the region generally support or oppose a greater security role for Japan in the Asia-Pacific at this time?
Answer:
Most countries in the region support Japan's security role which focuses on its self-defense and is consistent with Japan's constitution. Over the past 50 years of the U.S.-Japan alliance, Japan has demonstrated its firm commitment to peace and stability in the region.
Question: Please describe Administration policy toward Burma and what efforts the U.S. is making to coordinate policy with our friends in East Asia as well as the European Union?
Answer:
U.S. policy toward Burma is based on support for democracy, human rights, including worker rights, and improved counternarcotics efforts. We work closely with the UN, the ILO, key Asian and European partners, and Aung San Suu Kyi and the democratic opposition to formulate policy decisions. Most recently, the U.S. in late June met with delegations from 12 other Asian and European countries at the UN to consider how best to support UN Special Envoy Razali and facilitate the dialogue between Aung San Suu Kyi and the Burmese regime.
Question: Does the Administration have a position on S. 926, a bill to prohibit the importation of any article that is produced, manufactured, or grown in Burma?
Answer:
The U.S. already has the strongest set of sanctions in place against Burma of any country in the world, including a ban on new U.S. investment, a ban on assistance to the Burma regime, denial of OPIC and GSP benefits, and a visa ban on senior Burmese officials. We are closely monitoring developments in the ongoing dialogue between Aung San Suu Kyi and the Burmese Government. We have not ruled out any options at this time.
Question: Some Members have raised questions about the timing of going forward with the Bilateral Trade Agreement with Vietnam at a time when the Vietnamese government has increased religious freedom and human rights violations, placing Buddhist leader Thich Quang Do under house arrest, arresting a Catholic priest, and burning Christian churches in the Central Highlands. Please Comment.
Answer:
The Administration shares these concerns about the human rights situation in Vietnam; it is a constant theme in our diplomatic interaction with Vietnam's government. Both publicly and privately, Department officials have called for release of detained religious leaders' and for unrestricted access for U.S. diplomats to visit the Central Highlands to look into allegations of human rights abuses there. Ambassador Peterson is scheduled to visit the Central Highlands July 5-10, and we are in the process of scheduling the 2001 Annual Human Rights Dialogue, where we expect to have another in a series of frank discussion on all issues of concern.
Over time, our direct engagement with Vietnam on human rights has yielded positive results. Vietnam is a more open society now than it was ten years ago. A number of political prisoners have been released from jail, although some remain under house arrest. In principle,,individual Vietnamese members of legally authorized religious organizations have the right to worship freely, and the number of legally authorized religious organizations is slowly growing, but the Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam and some Protestant organizations remain illegal. Tolerance of freedom of expression is growing. Some criticism of the government is accepted, but some individuals, including Father Ly, have been imprisoned for doing so. Workers rights have expanded although workers do not have the right of association and the right to organize and bargain collectively. So, much still needs to be done, and therefore improvement of human rights will remain a vital part of our engagement with Vietnam.
The President sent the U.S.-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA) to Congress because the BTA advances our foreign and trade policy objectives in Vietnam. The BTA, the most comprehensive trade agreement ever negotiated with a non-market economy, will open Vietnam's markets to American businesses, creating jobs for American citizens. The BTA binds Vietnam to an unprecedented array of reform commitments, including tariff reductions for key U.S. exports, elimination of non-tariff barriers on most products, adoption of WTO-consistent protection for intellectual property rights, market access for American service industries, and protections for American investors. Additionally, Vietnam committed to grant its citizens trade and distribution rights and to implement important transparency mechanisms that will promote the rule of law. Many of these reforms, such as those in the BTA's Transparency Chapter, must be implemented immediately after the BTA enters into force. Others are phased-in over time. Clearly, implementation of these reforms sooner rather than later is in the U.S.'s interest.
The Administration believes that these broad changes in Vietnam's legal system, once implemented, will open Vietnam to the global economy, expanding jobs and income for Vietnam's people. Expanded economic activity in a rules-based environment can foster stronger civic institutions, transparency in government and judicial decision-making, and lead to a greater degree of individual freedoms. A more open and prosperous Vietnam will be more inclined to contribute positively to the security and stability of South East Asia, as well as demand more U.S. goods and services.
The BTA's entry into force completes the normalization process that has spanned four Administrations. We believe completion of that process will facilitate important bilateral engagement on other issues of concern, such as POW/MIA accounting, our highest foreign policy priority with Vietnam and the issue with which we began the long road to normalization.
Question: In what ways could the bilateral dialogue on human rights with Vietnam be enhanced so as to produce tangible results? Would you favor adding specific benchmarks for the dialogue, and what other ways could it be made more effective?
Answer:
The Human Rights Dialogue has evolved into a series of frank discussions on all issues of concern in the human rights field. The Dialogue serves as a useful complement to our direct approaches to the Vietnamese through our Embassy in Vietnam and here at the State Department.
The Human Rights Dialogue is an important item in our policy of engagement with Vietnam, a policy which we believe has garnered some results. On the whole, Vietnam is a more open society now than it was ten years ago. A number of political prisoners have been released from jail. In principle, individual Vietnamese members of legally authorized religious organizations may worship freely, and the number of legally authorized religious organizations is slowly growing, but does not include groups such as the Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam or the many Protestant house churches. Tolerance of freedom of expression is growing. Some criticism of the government is accepted. Workers rights have expanded although workers are denied the right of association and the right to organize and bargain collectively. So much still needs to be done, and therefore improvement of human rights will remain a vital part of our engagement with Vietnam.
We believe that our present approach to the Dialogue is the correct one. Vietnamese progress on human rights cases is best elicited through cooperation rather than confrontation. For this reason, we do not believe that explicit benchmarks are an appropriate measure for this forum, but, we will judge the dialogue on its results.
QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO ASSISTANT SECRETARY JAMES A. KELLY BY THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY
When was your last consular visit to Li Shaomin? Were you able to visit him without Chinese officials present? Were there visible signs that he had been coerced into confession?
Answer:
An Embassy Beijing consular officer visited Li Shaomin on June 3. It was our fourth visit with him since his detention on February 25. Dr. Li appeared to be in generally good health.
As in previous visits, this one occurred with Chinese officials present. Chinese practice does not allow foreign consular officials to speak with individuals in custody without the presence of officials. This arrangement did not hinder our consular officer communicating to Dr. Li the contents of personal letters to him written by his wife, daughter, and father. In one of our previous visits to Dr. Li, he signed a Privacy Act waiver, which allows the State Department to share specific information about his case with the public.
Our consular officer did not see signs of coercion during the June 3 meeting.
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